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Biometrics have been used for secure identification and authentication for more than
two decades since biometric data is unique, non-transferable, unforgettable, and always
with us. Recently, biometrics has pervaded other aspects of security applications that
can be listed under the topic of “Biometric Cryptosystems”. Although the security
of some of these systems is questionable when they are utilized alone, integration
with other technologies such as digital signatures or Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
schemes results in cryptographically secure applications of biometrics. It is exactly
this field of biometric cryptosystems that we focused in this thesis. In particular, our
goal is to design cryptographic protocols for biometrics in the framework of a realistic
security model with a security reduction. Our protocols are designed for biometric
based encryption, signature and remote authentication.
We first analyze the recently introduced biometric remote authentication schemes de-
signed according to the security model of Bringer et al.. In this model, we show that
one can improve the database storage cost significantly by designing a new architecture,
which is a two-factor authentication protocol. This construction is also secure against
the new attacks we present, which disprove the claimed security of remote authentica-
tion schemes, in particular the ones requiring a secure sketch. Thus, we introduce a new
notion called “Weak-identity Privacy” and propose a new construction by combining
cancelable biometrics and distributed remote authentication in order to obtain a highly
secure biometric authentication system. We continue our research on biometric remote
authentication by analyzing the security issues of multi-factor biometric authentication
(MFBA). We formally describe the security model for MFBA that captures simultane-
ous attacks against these systems and define the notion of user privacy, where the goal
of the adversary is to impersonate a client to the server. We design a new protocol
by combining bipartite biotokens, homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs
and provide a security reduction to achieve user privacy. The main difference of this
MFBA protocol is that the server-side computations are performed in the encrypted
domain but without requiring a decryption key for the authentication decision of the
server. Thus, leakage of the secret key of any system component does not affect the
security of the scheme as opposed to the current biometric systems involving crypto-
iii
graphic techniques. We also show that there is a tradeoff between the security level the
scheme achieves and the requirement for making the authentication decision without
using any secret key.
In the second part of the thesis, we delve into biometric-based signature and encryption
schemes. We start by designing a new biometric IBS system that is based on the
currently most efficient pairing based signature scheme in the literature. We prove the
security of our new scheme in the framework of a stronger model compared to existing
adversarial models for fuzzy IBS, which basically simulates the leakage of partial secret
key components of the challenge identity. In accordance with the novel features of this
scheme, we describe a new biometric IBE system called as BIO-IBE. BIO-IBE differs
from the current fuzzy systems with its key generation method that not only allows for
a larger set of encryption systems to function for biometric identities, but also provides
a better accuracy/identification of the users in the system. In this context, BIO-IBE
is the first scheme that allows for the use of multi-modal biometrics to avoid collision
attacks. Finally, BIO-IBE outperforms the current schemes and for small-universe of
attributes, it is secure in the standard model with a better efficiency compared to its
counterpart.
Another contribution of this thesis is the design of biometric IBE systems without
using pairings. In fact, current fuzzy IBE schemes are secure under (stronger) bilin-
ear assumptions and the decryption of each message requires pairing computations
almost equal to the number of attributes defining the user. Thus, fuzzy IBE makes
error-tolerant encryption possible at the expense of efficiency and security. Hence,
we design a completely new construction for biometric IBE based on error-correcting
codes, generic conversion schemes and weakly secure anonymous IBE schemes that en-
crypt a message bit by bit. The resulting scheme is anonymous, highly secure and more
efficient compared to pairing-based biometric IBE, especially for the decryption phase.
The security of our generic construction is reduced to the security of the anonymous
IBE scheme, which is based on the Quadratic Residuosity assumption. The binding of
biometric features to the user’s identity is achieved similar to BIO-IBE, thus, preserving
the advantages of its key generation procedure.
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a¯ bit complement of the string a
a||b concatenation of the strings a and b
{0, 1}n set of n-bit strings
{0, 1}∗ set of all finite binary strings
Sets
∅ empty set
|A| cardinality of the set A
a ∈ A a is an element of the set A
a /∈ A a is not an element of the set A
a ∈ [1, n] a ∈ {1, ..., n}
A ⊂ B set A is contained in set B
A ⊆ B set A is contained in or equal to set B
A ∪ B union of sets A and B
A ∩ B intersection of sets A and B
A \B difference of sets A and B
A×B Cartesian product of sets A and B
N set of natural numbers
Z set of integers
Q set of rational numbers
R set of real numbers
ZN set of integers modulo N (denoted also the set Z/NZ)
Z∗N group of units in ZN
Z∗N [+1] the set of elements in Z
∗
N with Jacobi symbol +1
QR(N) the set of quadratic residues (or squares) in Z∗N
Fq finite field of cardinality q
F∗q multiplicative group of Fq
vi
Groups
(G,+) group G is denoted additively
(G, ·) group G is denoted multiplicatively
0G identity in (G,+)
1G identity in (G, ·)
< g > group generated by the element g
Integers
x← y (for variables x and y) assigning the value of y to x
a << b a is strictly of smaller order than b
a >> b a is strictly of larger order than b
gcd(a, b) greatest common divisor of integers a and b
a = b mod n a is congruent to b modulo n
ϕ(N) Euler’s totient function.
( a
n
) Jacobi symbol of integer a and any positive odd integer n
Functions
f : A→ B f is function from set A to set B
a 7→ b a is mapped to b (by some function)
negl negligible function
Events, probabilities, and statistics
¬ E complement of event E
E1 ∧ E2 intersection of event E1 and event E2
E1 ∨ E2 union of event E1 and event E2
Pr[E] probability of event E
Pr[E1|E2] probability of event E1 given event E2
a← D (for a distribution D) a is sampled from distribution D
a
R← S (for a finite set S) a is selected uniformly at random from set S
vii
Acronyms
ABE attribute based encryption
ABS attribute based signature
ANO anonymity
BDH bilinear Diffie-Hellman
BDHI bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion
CCA chosen ciphertext attack
CDH computational Diffie-Hellman
CMA chosen message attack
CPA chosen plaintext attack
DDH decisional Diffie-Hellman
DEM data encapsulation mechanism
DHI Diffie-Hellman inversion
DBRA distributed biometric remote authentication
ECC error correcting codes
EUF existential unforgeability
FAR false acceptance rate
FDH full domain hash
FRR false reject rate
GDH gap Diffie-Hellman
HVZK honest verifier zero-knowledge
IBE identity based encryption
IBS identity based signature
IND indistinguishability
KEM key encapsulation mechanism
MFBA multi factor biometric authentication
MOC match-on-card
NIZK non-interactive zero knowledge
NM non-malleability
OW one-wayness
PCA plaintext checking attack
PIR private information retrieval
PKE public key encryption
PPTM probabilistic polynomial Turing machine
SS secure sketch
ROM random oracle model
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To prove our identity, we can use three ways:
• Something we have (e.g. a smartcard)
• Something we know (e.g. a PIN code, a password)
• Something we are (biometrics, e.g. fingerprint, face, iris)
In everyday life, we usually give our trust to a combination of something-we-have
and something-we-know (e.g. banking cards, SIM card in mobile phones) but a pass-
word can be communicated or guessed and a personal device can be lost or borrowed.
Building a three-factor authentication with the addition of one or several biometric
techniques brings high confidence in our authenticated interlocutor. The advantage
of using biometrics in a single or multi-factor authentication setting is that biometric
data is always handy, we cannot forget or loose it, we do not need to remember or
keep it secret for secure authentication (as in the case of a long password). Biometrics
uniquely defines a user and is direct evidence of personal participation in authenti-
cation, especially when two different biometric traits are combined as it is called as
multi-modal biometrics or biometric fusion. Currently, many countries collect at least
two different biometric traits (fingerprint and face) from each traveller in border con-
trol applications, for instance the US-visit program. Finally, under supervision or in
controlled environments, it is very difficult to forge biometrics and impersonate a user,
although it is much easier to forge documents.
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Standing Document defines biometrics as: “Automated recog-
nition of individuals based on their behavioral and biological characteristics”. A be-
havioral aspect of a biometric measures data pertaining to a personal trait, learned
over time, or to a learned action. Biometrics with stronger behavioral aspects (e.g.,
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keystroke, sign/signature, voice) utilize acoustics, pressure, and speed whereas those
with stronger biological aspects (e.g., fingerprint, iris, hand geometry, vein) measure
characteristics residing on or near the surface of the human body [Tilton, 2007]. The
classification of biometric modalities are given as below.
Figure 1.1: Biometric Modalities
A traditional biometric system has four important modules:
1. The sensor module which captures the trait in the form of raw biometric data
2. The feature extraction module which processes the data to extract a feature set
that is a compact representation of the trait. This set may consist of biometric
features that can be either ordered/grouped or not, depending on the biometric
trait.
3. The matching module which employs a classifier to compare the extracted feature
set with the templates residing in the database to generate matching scores.
The comparison is accomplished using a distance function that can be Hamming
distance, set difference, edit distance or Euclidean distance as described in the
following section for metric spaces.
4. The decision module which uses the matching scores to either determine an iden-
tity or validate a claimed identity.
The accuracy of a biometric system is measured by the following performance criteria:
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• False accept rate or false match rate (FAR or FMR): the probability that the
system incorrectly matches the input pattern to a non-matching template in
the database. It measures the percent of invalid inputs which are incorrectly
accepted.
• False reject rate or false non-match rate (FRR or FNMR): the probability that
the system fails to detect a match between the input pattern and a matching
template in the database. It measures the percent of valid inputs which are
incorrectly rejected.
Traditionally, biometric technology is used for identification or authentication pur-
poses. In the identification mode, the biometric system identifies a person from the
entire enrolled users in the system by searching a database for a match. This is some-
times called “one-to-many” matching. A system can also be used in authentication
(i.e. verification) mode, where the biometric system authenticates a person’s claimed
identity from their previously enrolled pattern. This is also called “one-to-one” match-
ing. When the matching is performed at the remote server, then the system is called
as a remote biometric authentication. Alternatively, biometrics can be used for local
authentication - for example, to control access to a private key on a smart card.
Biometric-based authentication applications include workstation and network access,
single sign-on, application logon, data protection, remote access to resources, transac-
tion security, and Web security. The promises of e-commerce and e-government can be
achieved through the utilization of strong personal authentication procedures. Secure
electronic banking, investing and other financial transactions, retail sales, law enforce-
ment, and health and social services are already benefiting from these technologies.
Biometric technologies are expected to play a key role in personal authentication for
large-scale enterprise network authentication environments, Point-of-Sale and for the
protection of all types of digital content such as in Digital Rights Management and
Health Care applications [Podio and Dunn, 2001].
1.1 Motivations
Recently, biometrics has pervaded other aspects of security applications that are listed
under the topic of biometric cryptosystems: Biometric encryption, biometric key gen-
eration/key locking/key release systems output a secret key such as a 128-bit AES
key that can be used for encryption or authentication purposes. Although the secu-
rity of some of these systems is questionable when they are utilized alone, integration
with other technologies such as digital signatures or Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
schemes results in cryptographicly secure applications of biometrics. It is exactly this
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field of biometric cryptosystems that we focused in this thesis. In particular, our goal
is to design cryptographic protocols for biometrics in the framework of a realistic and
strong security model and provide a security reduction to a hard problem. The ma-
jority of the biometric cryptosystems in the literature lacks a security analysis from a
cryptographic point of view, which have led us to work in this field. In fact, the first
biometric authentication system that assumes biometrics as public data and that is
evaluated in a reductionist sense of security is described by Bringer et al. in 2007.
Despite the fact that biometric technologies are implemented for a long period of time,
the security concerns about the storage of the biometric templates (i.e. biometric
features of each user enrolled in the authentication system) and solutions for tem-
plate protection have emerged recently. Also, there is skeptical view about the secrecy
of biometrics, which invalidates the assumptions that many biometric cryptosystems
rely on. In fact, if we assume biometrics as public data as in distributed biometric
authentication and biometric-based IBE/IBS systems, the security provided by the
majority of biometric cryptosystems for biometric key generation/template protection
is questionable. Thus, we base our designs for biometric-based IBE/IBS and for remote
authentication on valid assumptions such as public biometric data, whose distribution
is known to the adversary.
The first biometric-based encryption system with a security reduction is introduced
in Eurocrypt 2005 by Sahai and Waters. The authors define their system as “Fuzzy
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE): Privacy for the Unprepared”. As the name suggests,
fuzzy IBE does not require either the sender or the receiver to possess/store an RSA
public key and the related online certification authority that binds this RSA key to its
owner. Certification in fuzzy IBE is natural since the biometric data used as the public
key is bound to the user. The system is even less complicated than a standard IBE sys-
tem, which requires a unique e-mail address as the identity that should be proven to be
different for the people sharing the same name. Thus, an unprepared user can present
his biometrics as his encryption key to someone when they are physically present or
when a user is traveling and another party encrypts an ad-hoc meeting between them.
A biometric identity is an inherent trait and will always with the person, namely, the
person will always have their public key handy. Besides, the process of obtaining a se-
cret key from an offline authority is very natural and straightforward. In standard IBE
schemes, a user with a an identity such as an e-mail address “proves” to the trusted au-
thority that he is indeed entitled to this identity. This will typically involve presenting
supplementary documents or credentials. The type of authentication that is necessary
is not always clear and robustness of this process is questionable (the supplementary
documents themselves could be subject to forgery). However, in fuzzy/biometric IBE,
the user only presents his biometrics to the trusted authority under the supervision of
a well trained operator. The operator is able to detect imitation attacks, for example
playing the recording of a voice. We emphasize that the biometric measurement for
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an individual need not be kept secret since it is used as a public key. This assumption
is also accepted by the biometrics community who consider the biometrics as public
data, whereas the biometric template that is stored in a database for authentication
purposes should be kept private.
Finally, using biometric as the identity has the advantage that identities are unique if
the underlying biometric is of a good quality. Some types of standard identities, such
as the name “Bob Smith” will clearly not be unique or change owners over time.
In parallel to the introduction of fuzzy IBE, the first biometric-based signature was
already implemented based on a standard IBS scheme and a special primitive called
fuzzy extractor. Since then, other schemes for biometric-based encryption and signa-
ture have been designed to improve the efficiency of the previous schemes. Despite
these improvements, new constructions are necessary in order to significantly reduce
the computational cost resulting from the high number of pairing operations at each
decryption.
The second line of work that assumes biometrics as public data and includes a security
reduction focuses on remote biometric authentication. In 2007, distributed biometric
remote authentication was introduced by Bringer et al. with a new security model that
evaluates security against insider adversaries from a cryptographic point of view. In
this system, the server-side functionalities are performed in encrypted domain and in
a distributed fashion using a detached biometric database and non-colluding system
components. This leads to a new security notion called identity privacy that guaran-
tees the privacy of the link between the identity (name) and the (reference) biometrics
of the user although biometrics is assumed as public data. Moreover, the database is
prevented from tracking the user that authenticates to the system, thus transaction
anonymity against a (malicious) database is satisfied which is the second notion for bio-
metric remote authentication. In this security model, the authors describe a concrete
protocol that achieves these two notions by reducing the security to breaking the un-
derlying homomorphic encryption scheme. With this property, this system is the first
(pure) biometric authentication protocol with a security reduction in the framework
of a strong and realistic security model. Other papers followed the work of Bringer et
al. to improve the security, accuracy and efficiency of this protocol. Recently, attacks
have been proposed to the first system in this model, which lead us to question the
security of the following schemes and the correctness of the security notions.
We note that the research on fuzzy IBE and distributed remote authentication does
not include implementation of the protocols since this requires additional sources of
information on biometric traits, biometric sampling, image processing, feature extrac-
tion, feature selection, etc. Thus, as in the case of fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault,
the implementation of these biometric cryptosystems for a particular biometric trait is
of interest to the biometrics community.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents the ensemble of my PhD results [Sarier, 2008, 2009a,b, 2010a,b,c,d,
2011a,b] obtained in the area of biometric cryptosystems. The thesis can be split into
two parts. The first part with chapters 3 and 4 is concentrated on biometric remote
authentication, whereas the second part consists of the biometric-based IBE/IBS con-
structions that are described in chapters 5 through 7.
Chapter 3 starts with the analysis of the distributed biometric remote authentication
(DBRA) by presenting the recently introduced security model and the current schemes
for this particular type of authentication. Next, we present our contributions by de-
scribing a new and efficient biometric storage mechanism, where the biometric features
of the users in the system are stored as a random pool of features instead of storing
each complete reference template. This way, common features belonging to different
users in the system are not stored multiple times, which results in a reduced storage
cost. Secondly, we prove that identity privacy cannot be achieved for DBRA, if biomet-
rics is assumed as public data and a publicly stored sketch is employed for improved
accuracy. Besides, a statistical attack is shown that is effective even if the sketch is
stored as encrypted. For DBRA with encrypted sketches, we define a weaker notion of
security called “Weak Identity Privacy” in order to eliminate such statistical attacks.
The remaining schemes are vulnerable to our attacks if they are not implemented as a
two-factor solution, where a tamper-proof smartcard is required as the second factor to
store some parameters of the scheme secretly. In view of this result, we describe a new
two-factor biometric remote authentication system by combining distributed biometric
authentication and cancelable biometrics, which is also applicable for biometrics repre-
sented as a set of features. Next, we define “identity privacy for cancelable biometrics”
as a new notion and show that existing schemes vulnerable to our attacks are secure
in the cancelable biometric setting. The security of our protocols are reduced to the
security of well-defined problems such as Gap Diffie-Hellman or security of ElGamal
Encryption scheme.
This chapter is based on our work presented in [Sarier, 2009a,b, 2010b, 2011a].
In chapter 4, we evaluate the security properties of Multi-Factor Biometric Authen-
tication (MFBA), where biometrics is assumed as a set of features that can be ei-
ther ordered or unordered depending on the biometric modality. We propose efficient
schemes for MFBA that are suitable for a different template extraction method used
in bipartite biotokens that separates the stable and non-stable parts of each feature,
thus, a cryptographic protocol can be applied to encrypt the stable parts and the
matching score is computed in the encryption domain at the remote server, whereas
another matching can be performed at the client-side by checking whether each non-
stable part is within its predefined range. We formally describe the security model for
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MFBA, where the server-side computations are performed in the encrypted domain
but without requiring a decryption key for the authentication decision of the server.
Thus, leakage of the secret key of any system component does not affect the security of
the scheme as opposed to the current biometric systems involving cryptographic tech-
niques. Finally, we reduce the security of our design to the unforgeability of the Schnorr
Signature Scheme according to our new security model that captures simultaneous at-
tacks against a MFBA. In this context, we define the notion of user privacy, where the
goal of the adversary is to impersonate a client to the server. The adversary has access
to different oracles that model the adversaries capabilities such as eavesdropping on
the communication channel -even in the case of a compromised session key that is used
to build a secure communication link before the start of the protocol execution-, and
compromise of either the sensor (namely biometrics of the user) or the smart card of
the user that stores the secret parameters for the stable/non-stable part separation.
Our system is based on the signed ElGamal encryption scheme, which is IND-CCA
secure and plaintext aware in Random Oracle Model (ROM). Due to the combination
of a (weakly secure) encryption scheme and non-malleable proof of knowledge of the
randomness used, the adversary proves his knowledge of the (stable) biometric features,
thus a decryption oracle would be useless and security against Chosen Ciphertext At-
tacks (CCA) is provided. Hence, our design is the first biometric system based on a
CCA secure encryption system. Furthermote, when implemented on a pairing friendly
elliptic curve, the server can make the authentication decision without any decryption
operation through the use of bilinear pairings. In particular, elliptic curve signed El-
Gamal achieves at most OW-CCA security in ROM if bilinear pairings are used to test
for equality of biometric data in the encrypted domain. We also show that there is
a tradeoff between the security the scheme achieves (OW-CCA instead of IND-CCA)
and the requirement for making the authentication decision without using any secret
key. Clearly, if the final decision is made by decrypting the resulting computation as in
current biometric authentication systems, our construction achieves highest (i.e. IND-
CCA) security level. For unordered biometrics such as fingerprint minutia, we employ
RSA encryption combined with a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of plaintext for
RSA. The results described in this chapter were published in [Sarier, 2010a].
In chapter 5, we present a new biometric Identity Based Signature (IBS) scheme that
is more efficient compared to the current fuzzy IBS and threshold Attribute Based
Signature (t-ABS) schemes in all aspects, since it is based on the currently most efficient
pairing-based IBS scheme. Moreover, our scheme could function as a fuzzy IBS or t-
ABS scheme if the biometric features are replaced by attributes defining the identity
of the signer.
We prove the security of our new scheme first in the framework of the security model
of fuzzy IBS. Next, we define a stronger security model, which basically simulates the
leakage of partial secret key components of the challenge identity. This property is not
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considered in the model of fuzzy IBS (and t-ABS), which return to the adversary only
the private key components belonging to any identity other than (i.e. not similar to)
the challenge identity. However, in our security reduction, we allow the adversary to
query for some of the private key components belonging to the challenge identity. The
contributions of this chapter are based on the paper [Sarier, 2010c].
In chapter 6, we present two efficient biometric IBE schemes based on pairings. The
schemes are based on the Sakai Kasahara IBE, which includes the most efficient key
generation method among pairing-based IBE schemes. As a starting point, we present
a new construction for identities represented as an ordered set of features/attributes
and provide a security reduction following the security model described for fuzzy IBE
systems. Next, we introduce BIO-IBE, which has a different structure compared to
current fuzzy IBE systems. The security reduction is presented for large universe of
biometric attributes in ROM and for small universe, in the standard model. We will
show that for the large universe of attributes, BIO-IBE is more efficient compared to
the fuzzy IBE schemes and for the small universe, it is more efficient than the small
universe construction of [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. Moreover, we describe a stronger
security model and prove the security of BIO-IBE based on this stronger model that
basically simulates the leakage of partial secret key components of the challenge identity
similar to the model for our biometric IBS. As different from the fuzzy IBE scheme of
[Sahai and Waters, 2005], the ciphertexts can contain a variable number of attributes
but the error tolerance parameter is a fixed threshold value as in current systems.
Our new scheme BIO-IBE is the first biometric IBE scheme that allows for the use
of multi-modal biometrics for defining the identity of the user. In particular, the key
generation algorithm of BIO-IBE fuzzy-extracts a unique biometric identity string ID
from the biometrics of the user instead of picking a different polynomial for each user
as in other fuzzy IBE schemes. For instance, the private key components of each user is
computed by using a biometric trait such as fingerprint, face, palmprint, etc. combined
with the unique biometric identity string fuzzy-extracted from the same or a different
biometric trait such as the Iris scan of the user. This combination is used to bind the
private key components to that user and to avoid collision attacks, thus different users
sharing common biometric attributes with the receiver of the ciphertext cannot decrypt
this ciphertext by combining their secret key components associated to these common
attributes. From the efficiency point of view, the fuzzy extraction is performed only
by the sender, is independent of the message, and hence can be done once and for
all. In current fuzzy IBE schemes, collision attacks are prevented by picking a unique
polynomial for each user that is evaluated at each biometric feature of the user and
that is combined with the master secret key to generate the private key components.
In BIO-IBE, the final computed private key components of each user can be thought
as a biometric fusion at the feature level. This new combination does not only prevent
collision attacks, but also has the advantage of better accuracy/identification compared
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to the use of uni-modal biometrics as in current fuzzy IBE. Impersonation/spoofing
attacks are prevented as forging two different biometric traits is more difficult compared
to the use of one modality. Multimodal biometric systems are shown to be more reliable,
which also relax the requirement for a well trained supervisor since a challenge response
type of mechanism by requesting the user to present a random subset of biometric traits
thereby ensuring that a “live” user is indeed present at the point of data acquisition.
Secondly, the new design eliminates the requirement of a special hash function called
MapToPoint hash function that maps a user’s identity to a point on the underlying
elliptic curve in IBE schemes. Currently, efficient fuzzy IBE schemes [Pirretti et al.,
2006, Baek et al., 2007, van Liesdonk, 2007] employ this special function, which is
usually implemented as a probabilistic algorithm and is more expensive than a point
scalar multiplication in terms of computation time. Besides, it is difficult to find groups
as the range of the MapToPoint hash function and to define an efficient isomorphism
at the same time. Apart from the efficiency gain resulting from the replacement of the
MapToPoint hash function with an ordinary one, BIO-IBE has a structurally simpler
key generation algorithm and provides better efficiency in terms of the key generation
and decryption algorithms compared to the existing fuzzy IBE schemes despite the
additional fuzzy extraction process.
Next, we improve the reduction cost of BIO-IBE by reducing its security to the deci-
sional k-BDHI problem instead of computational k-BDHI problem. We see a tradeoff
between the tightness of the reduction cost and the hardness of the underlying prob-
lem. By a small modification, BIO-IBE becomes resistant against an Denial of Service
(DoS) attack resulting from the use of the fuzzy extraction process. We should note
that the use of multi-biometric based encryption using a fuzzy extractor is claimed to
be introduced in 2011 by [Zhang et al., 2011], although the first use of this approach
is presented for BIO-IBE in 2008. Finally, our new method for preventing collision
attacks can be applied in other IBE systems that are not based on pairing based cryp-
tography, as we will see in chapter 7. The contributions of this chapter are based on
the papers [Sarier, 2008] and [Sarier, 2011b].
In chapter 7, we present a novel framework for the generic construction of biomet-
ric Identity Based Encryption (IBE) schemes, which do not require bilinear pairings
and result in more efficient schemes than existing fuzzy IBE systems implemented for
biometric identities. Currently, fuzzy IBE schemes are based on stronger (bilinear)
assumptions and guarantee a weak level of security, but they could be combined with
well-known generic conversion systems to obtain a high level of security. Besides, bio-
metrics is considered as public information, thus, biometrics w′ of the receiver is sent
together with the corresponding ciphertext so that the receiver with biometrics w can
determine the common features between w and w′ in order to apply the correct se-
cret key components. Clearly, this could effect the privacy of the user’s actions if we
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consider anonymity notion for IBE systems. Thus, we analyze the security properties
that are specific to biometric IBE, i.e. anonymity, and introduce a new notion for bio-
metric IBE called as identity privacy. We note that current fuzzy IBE and biometric
IBE systems do not consider anonymity and privacy of user biometrics at the same
time, hence, it is vital to describe an efficient and anonymous error-tolerant encryption
system for biometric identities in order to avoid traceability of the user’s actions. Con-
sidering these notions, we present generic constructions for biometric IBE and ID-KEM
based on weakly secure anonymous IBE schemes, error correcting codes and generic
conversion schemes in order to obtain highly secure anonymous biometric IBE schemes.
Our generic constructions for biometric IBE and ID-KEMs convert any weakly secure
anonymous IBE scheme encrypting a message bit by bit to a highly secure biometric
IBE scheme. Finally, we describe concrete applications of our framework and compare
them to the existing fuzzy IBE systems in terms of time complexity and bandwidth.
We design our new constructions for any type of biometrics that can be represented
as an ordered set of features (i.e. a sequence of n feature points) such as face, online
handwritten signatures, iris, voice etc. However, if anonymity property is not required,
then our system is applicable for any type of biometrics since we can allow for the
attachment of the biometrics to the ciphertext as in fuzzy IBE schemes. To avoid col-
lusion attacks and to guarantee the security notions that we present, the anonymous
IBE schemes are implemented for biometric identities using our new method that com-
bines each feature with a unique biometric string obtained via a fuzzy extractor as
described in chapter 6. Thus, we achieve more efficient and anonymous biometric IBE
schemes based on weaker assumptions (such as Quadratic Residuosity) with higher
security/accuracy due to the multi-modal identities. The contributions of this chapter




The definitions of the primitives and methods used in the following chapters are
given in two parts. The first part of the chapter summarizes the necessary defini-
tions of biometric concepts and describes biometric template protection methods in-
cluding key locking/hiding/extraction, multi-modal biometrics and different applica-
tions/representations of biometrics. The second part summarizes the definitions and
properties of the cryptographic primitives and reviews different Identity Based En-
cryption (IBE) schemes that form the basis for the recently introduced fuzzy IBE/IBS
systems.
Part I : Background in Biometrics
2.1 Biometric Modalities
As shown in figure 1.1, various biometric traits can be used for various applications.
However, each of these biometrics has its strengths and weaknesses and therefore the
choice of the biometric depends on the application. Apart from the classification of
biometric modalities in figure 1.1, biometrics can be categorized based on its represen-
tation. A large class of biometric traits can be represented as a set of ordered/grouped
features, namely a sequence of n ordered feature points [Ballard et al., 2008, Teoh
et al., 2008], such as Iris [Kanade et al., 2009, Bringer et al., 2007b], fingercode [Jain
et al., 2000, Tong et al., 2007], face [Li et al., 2006, Ekenel and Stiefelhagen, 2009,
Gao et al., 2009, Boehnen et al., 2009, Moreno et al., 2005], online signatures [Igarza
et al., 2004]. For instance, the face recognition system of [Moreno et al., 2005] extracts
each feature from particular regions of face such as mouth, nose,eyes, etc., where a
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feature is zero valued if it cannot be computed because of the non-existence of a region
from which it is derived. Besides, the fuzzy commitment construction of [Juels and
Wattenberg, 1999] is based on ordered biometric feature vectors as we discuss in the
following section. However, there exists also biometric representations, which cannot
be ordered as in the case of fingerprint minutia. In this section, the properties of the
most commonly used biometrics are outlined. Subsequently, the representation of these
biometric characteristics and which features of these characteristics can be extracted,
is explained.
2.1.1 Fingerprint
Fingerprints are the oldest traits that are mostly represented as friction minutiae-
based features while systems are rarely designed to use an entire image of a fingerprint.
Thus, a fingerprint of a user consists of a set of unordered features called as fingerprint
minutia. Each minutia is assumed to be represented by its 2D spatial location and its
local orientation. Discontinuities in the flow of ridges (ridge bifurcations and endings)
constitute the minutiae. The following figure shows a sample fingerprint image with
overlaid minutiae.
Figure 2.1: Fingerprint Minutia
The main difficulty within fingerprint biometrics is in finding specific fingerprint orien-
tation and its center. Otherwise, all calculations resulting out of minutiae are destined
to be orientation/position-dependent. Thus, the matching algorithm has to deal with
transformations of fingerprint data by aligning fingerprint images using high curvature
points and orientation lines.
In the systems we consider, fingerprints are represented by the cartesian coordinates
of the fingerprint minutia features, where the couples of coordinates are concatenated
to single numbers that are mapped to the elements of a finite field by some convention
[Nandakumar et al., 2007a, Mihailescu, 2007].
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2.1.2 Face
In a face recognition system, images of the whole face of a person are captured out
of which unique key features are extracted to identify persons reliably. The acquired
set of key features include relative distances between characteristics such as eyes, the
nose, the mouth, cheekbones and the jaw. Using all of this information, a unique
template is created by applying dimension reduction. In [Moreno et al., 2005], the
ordered set of face features are obtained through the segmentation of regions and lines
of interest, feature extraction from the segmented regions and lines, and classification
of the feature vectors that model the faces. In figure 2.2, the segmentation of regions
and lines of interest of a face model is shown.
Figure 2.2: Segmented regions and lines of a face from which facial features are ex-
tracted [Moreno et al., 2005]
In figure 2.3, 30 more discriminating features and their position in an ordered list
according to their discriminating power are shown. As a result, the feature set of a
user is represented by 30-37 ordered features. The used acronyms are: Ri = region
i; Li = line i; A_Ri = area of region i; C_Ri = centroid of region i; d(P1, P2) =
Euclidean distance between 3D points P1 and P2; ang(P1, P2, P3) = angle defined
by the 3D points P1, P2 and P3, being P2 the intermediate vertex; H_Ri and K_Ri
are the respective averages of the Mean and Gaussian curvatures, evaluated in points
belonging to the region i; VH_Ri and VK_Ri are the respective variances of the Mean
and Gaussian curvatures evaluated in points belonging to the region i.
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Figure 2.3: Face biometrics represented as grouped/ordered feature vector [Moreno
et al., 2005]
2.1.3 Iris
Breakthrough work to create iris recognition algorithms required for image acquisition
and matching were developed by J. G. Daugman [Daugman, 2004]. Daugman’s algo-
rithms are the basis of all today’s commercially used iris recognition systems. In his
system, first the iris has to be extracted out of the whole image of the person’s eye.
Therefore the center of the iris and the inner and outer boundaries have to be detected.
In the next step, so-called analysis bands are defined for the extracted iris (in form of
a ring). These bands are used to position points which are then explored using 2D
Gabor filters to denoise the acquired signal. Then iris ring is unwrapped by mapping
polar coordinates to cartesian-coordinates which results in a rectangular image. In this
image, the radii of the previously defined analysis bands is fixed and every explored
point is a center of a 2D Gabor wavelet. For this wavelet the coefficients are gener-
ated out of which two bits are extracted. This method is applied again until enough
bits are extracted. The rectangular image of the iris mostly includes some part of the
eyelid and eyelashes. Eyelashes are seen as noise which have to be detected during the
unwrapping of the iris. This is done by calculating a bit-mask where one bit represents
a region of the iris and is set to 0 if any noise is detected and otherwise to 1. The
result of the whole procedure is a so-called “iris-code” (for example 2048-bit long in J.
G. Daugman’s approach). This iris code serves as a biometric template which can be
stored in a database together with the bit-mask. After the extraction of the iris-code
the matching process can be performed using several metrices, for example, the Ham-
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ming distance. This could be easily done by just bitwise XORing two iris-codes and
comparing the number of mismatching bits to a specific threshold [Rathgeb, 2008].
2.1.4 Multi-Modal Biometrics
In order to address some of the limitations of unimodal systems such as noisy data,
intra-class variations, restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof attacks,
and unacceptable error rates, multimodal biometric systems are deployed [Ross and
Jain, 2004].
Firstly, multiple traits ensure sufficient population coverage and deter spoofing since it
would be difficult for an impostor to spoof multiple biometric traits of a genuine user
simultaneously. Besides, they ensure that liveliness assumption holds by facilitating
a challenge-response type of mechanism that requires the user to present a random
subset of biometric traits during each authentication. Multi-modal biometric systems
can be classified in three levels. (a) Fusion at the data or feature level: Either the data
itself or the feature sets originating from multiple sensors/sources are fused. (b)Fusion
at the match score level: The scores generated by multiple classifiers pertaining to
different modalities are combined. (c) Fusion at the decision level: The final output of
multiple classifiers are consolidated via techniques such as majority voting [Ross and
Jain, 2004].
In figure 2.4 and 2.5, we present example applications of multi-modal biometric systems.
The abbreviations denotes FU: Fusion Module, MM: Matching Module, DM: Decision
Module.
In our theses, we focus on the fusion at the feature level and employ the multi-modal
biometric scenario for multiple biometric traits denoted with number 2) of figure 2.5.
2.2 Biometric Cryptosystems
Combination of biometrics and cryptography is achieved under different names: Un-
traceable Biometrics, Biometric Encryption (BE), Fuzzy Extractor, Secure sketch,
Helper Data Systems, Biometric Locking, Biometric Key Generation, etc. Despite the
different names, the goal of these systems is the same: Biometric Template Protection.
In figure 2.6, we see an overview of these systems.
One approach focuses on the BE technologies that securely bind a digital key to a bio-
metric, or extract a key from the biometric so that neither the key nor the biometric
can be retrieved from the stored BE template, also called “helper data” [Li and Jain,
2009]; The key is re-created only if a correct biometric sample is presented on verifica-
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Figure 2.4: Levels of fusion in a bimodal biometric system [Ross and Jain, 2004]
tion; and the output of BE verification is either a key (correct or incorrect) or a failure
message. There is always a biometric dependent helper data stored in the system, but
the cryptographic key is not kept at all. In practice, BE, like any biometric system,
has both false rejection and false acceptance rates (FRR and FAR). We note that BE
does not use any matching score; instead, the FRR/FAR tradeoff may be achieved in
some cases by varying the parameters of the BE scheme.
A different line of research is Cancelable Biometrics (CB), which is closer to a conven-
tional biometric system. CB technologies apply a secret transform to the biometric.
The transform can be invertible or not, and both the transformed template and the
secret transform are stored. On verification, the same transform is applied to a fresh
biometric sample, and two transformed templates are matched, where the output of
CB verification is a Yes/No response.
Recently, biometrics is combined with traditional encryption schemes such as ElGamal-
type encryption schemes to obtain secure authentication/fuzzy IBE systems that as-
sume biometrics as public data. These systems provide provable security guarantees
since they are designed according to a formal security model with a security reduction
to a hard problem.
Before we describe various biometric cryptosystems, we review the definitions of the
primitives required in these systems.
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Figure 2.5: Scenarios in a multimodal biometric system [Ross and Jain, 2004]
2.2.1 Metric Spaces
Every biometric trait is assumed to have a metric space. A metric space is a set M
with a distance function dis: M×M → R+. M will always be a finite set, and the
distance function will only take on integer values with dis (x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y,
and will obey symmetry dis (x, y) = dis (y, x) and the triangle inequality
dis (x, z) ≤ dis(x, y) + dis(y, z). The similarity measures used in different biometric
traits are given in [Dodis et al., 2004] as follows.
• Hamming distance denotes the number of symbol positions that differ between
two biometrics w and w′. Here, M = Fn for some alphabet F , and dis(w,w′) is
the number of positions in which the strings w and w′ differ. Hamming distance
is a suitable similarity measure for Iris.
• Set difference denotes the size of the symmetric difference of two input biometric
sets and is appropriate whenever the noisy input is represented as a subset of
features from a universe of possible features. Here M consists of all subsets of
a universe U . For two sets (w,w′) their symmetric difference is w△w′ = {x ∈
w ∪ w′|x /∈ w ∩ w′}. The distance between two sets (w,w′) is |w△w′|. We will
sometimes restrictM to contain only k-element subsets for some k. Set difference
or set intersection is a suitable similarity measure for fingerprint minutia.
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Figure 2.6: Systems for Biometric Template Protection
• Euclidean distance: Euclidean distance between points p and q is the length of
the line segment connecting them (pq).
In Cartesian coordinates, if p = (p1, p2) and q = (q1, q2) are two points, then the
distance from p to q, or from q to p is given by:
d(p,q) = d(q,p) =
√




Again, fingerprint minutia can be evaluated in this metric.
• Edit distance denotes the number of insertions and deletions needed to convert
one string into the other, for instance, when the password is entered as a string,
due to typing errors or mistakes made in handwriting recognition. Here, the dis-
tance between (w,w′) is defined to be the smallest number of character insertions
and deletions needed to transform w into w′. This is different from the Ham-
ming metric because insertions and deletions shift the characters that are to the
right of the insertion/deletion point. This metric is applicable for handwriting
recognition.
For our constructions, we will focus on the first two distance functions.
2.2.2 Error-Correcting Codes
Error correcting codes (ECC) are used in communications, data storage, and in other
systems where errors can occur. Biometric Encryption is a new area for the application
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of ECC since some noise will be inevitably introduced into biometric samples during
acquisition and processing. In general, two types of noise can be corrected in a biometric
system. Under noise, each biometric feature can be perturbed by some distance and
additionally, some of the features can be replaced. The first noise is denoted as white
noise, and the second replacement noise [Li et al., 2006]. Some recent techniques
attempt to correct the noise in the data using an ECC.
A code C is a subset {w0, ..., wK−1} of K elements of M. The map from i to wi,
which we will also sometimes denote by C, is called encoding. For example, a binary
block ECC, which is denoted (n, k, d), encodes k bits with n > k bits by adding some
redundancy. Those n-bit strings are called codewords; there are K = 2k of them in
total, where k is the key length. The minimum distance (usually a Hamming distance is
implied) between the codewords is d. If, at a later stage (in case of BE, on verification),
the errors occur, the ECC is guaranteed to correct up to (d− 1)/2 bit errors among n
bits since for every w ∈M, there exists at most one codeword c in the ball of radius t
around w. Namely, dis(w, c) ≤ t for at most one c ∈ C. We will use the term decoding
for the map that finds, given w, the c ∈ C such that dis(w, c) ≤ t (note that for some
w, such c may not exist, but if it exists, it will be unique). Ideally, the legitimate
users will have a number of errors within the ECC bound so that the ECC will decode
the original codeword, and hence, the digital key. On the other hand, the impostors
will produce an uncorrectable number of errors, in which case the ECC (and the BE
algorithm as a whole) will declare a failure. Some ECCs may work in a soft decoding
mode, that is, the decoder always outputs the nearest codeword, even if it is beyond
the ECC bound. This allows achieving better error-correcting capabilities.
2.2.3 Secure Sketches
Introduced in [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999] and further refined in [Dodis et al., 2004],
a secure sketch allows generating public data about its biometric input which does not
reveal (much) information about the original data - but allows regenerating the exact
input data if other similar data (such as another biometric reading at enrollment time)
is passed to it.
Let H be a metric space with distance function dis. As in [Dodis et al., 2004], we define
the predictability of a random variable A is maxa Pr[A = a], and, correspondingly,
min-entropy H∞(A) is -log(maxa Pr[A = a]) (min-entropy can thus be viewed as the
“worst-case” entropy). The min-entropy of a distribution tells us how many nearly
uniform random bits can be extracted from it. The notion of “nearly” is measured by
the statistical distance between two probability distributions.
A secure sketch scheme allows recovery of a hidden value w ∈ H from any value w′ ∈ H
close to this hidden value with the help of some public value PAR, which does not leak
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too much information about w. A (H,m,m′, t)- sketch is a pair of functions (SS, Rec):
• The sketching function SS takes w ∈ H as input and returns the public parameter
PAR in {0, 1}∗ such that for all random variables W over H with min-entropy
H∞(W ) ≥ m, the conditional min-entropy is H¯∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m′.
• The reconstruction function Rec takes a vector w′ and PAR as input and computes
w if and only if dis(b, b′) ≤ t for any PAR = SS(w).
Fuzzy Commitment
The fuzzy commitment scheme [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999] is an error tolerant au-
thentication scheme which follows the above method with the use of a committed value.
We observe that the fuzzy-commitment construction of Juels and Wattenberg based
on error-correcting codes can be viewed as a (nearly optimal) secure sketch. The main
goal is to protect the storage of biometric data involved in an authentication biomet-
ric system [Bringer et al., 2007a]. A biometric template must be in the form of an
ordered bit string of a fixed length. A key is mapped to an Error Correcting Code
(ECC) codeword of the same length as the biometric template. The codeword and the
template are xored, and the resulting string is stored into helper data along with the
hashed value of the key. On verification, a fresh biometric template is xored with the
stored string, and the result is decoded by the ECC. If the codeword obtained coincides
with the enrolled one (this is checked by comparing the hashed values), the k-bit key
is released. If not, a failure is declared. An overview of this scheme is shown in figure
2.7.
Let C be an (n, k, 2t+1) binary linear error correcting code in Hamming space. Let h
be a cryptographic one-way function and z = c⊕ b, where c is a random codeword in
C. Store h(c), in the enrollment phase, together with z. From the corrupted codeword
c′ = z ⊕ b′ = c ⊕ (b ⊕ b′), one can recover c if the hamming distance disH between b
and b′ is disH(b, b
′) < t. The authentication will be a success if the verification returns
a codeword c′ such that h(c′) = h(c).
An important requirement for such a scheme is that the value PAR should not reveal
too much information about the biometric template b [Bringer et al., 2007a].
2.2.4 Biometric Key Generation/Locking/Release
Juels and Wattenberg [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999] introduce the fuzzy commitment
scheme as a cryptographic primitive, which is specific for biometrics that can be rep-
resented as an ordered set of features. However, biometrics can be affected from two
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Figure 2.7: Fuzzy Commitment Scheme [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999]
types of noise, i.e. white noise that represents the slight perturbation of each feature
and the replacement noise caused by the replacement of some features. Thus, Juels
and Sudan have developed the fuzzy vault [Juels and Sudan, 2006], which assumes that
biometrics consists of an unordered set of features and is designed for the set difference
metric. Hence, fuzzy vault construction of Juels and Sudan can be viewed as a secure
sketch in the set difference metric. Specifically, fuzzy vault is a key locking system
that hides an encoded secret among some chaff points, where the secret key is encoded
as the coefficients of a polynomial that is evaluated at the biometric feature locations
such as fingerprint minutia locations. Implementation of fuzzy vault for fingerprints
are given in [Clancy et al., 2003] and [Uludag et al., 2005, Uludag and Jain, 2006], the
latter two use CRC codes for error correction in order to have increased tolerance to
biometric intra-class variations.
Fuzzy Vault
Fuzzy vault is a cryptographic primitive used to lock a secret data (i.e. cryptographic
key) using an unordered set of locking elements (i.e. biometric features) such that a
user who possesses a substantial amount of the locking elements will recover the secret.
A fuzzy vault scheme V = V(k, t, r,Fq) consists of three phases:
• Setup: Choose a finite field Fq of order q and set the parameters of t and r,
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where t is the number of genuine points G hidden in the vault and r denotes the
cardinality of the vault points V ⊂ F2q.
• Lock: A secret data S such as an 128-bit AES key is hidden in the vault as
follows.
1. A secret S = {Si}ki=1 is identified with a polynomial f ∈ Fq[X] of degree
k − 1 by encoding S as the coefficients of f .
2. To hide f using t > k biometric features (i.e. locking set L) identified with
elements of Fq, the locking set L (i.e. minutia locations) is evaluated at f
resulting in the genuine set G.
3. Generate chaff points C uniformly at random such that C ⊂ Fq/G.
4. The vault is V = V(k, t, r,Fq) = G ∪ C
Thus, the axis of abscissae determines information relevant to minutiae while the
ordinate associates them with the secret. The template used to extract points
from the vault must have neglible nonlinear distortion and be aligned modulo
affine transform [Nandakumar et al., 2007a]. Chaff points lie with minutiae lo-
cations and their association to the secret. All data lie in the finite field Fq.
The degree k of the polynomial and the number of genuine points t are hidden
in the vault. G uniquely determines f and L. Since using false points yields to a
complete different secret, to give extractors a chance, minutiae locations of chaff
points must have sufficient distance to genuine minutiae locations, depending on
the image quality. Thus, one can not add arbitrary many chaff points to the
vault. Otherwise, genuine minutiae locations appear as isolated points. Thus, we
generate chaff points C uniformly at random with the above considerations.
As different from [Juels and Sudan, 2006], the authors of [Uludag et al., 2005,
Uludag and Jain, 2006] append a 16-bit CRC checksum to the secret data and
encode the coefficients of the polynomial using a 144-bit data block. This way,
increased tolerance to biometric intra-class variation is obtained.
• Unlock: To open the vault one needs to know k+1 genuine points of the vault and
compute its interpolating polynomial. Genuine and false minutiae locations are
determined by the axis of abscissae. Given an unlocking set L′ and a vault V , the
algorithm returns the secret data as follows. Since vault points G ′ are extracted
using a fresh biometrics, this set may contain points which are not genuine points
(i.e. randomly matching chaff points). Thus, one may choose wrong extracted
points to interpolate f . If not too many points are erroneously extracted most
ways to interpolate f will lead to the correct f by extracting k genuine vault
points using a second impression of a similar biometrics L′ such that |L′∩L| ≥ k
and computing its interpolating polynomial to decode S.
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In [Uludag and Jain, 2006], the CRC based error detection is used to identify the
correct polynomial and thus the correct secret.
Theorem 2.1. (Coding theoretical interlude). Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xt, yt) ∈ F2q be distinct
points where (k + t)/2 lie on a polynomial f ∈ Fq[X] of degree k. There is an O(t3)
time algorithm which discovers f .
Corollary 2.1. Let G ′ consists of t extracted vault points comprising at least (k+ t)/2
genuine points. Then the secret S can be efficiently and safely discovered.
The first implementation of fuzzy vault for fingerprints together with a security analysis
is presented in [Clancy et al., 2003], where the authors claim that an attack requires 269
operations. Next, Uludag et al. [Uludag et al., 2005, Uludag and Jain, 2006] present
two implementations of fuzzy vault for fingerprints, where the system also includes
helper data constructed from the high curvature points of the fingerprint minutia,
which does not leak any information about the minutia locations and is used for easing
the alignment of the query fingerprint to the original template. Finally, Yang et al.
[Yang and Verbauwhede, 2005] describe another implementation with variations on the
vault parameters depending on the template quality.
Attacks against the Fuzzy Vault
The first attacks on the fuzzy vault are described in [Adler, 2005, Chang et al., 2006]
by identifying the chaff points based on the non-randomness of the fuzzy vault scheme.
Apart from that, the broad categorization of the attacks consists of known-plaintext
and ciphertext-only attacks, where the former assumes that an attacker can gain access
to the secret key hidden in the fuzzy vault, which leads to the biometric template by
verifying the secret polynomial on the points in the vault. The second group of at-
tacks, namely ciphertext-only attacks do not require any insider knowledge. For fuzzy
vault, brute force attack [Mihailescu, 2007, Mihăilescu et al., 2009] or collusion attacks
[Scheirer and Boult, 2007] (i.e. different instances of the vault encoded with the biomet-
rics of the same user is enough to obtain the biometric template of that user), are the
two main attacks. Also, Scheirer and Boult present three different attacks (including
the collusion attacks) against the fuzzy vault and biometric encryption [Scheirer and
Boult, 2007] and in view of that, they proposed revocable biotokens [Boult et al., 2007]
and its implementation as bipartite biotokens in [Scheirer and Boult, 2009]. Further
implementations of the collusion attack with different parameters is given in [Poon and
Miri, 2009].
Collusion Attacks: Collusion attacks (also defined as attacks via record multiplicity
[Scheirer and Boult, 2007]) can be applied if an adversary has access to two or more
vault instances generated from the same user for different applications, which may be
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implemented for hiding the same secret or different secrets. Additionally, [Poon and
Miri, 2009] analyzed the case that an adversary has access to n different vaults that
lock the same secret using different biometrics. The main idea of this attack is that
availability of two vaults locked with the same key enables an attacker to identify the
genuine points in the two vaults and decode the vault, which is the most likely situation
to occur in practice. Thus, the fuzzy vault scheme does not provide diversity and
revocability. A detailed analysis on the security of the fuzzy vault against collusion
attacks is presented in [Poon and Miri, 2009], where the authors also suggest some
countermeasures against this attack by applying a keyed one-way transform of the
locking set L, or generating the chaff points depending on the locking set or by using
the maximal vault size, namely the vault will contain the whole Fq\L as the abscissae
values of the chaff points.
Stolen key inversion attack: In this attack, an adversary somehow recovers the key
embedded in the vault through means other than an attack against the biometric
template, thus he can decode the vault to obtain the biometric template. It is noted
that even if an encrypted version of the secret is hidden in the vault, insider attacks
are still possible [Scheirer and Boult, 2007].
Blended substitution attack: Since the vault contains a large number of chaff points,
it is possible for an adversary to substitute a few points in the vault using his own
biometric features resulting in a successful authentication of the genuine user and the
adversary. This attack can be prevented using digitally signed templates [Scheirer and
Boult, 2007].
Brute force attack: In [Mihailescu, 2007], the author presents a brute force attack
against the fuzzy vault implementation of Uludag et al. and this attack is further
investigated in [Mihăilescu et al., 2009] with a proposal to improve the security of
fingerprint fuzzy vault using additional minutia information, in particular the use of
larger parameters for the vault with increased biometric data, for instance more fingers
for identification. The complexity of the attack is found much below cryptographic
security, i.e. 255 for Clancy et al. [Clancy et al., 2003] and 237 for Uludag et al.
[Uludag et al., 2005], where the additional CRC checksum allows the attacker to verify
whether he has found the correct secret and the unlocking set [Mihailescu, 2007].
The attack for a fingerprint vault V = V(k, t, r,Fq) is as follows:
1. Choose k distinct points from the vault V uniformly at random;
2. Compute the unique degree k − 1 polynomial f ∈ Fq[X] interpolating them;
3. If the graph of f contains t vault points, output f ; otherwise go to step 1;
Let V = V(k, t, r,Fq) be a fuzzy fingerprint vault. Clancy, Kiyavash, and Lin deter-
mined optimal security parameters for fingerprints image having 251 × 251 pixels as
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Table 2.1: Implementation of Brute Force Attack
System Parameters Complexity
Clancy et al. [Clancy et al., 2003] V(14, 38, 313,F2512) 255
Uludag et al. [Uludag et al., 2005] V(8, 24, 224,F225) 237
Uludag et al. [Uludag et al., 2005] V(8, 24, 224,F2108) 237
k = 14, t = 38, and r = 313 where q = 2512. Later, Yang and Verbaudwhede describe
an implementation where t and k vary depending on the template quality. Finally,
Uludag and Jain describe the usage of helper data for easing image alignment. They
use CRC codes instead of RS codes and describe experiments with k = 8, t = 24, and
r = 224. Table 2.1 presents an overview of the attack against these implementations
of fuzzy vault.
Countermeasures: To counter the first three attacks, Nandakumar et al. [Nandakumar
et al., 2007b] proposed a hybrid approach where (i) biometric features are first salted
based on a user password to prevent collusion attacks, (ii) vault is constructed using the
salted template and (iii) the vault is encrypted using a key derived from the password to
prevent blended substitution and stolen key inversion attacks. In order to prevent brute
force attack, the authors of [Mihăilescu et al., 2009] propose a new primitive called fuzzy
vault with quiz, where the security is improved using additional minutiae information
i.e. its orientation. Let (X, Y ) ∈ F2q genuine vault point and α its orientation in
a granularity of π/n, where n is small. The quiz function uses α to change the Y -
coordinate of genuine vault points by choosing a j that encodes a transformation to
shift Y , where j π
n
= α − β mod π. Thus, genuine vault points are now of the shape
(X, Y ′, β) where Y ′ = T (Y ) and chaff points are also equipped with a random β. The
security against this attack increases by a factor 2kb where k is the secret polynomial
degree and b = ⌈log2(n)⌉ [Mihăilescu et al., 2009].
However, fuzzy vault with quiz is still vulnerable to collusion attack since the trans-
formation is only on the Y coordinate of the vault. Thus, additional one-way transfor-
mation on the locking set L or the use of maximal vault size is required to avoid these
attacks.
Fuzzy Extractors
Linnartz and Tuyls [Linnartz and Tuyls, 2003] defined and constructed a primitive very
similar to a fuzzy extractor, which focuses on the continuous space Rn and assumes a
particular input distribution (typically a known, multivariate Gaussian). In the same
paper for secure sketch, [Dodis et al., 2004] introduce the concept of a fuzzy extractor,
which can be viewed as a generalization of the notion of a “shielding function” of
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[Linnartz and Tuyls, 2003] on discrete metric spaces. A fuzzy extractor allows deriving
a cryptographic key with uniform randomness from a biometric input that stays the
same even if the input changes slightly. In this way a biometric system could be seen
as key-generating instead of key-binding, as the biometric data itself can be used as
source for a key, instead of binding a key as in the case of the fuzzy commitment
scheme. For fuzzy extractors, a similar attack based on the reusability of the same
(or a noisy variant) of the biometrics for multiple extractions of independent public
strings is described due to improper fuzzy sketch constructions or wrongly chosen error
correcting codes. From these public strings, an attacker can exactly regenerate the
corresponding secret keys that are output by the fuzzy extractor. In particular, [Boyen,
2004] presented the first attack on the fuzzy extractors based on the reusability of the
same noisy secret (biometrics) in the presence of both outsider and insider attackers.
The author describes how to improve security of fuzzy extractors when they are used
multiple times for the same biometrics, by adding an additional permutation.
2.2.5 Cancelable Biometrics
Another way to secure biometric templates besides helper data methods is to use some
kind of transformation which does not allow retrieving the original biometric features
from the transformed template. Because the transformation involves additional data
such as a seed value to a pseudo random number generator, new templates can be
issued for the same biometric data and therefore the templates are cancelable. At
enrollment time, such a transformation is applied either directly to the biometric data
obtained from the sensor or to the extracted features. In either case the resulting
biometric template does not allow restoring the original biometric data as long as the
transformation is not invertible. At authentication time, the same transformation is
applied to the supplied biometric data - and matching against the stored template is
performed with the transformed data.
Informally, the idea of cancelable biometrics (CB) is to transform biometric data with
an irreversible transformation and to perform the matching directly on the transformed
data allowing the use of existing feature extraction and matching algorithms. Formally,
given two biometric data w and w′, the matching score will be computed directly on
transformed data by m(f(w), f(w′)), where m denotes the similarity measure and f
be a transformation that does not degrade the matching performances too much. The
three properties of f are: (1) w and f(w) do not match together; (2) For two different
transformations f1 and f2, f1(w) and f2(w) do not match together; (3) A pre-image of
f(w) is hard to compute.
Besides, [Hirata and Takahashi, 2009, Cambier et al., 2002] proposes another method
for cancelable biometrics, where the biometric information is masked by a random
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number, and then, the masked information is stored in the server as a template. The
random number used for masking is needed to have a certain level of entropy, and
to be stored in a smart card carried by the authorized user. Biometric information
presented at the authentication phase is also masked by the same random number,
and compared with the template (i.e. biometric information masked by the random
number) [Sakashita et al., 2009]. This way, biometric data stored at the server is
protected through this transformation and biometrics can be updated by changing
the transformation function or the randomness. This system also prevents the user’s
traceability across different biometric databases. Example systems employing a high
entropy randomness stored in a smart card for cancelable biometrics are given in [Hi-
rata and Takahashi, 2009, Cambier et al., 2002, Sakashita et al., 2009]. Even if the
(masked) templates are compromised, no biometric information will leak out. Also, in
this method, no information except for the random number is stored in a smart card,
which is assumed as a tamper proof smart card.
BioHash
An ordered biometric feature set is transformed into a new space of a lower dimension
by generating a random set of orthogonal vectors and obtaining an inner product
between each vector and the biometric feature set [Li and Jain, 2009]. The result
(called Biohash) is binarized to produce a bit string. The random feature vectors are
generated from a random seed that is kept secret, for example, by storing it in a token.
The key is bound to the Biohash via Shamir secret sharing with linear interpolation, or
by using a standard Fuzzy Commitment scheme. Very good FRR/FAR numbers were
obtained, however, in an unrealistic non-stolen token scenario. Biohashing is referred
more often as a CB scheme where Biohashes are matched directly, that is, without the
key binding.
Bipartite Biotokens
Another CB approach that is claimed to be secure against collusion and brute force
attack is bipartite biotoken [Scheirer and Boult, 2009], which is implemented for fin-
gerprints and works in the finite field F28 to encode the secret and the locking set.
First, the raw biometric data v′′ (the distance d and angles a1, a2 of each feature) is
transformed via a translation t and scaling s. Next, the transformed biometrics v′
is separated to fraction (residual part) r and integer (stable) part g using a reflected
modulus rmod that does not increase the distance between points. The amount of
stable/unstable data is a function of the biometric modality. In [Boult et al., 2007],
the separation parameter E that depends on the expected variations on v′′ separates
the stable (integer) part g = int(v′/E) and non stable part r = rmod(v′, E) using a
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simple mod operation:
r = rmod(v′, E) = v′%2E if (v′%2E) < E and
r = rmod(v′, E) = 2E − (v′%2E), otherwise
The stable part g can be hashed or encrypted using public key cryptography to obtain
w, whereas the residual r is left in clear. The authors use the term hash as a general
concept since any checksum such as MD5, SHA1 or for many embodiments a traditional
CRC is sufficient. Finally, multiple embedded polynomials (i.e. four key columns)
allows for encoding of larger secret keys.
1. Store the secret S together with E bytes of
error correction as B bytes
2. The RS polynomial f encodes B.
3. Compute the distance d and angles a1, a2 per
row.
4. Transfrom d, a1, a2 and split into the sta-
ble parts sd, sa1, sa2 and the residual parts
rd, ra1, ra2.
5. Hash the 24 bits of sd, sa1, sa2 into an 8-bit
value i, hash i to an 8-bit value h.
6. Evaluate h for different polynomials resulting
in values rs1, rs2, rs3, rs4 to support larger keys.
7. Encode the stable part to w, leave the residual
part r in clear.
8. Randomize the location of w i.e.
rs1, rs2, rs3, rs4 follow w via circular map.
9. Store the protected parts w, rs1, rs2, rs3, rs4, i
and residuals in the gallery except for h.
1. To unlock the secret key, the server sends
the biotoken over an insecure channel.
2. To match the gallery to the probe, create
all the stable and non-stable fields and
compute h for each row.
3. Find a matching w and check whether the
residuals are within threshold.
4. With w identified, extract the polynomial
values rs1, rs2, rs3, rs4.
5. Select a set of correct matched rows from
the potentially matching rows.
6. Recover the secret data by Reed Solomon
decoding of the polynomial values.
7. Since four different polynomials are
evaluated at h at each row, larger keys can
be encoded by concatenation.
Lock Algorithm Unlock Algorithm
2.2.6 Distributed Biometric Remote Authentication
Biometric authentication systems are classified as remote, local or match-on-card (MOC)
systems, where the latter two are closed self-contained systems performing the neces-
sary operations and storage of the biometric profile information in a controlled and
trusted environment. Recently, distributed biometric remote authentication (DBRA)
systems are designed in the framework of cryptographic security, where data acquisition
and feature recognition are performed by separate sub-systems, which communicate
over an insecure channel. This type of scenario may occur, for instance, if one intends
to use biometric authentication to access privileged resources over the Internet [Bar-
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bosa et al., 2008]. The main difference of these systems compared to other biometric
cryptosystems is that they assume biometrics as public data. In the following chapter,
we present recent results in this area in detail.
2.2.7 Fuzzy IBE/IBS
Another application of biometrics in the context of public key cryptography is integra-
tion of biometrics into an identity based encryption/signature scheme. In Eurocrypt’05,
Sahai and Waters [Sahai and Waters, 2005] proposed a new Identity Based Encryption
(IBE) system called fuzzy IBE that uses biometric attributes as the identity instead
of an arbitrary string like an email address. Since biometrics can identify a person
uniquely, it makes sense to use them as the public key in an identity-based encryption
scheme. Encryption using biometric inputs as identities is provided with fuzzy IBE,
since the error-tolerance property of a fuzzy IBE scheme is precisely what allows for
the use of biometric identities, which inherently will have some noise each time they
are sampled. Biometrics usually consist of noisy data, i.e. two measures w and w′
of the same biometric are not completely the same. However, the main feature of
fuzzy IBE is the construction of the secret key based on the biometric data of the user
which can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with a slightly different measurement of the
same biometrics. Specifically, fuzzy IBE allows for error tolerance in the decryption
stage, where a ciphertext encrypted with the biometrics w could be decrypted by the
receiver using the private key corresponding to the biometrics w′, provided that w and
w′ are within a certain distance of each other according to the “set overlap” (i.e. set
intersection) distance metric. This is actually the same metric used in fuzzy vault,
where Bob, using an unordered biometric set w, can unlock the vault (and access the
hidden secret data) only if w overlaps with w′ to a large extent. This is in contrast
to regular IBE schemes, which view the identity of a person as a unique string like an
e-mail address, thus they are not suitable for error-prone identities. Thus, fuzzy IBE
combines the advantages of IBE with using biometrics as an identity, where IBE avoids
the need for an online Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is the most inefficient
and costly part of public key encryption. The use of biometrics as the identity in the
framework of IBE simplifies the process of key generation at the Private Key Generator
(PKG). Since biometric information is unique, unforgettable and non-transferable, the
user only needs to provide his biometrics at the PKG to obtain his secret key instead of
presenting special documents and credentials to convince the PKG about his identity.
Similar to the distributed biometric remote authentication, biometrics is assumed as
public data, thus the compromise of the biometrics does not affect the security of the
system as opposed to the fuzzy vault. Also, biometrics is attached to the user, hence
the public key of the user is always with him to be used for encryption during an ad
hoc meeting. Finally, biometric data could be easily integrated with fuzzy IBE due
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to its error tolerance property, which is required for the noisy nature of biometrics.
Besides, fuzzy IBE could be applied in the context of Attribute-Based Encryption [Pir-
retti et al., 2006, Sahai and Waters, 2005], where the sender encrypts data using a set
of attributes such as {university, faculty, department} and the ciphertext could only
be decrypted if the receiver has the secret key associated to all of these attributes or
sufficient number of them.
In current fuzzy IBE schemes, the private key components are generated by combining
the values of a unique polynomial evaluated on each attribute with the master secret
key. This way, different users, each having some portion of the secret keys associated
to the attributes of a given ciphertext c cannot collude to decrypt c, which is defined
as collusion resistance. Clearly, this construction is not possible for any IBE system,
but only for the ones that provide some error-tolerant encryption through the use of
specific primitives such as bilinear pairings and Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. In the
second part of this chapter, we will review the base schemes of the recently described
fuzzy IBE systems.
Part II : Background in Cryptographic Tools
2.3 Public Key Encryption
In 1976, the authors of [Diffie and Hellman, 1976] invented public key encryption
(PKE), also called as asymmetric encryption, where the receiver generates a pair of
keys pk and sk that will be used for encryption and decryption, respectively. The
receiver will publish the encryption key pk and store privately the decryption key sk.
With this mechanism, it is obvious that anyone can encrypt a message m using pk and
generate the ciphertext c, whilst only the receiver can decrypt this c using his private
key sk. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 2.1. (PKE). A Public Key Encryption scheme Π = (Keygen, Encrypt,
Decrypt) with message space M consists of three algorithms.
• Keygen: The key generation algorithm samples a keypair (pk, sk), which is de-
noted by (pk, sk) ←Keygen(k). Here, k ∈ N (also written as 1k) is called as the
security parameter, that measures the degree of security we want to achieve. k
denotes the key length, (i.e. the bit-length of the RSA modulus or the order of
the group for group-based cryptosystems).
• Encrypt: This algorithm encrypts a message m ∈ M using the pk of the receiver
and outputs the ciphertext c, which is denoted by c←Encrypt(pk,m).
30
• Decrypt: The recipient can recover the messagem by decrypting c using his secret
key sk as m←Decrypt(sk, c).
We require perfect correctness of the scheme, i.e. Decrypt(sk,Encrypt(pk,m))=m for
all m ∈M and all possible (pk, sk)←Keygen(k).
An asymmetric encryption scheme could be either deterministic or probabilistic. A
deterministic scheme means that for a fixed encryption key, a given plaintext will always
be encrypted in the same ciphertext. When using a deterministic encryption scheme, it
is easy to detect when the same message is sent twice while processed with the same key.
So, in practice, we prefer encryption schemes to be probabilistic, namely, encryption
of the same message results in different ciphertexts. In other words, for a plaintext
we require the existence of several possible ciphertexts, the number of ciphertexts is
greater than the number of possible plaintexts. Probabilistic encryption was introduced
in order to properly define different security levels, in particular, semantic security. We
describe these different security levels as follows.
2.4 Security Notions of PKE
A PKE scheme is secure based on a security notion if an adversary A has negligible
probability in a specific game between a challenger and an adversary A, where A is
modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Turing machine with possibly access
to some oracles. What we mean with the term “negligible” is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2. (Negligible Function). A function negl : N→ R is defined as negligible
if for any constant c, there exists k0 ∈ N with k > k0 such that negl(k) < (1/k)c. In
other words, negl eventually vanishes faster than any given polynomial.
As a result, all algorithms (i.e. any potential adversary) are PPT in the security
parameter k and the success of the adversary should be negligible in k. The security
notion, i.e. the adversary model, is defined by combining the means and the goals of
the adversary A.
2.4.1 Means of the Adversary
Informally, means of the adversary defines the access of A to some oracles, which are
listed as below.
• Chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA): A only knows the public key of the user, which
implies that he may encrypt any plaintext of his choice.
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• Plaintext-checking attacks (PCA): A can check whether a given ciphertext would
be decrypted as a given plaintext.
• Chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA): A may ask for decryption of ciphertexts of its
choice except that A cannot ask for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext.
2.4.2 Goals of the Adversary
Briefly, the goals of the adversary A is listed as below.
• Unbreakability: A wants to recover the secret key of the user.
• One-wayness (OW):A wants to be able to decrypt any ciphertext. The encryption
scheme is said to be one-way if no efficient attacker is able to decrypt a random
ciphertext with non-negligible probability. By a random ciphertext, we mean the
ciphertext of a plaintext chosen uniformly at random over the plaintext space.
• Non-malleability (NM): Given a list of ciphertexts, A wants to build a new ci-
phertext whose plaintext is related to the plaintexts of the input ciphertexts.
• Indistinguishability (IND): A wants to output two distinct messages m0 and m1
such that if a challenger encrypts either m0 or m1, A would be able to tell which
message was encrypted. Clearly, if the encryption scheme is deterministic, there
is always a trivial distinguisher: one could select any pair of distinct messages m0
and m1, and by encrypting bothm0 and m1, one could tell which one corresponds
to the challenge ciphertext. This implies that probabilistic encryption is necessary
to satisfy strong security notions.
If we combine the means and the goals of the adversary, we obtain the following se-
curity notions that are considered as the standard notions for the security of PKE








m′ ← AO2 (s, c)
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Here, depending on the attack model ATK, the oracle O represents a decryption oracle
or a plaintext checking oracle.
Definition 2.3. A PKE scheme Π is said to be secure in the sense of OW-ATK, ATK
∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA} if for all PPT algorithms A = (A1, A2)
AdvΠ,A(k) = Pr[m = m
′] < negl(k)
2.4.4 Indistinguishability
For some encryption schemes that are only one-way secure, it may be easy to compute
partial information about the plaintext: For instance, an RSA ciphertext c leaks one
bit of information about the plaintext m, namely, the socalled Jacobi symbol. As
a higher security level, semantic security was introduced in [Goldwasser and Micali,
1982], which is unavailable without probabilistic encryption. A probabilistic encryption
is semantically secure if the knowledge of a ciphertext does not provide any useful
information on the plaintext to some adversary with only polynomial computational
power. More formally, for any function f and any plaintext m, the probability to guess
f (m) (knowing f but not m) does not increase if the adversary knows a ciphertext
corresponding to m. This might be thought of as a kind of perfect secrecy in the case
when we only have polynomial resources [Fontaine and F.Galand, 2007]. Due to the








d← AO2 (m0,m1, s, c)
if d = b return 1 else return 0
Here, depending on the attack model, A has access a plaintext checking oracle or a
decryption oracle except for the query on the challenge c. |m0| = |m1| is compulsory
to prevent the attacker from breaking the scheme trivially.
Definition 2.4. A PKE scheme Π with security parameter 1k is said to be secure in
the sense of IND-ATK with ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA} if for all PPT algorithms
A = (A1, A2)
AdvΠ,A(k) = Pr[ExpΠ,A(k) = 1|b = 1]− Pr[ExpΠ,A(k) = 1|b = 0] < negl(k)
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A deterministic asymmetric encryption scheme cannot be semantically secure since it
cannot be indistinguishable: the adversary knows the encryption function, and thus
can compute the single ciphertext corresponding to each plaintext.
2.4.5 Non-Malleability





y∗ = Encrypt(pk, x1)
R,y← AO2 (y∗, s)
x = Decrypt(y, pk)
if y∗ 6∈ y ∧R(xb,x)
return 1
else return 0
Here, y denotes a vector of ciphertexts and no component of y should be equal to y∗.
The adversary A hopes that the relation R(x1,x) holds with a probability significantly
more than the probability that the relation R(x0,x) holds. Here, x1 with |x1| = |x0| is
also a plaintext chosen uniformly at random from M and independent of x0.
Definition 2.5. A PKE scheme Π with security parameter 1k is said to be secure
in the sense of NM-ATK with ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,CCA} if for all PPT algorithms
A = (A1, A2), every relation R computable in polynomial time such that
AdvΠ,A(k) = Pr[ExpΠ,A(k) = 1|b = 1]− Pr[ExpΠ,A(k) = 1|b = 0] < negl(k)
2.5 Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions play a role in data integrity and message authentication.
A hash function is a function from strings of arbitrary finite bit length to strings
of n bits for some fixed integer n. A hash function is necessarily many-to-one, but
for cryptographic applications n will be in the range of 128 to 256 bits and should
satisfy much stronger conditions than are required for typical hashing purposes. These
conditions are classified by the difficulty of solving certain problems, as presented below.
Preimage resistance: Given H(x) find y such that H(y) = H(x).
Second preimage resistance: Given x, find y such that H(y) = H(x).
Collision resistance: Find x, y such that H(x) = H(y)
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The basic idea of the design of cryptographic hash functions consists in splitting the
message to be hashed into blocks of fixed length, and hashing them block by block with
a compression function. Moreover, this structure is the origin of the hash functions
massively used in cryptography, i.e. SHA-1 and MD5.
2.6 Security Reduction
In order to guarantee the security of a PKE scheme, the precise definition of the
security notion for the cryptographic scheme must be stated. To prove that a scheme
can achieve the given security notion, one needs to describe a polynomial reduction
which is an algorithm that uses an adversary A on a given scheme, in order to solve a
hard cryptographic problem with almost the same success and time as the adversary
has against the scheme. Basically, if any efficient algorithm solves the problem only
with negligible probability, we say the problem is hard. For instance, the unbreakability,
i.e. “public key inversion problem” should be hard on average, but not only hard in
the worst case, where the latter means there exists hard instances. There is a small
number of candidates for computational problems which are hard on average such as
factoring n = pq, where p and q are large primes. For instance, using a reduction one is
able to prove that if an adversary can break a system, then this yields a fast algorithm
for factoring. As a result, security proof of a cryptographic scheme is constructed using
an attacker running against the scheme, as a sub-part of an algorithm that breaks the
underlying assumption. Secure schemes are defined to be those in which the advantage
of this computationally bounded attacker is negligible. We denote this reduction as
follows. Let P1 and P2 be two computational problems. P1 ≤P P2 if we have an oracle
(or efficient algorithm) to solve problem P2. We then use this oracle to give an efficient
algorithm for problem P1.
The assumption on the primitive (or the problem P ) states that no polynomial time
algorithm exists to solve the underlying primitive (or problem P ). An assumption
is basically the condition to guarantee the security notion. Thus, security relies on
computational assumptions such as one way functions (integer factorization, discrete
logarithms in a finite field), trapdoor one way function or permutations (RSA), where
the inversion of the one way function is hard without knowing the trapdoor. However,
assuming this intractability of some computational problem is not enough for efficient
cryptographic primitives, which require hard decisional problems. Moreover, the as-
sumption based on the problem P is weaker than the assumption on P ′ if the problem
P is stronger than problem P ′. Hence, to obtain more secure cryptographic schemes,
weaker assumptions are required to be used. If the probability of breaking the scheme
by the adversary is closer to the probability of the problem being solved by an algo-
rithm, the reduction is tighter, which is a measure of provable security. In case of a
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non-tight reduction, larger key sizes provide the same security as a scheme with a tight
security reduction. It can be argued that a proof relying on a stronger assumption and
resulting in a tight reduction can be preferred to a loose reduction from a potentially
weaker assumption.
2.6.1 Random Oracle Model
In a security reduction, Random Oracle Model (ROM) is used when certain parts of
the cipher such as the hash functions are modeled as random functions. This model
requires some additional assumptions to be made, and the security reduction is valid
only if these assumptions are valid. In this model, a hash function h : D → R is chosen
uniformly at random from the set of functions from D to R. Moreover, h is not given
by a formula or algorithm to compute its outputs. Thus, the only way to compute
the value h(x) of some x ∈ D is through a call to the function oracle. This can be
assimilated to looking up a huge codebook consisting of values in D and corresponding
values in R such that for each possible x ∈ D, there exists a completely random value
h(x) ∈ R. The only necessary thing in using a security reduction in the ROM is to
replace the random function by a particular hash function.
However, when an encryption or signature scheme is actually used in practice, a par-
ticular hash function must be specified, and so the assumption used in the random
oracle model is not valid. Besides, ROM does not model real life, where there are no
random functions instead a single fixed hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1 is used.
Therefore, even if an adversary designed with the knowledge of the fixed hash function
in the scheme may have no success against the scheme with a random function, it may
be successful for this fixed function. Also, due to the fact that MD5 and SHA-1 are
polynomial-time computable functions, it is theoretically possible that the adversary
would fail for a random function, but not for a polynomial-time one. It is possible
that an algorithm can break the scheme for some particular hash functions using the
information of the way the hash function is computed. In [Stinson, 2006], it is stated
that no practical protocol proven secure in the random oracle model has been broken
when used with a “good” hash function, such as SHA-1. On the other hand, Goldreich
and Halevi showed that there exists a theoretical signature scheme which has been
proved secure in the random oracle model, which becomes insecure whenever the hash
function used in the protocol is specified as a polynomial time computable function.
Hence, the reduction considers adversaries against certain types of attacks on the pro-
tocol instead of attacks on the hash function since any attack which treats the hash
function as a random function will not be successful regardless of whether the hash
function is actually a random function. In other words, the assumption is made about
the attacking algorithm instead of the hash function. Unfortunately, many schemes
that seem secure in ROM, could not be proven to be secure in the standard model.
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2.6.2 Decisional and Computational Assumptions
Public key cryptography rests heavily upon two one way functions related to two num-
ber theoretic hard problems, namely factoring integers and computing discrete loga-
rithms. There exists also other problems that are assumed to be hard, but easier than
factoring and discrete logarithm. In this section, we review the assumptions which
form the basis of the security of the schemes presented in the next section.
Assumption 2.1. (RSA). Let N be a product of two equally sized primes p and q (p
and q are k-bit integers). Let further y be an integer in Z∗N and e > 1 be an integer
co-prime with ϕ(N). Computing the unique integer x ∈ Z∗N such that xe = y mod N
is hard.
Assumption 2.2. (Quadratic Residuosity (QR)). Given n as a security parameter
and Keygen(1n) that generates a RSA-type n-bit Blum modulus N and its two prime
factors p, q, distinguishing between the distributions DQR(n) = {(c,N) : (N, p, q) ←
Keygen(1n); c ← QR(N)} and DQRN(n) = {(c,N) : (N, p, q) ← Keygen(1n); c ←
Z∗N [+1] \QR(N)} is hard.
For this assumption, we denote with Z∗N [+1] the set of elements in Z
∗
N with Jacobi
symbol +1 and with QR(N) the set of quadratic residues (or squares) in Z∗N . For any
integer a and any positive odd integer N , the Jacobi symbol is defined as the product
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0 if a ≡ 0 (mod p)
+1 if a 6≡ 0 (mod p) and for some integer x, a ≡ x2 (mod p)
−1 if there is no such x.
Finally, an integer y is called a quadratic residue modulo N if there exists an integer x
such that x2 ≡ y (mod N). Otherwise, y is called a quadratic nonresidue modulo N .
A stronger QR assumption is introduced in [Boneh et al., 2007], which is called as
interactive QR (IQR) assumption. Basically, the assumption says that the QR as-
sumption holds relative to a square root oracle, which is actually a Rabin signature
oracle with a collision-resistant hash function. If this hash is assumed as a random
oracle, QR implies IQR.
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Assumption 2.3. (Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR)). Given a composite N
and an integer z ∈ Z∗N2, it is hard to decide whether there exists y ∈ Z∗N2 such that
z ≡ yN (mod N2).
For the following assumptions, we have the following notation. G∗ = G \ {1G}, where
1G is the identity element of the multiplicative group G of prime order and g denotes
the generator of G.
Assumption 2.4. (Discrete Log (DL)). For x
R← Z∗q and g ∈ G∗ be a generator of G,
given (g, gx) computing x is hard.
Assumption 2.5. (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)). Let x, y
R← Z∗q and g ∈ G∗
be a random generator of G. Given (g, gx, gy) computing gxy is hard.
Assumption 2.6. (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)). Let x, y, z
R← Z∗q and g ∈ G∗
be a random generator of G. Given (g, gx, gy) distinguishing between the distributions
(g, gx, gy, gxy) and (g, gx, gy, gz) is hard.
Assumption 2.7. (Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH)). Given a randomly chosen generator
g of G, and ga, gb for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q, computing gab with the help of a DDH oracle
is hard.
A prime order group G is a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group if there exists an efficient
polynomial-time algorithm that solves the DDH problem in G and there is no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm that solves the CDH problem with non-negligible
probability. The Diffie-Hellman problem on such a group is called Gap Diffie-Hellman
Problem, that states given a randomly chosen generator g, and ga, gb for unknown
a, b ∈ Z∗q, compute gab with the help of the DDH oracle. The Gap-problems are based
on the fact that the computational problems such as DL problem and CDH are much
harder than the DDH, in other words, DDH ≤ CDH ≤ DL is satisfied.
The CDH problem can be reduced to the DL problem, namely given (g, gx) ∈ G, the
oracle for DL in group (g,G) outputs x, which is used to compute the CDH problem
of (gy)x.
The DDH problem can be reduced to the CDH problem using the CDH oracle for
group (g,G) with the input gx, gy resulting in the value gxy. If this value is compared
to the DDH instance gz then DDH is solved.
When we focus to the DDH problem, it is clear that DDH is a weaker variant of
the CDH and thus the DDH can be no harder than the CDH. Nevertheless, for
the general case, it is not clear whether the DDH problem is always easier than the
CDH problem. In summary, when the security of a protocol is proven depending on
the GDH problem (or any Gap-{.}), it is assumed that there is a big gap between the
DDH (or Decisional-{.}) and the problem underlying the protocol.
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2.7 Example PKE Schemes
The most famous public key encryption scheme called as RSA dates back to 1978
[Rivest et al., 1978], which is a deterministic scheme, thus cannot achieve IND-CPA
security.
2.7.1 RSA Encryption Scheme:
• Keygen: Based on the parameter k = |n|, the user chooses two large primes p and
q and publishes n = pq. A random exponent e is chosen that is relatively prime to
ϕ(n) = (p−1)(q−1). The decryptor keeps p and q secret, or the invert exponent
d = e−1mod ϕ(n), where d is the secret key sk. The public key is pk = (n, e).
• Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ Z∗n, one just has to compute c = me mod n.
• Decrypt: The recipient can recover the message by computing m = cd mod n
using his secret key d.
One-wayness of RSA relies on the problem of factoring large numbers and RSA problem.
2.7.2 Goldwasser-Micali Scheme
As different from RSA, Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme [Goldwasser and Micali,
1982] is a probabilistic encryption scheme, namely, encryption of the same message
results in different ciphertexts. Several other schemes were obtained as generalizations
of this one. Here, as for RSA, we use computations modulo n = pq, a product of two
large primes.
• Keygen: Let k = |n| be the security parameter and n be an RSA modulus n = pq
and p, q are two primes of equal length. Let x be a non-residue for which the
Jacobi symbol is 1. The private key is sk = (p, q) corresponding public key is
pk = (n, x).
• Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}, one randomly selects y ← Z∗n and
computes c = Encrypt(m, pk) = y2xm mod n. The ciphertext c is a quadratic
residue if and only if m = 0. The scheme encrypts 1 bit of information, while its
output is usually 1024 bits long.
• Decrypt: To decrypt a ciphertext c, check whether c is a quadratic residue. To
do so, we use the property that the Legendre symbol ( c
p
) is equal to (−1)m. If
so, then m = 0, else m = 1.
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The semantic security of Goldwasser-Micali scheme is based on the quadratic resid-
uosity problem. Regarding its efficiency, a single bit encryption requires a product
and a square, whereas decryption requires an exponentiation. The two properties of
this scheme is; its input consists of a single bit. This is not very efficient even if it is
considered as practical. Secondly, a single bit of plaintext is encrypted in an integer
modulo n. Thus, the expansion is huge for a k bit message. The basic principle of
this scheme is to partition a well-chosen subset of integers modulo n into two secret
parts: M0 and M1. Then, encryption selects a random element of Mb to encrypt b,
and decryption allows to know in which part the randomly selected element lies. The
core point lies in the way to choose the subset, and to partition it into M0 and M1.
This scheme uses group theory to achieve the following: the subset is the group G of
invertible integers modulo n with a Jacobi symbol, with respect to n, equal to 1. The
partition is generated by another group H ⊂ G, composed of the elements that are
invertible modulo n with a Jacobi symbol, with respect to a fixed factor of n, equal
to 1; with these settings, it is possible to split G into two parts: H and G\H. The
generalizations of Goldwasser-Micali play with these two groups; they try to find two
groups G and H such that G can be split into more than k = 2 parts [Fontaine and
F.Galand, 2007].
2.7.3 Paillier Encryption Scheme
One of the most well-known homomorphic encryption schemes is due to Paillier [Pail-
lier, 1999], which can be considered as a generalization of Goldwasser-Micali encryption.
Again, n = pq, with gcd(n, ϕ(n)) = 1, but Paillier considered the group G = Zn2 , and
a proper choice of H leads to k = |n|.
• Keygen: Let l = |n| be the security parameter and n be an RSA modulus n = pq
and p, q are two primes of equal length. Let g be an integer of order a multiple
of n mod n2. Define λ(n) =lcm(p− 1)(q − 1) and L(u) = u−1
n
, where L-function
takes inputs from the set Sn = {u < n2|u = 1 mod n}. The private key is
sk = λ(n) and the corresponding public key is pk = (n, g).
• Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, one randomly selects x ← Z∗n and
computes Encrypt(m, pk) = c = gmxn mod n2.
• Decrypt: To decrypt a ciphertext c, one computes m = L(cλ(n) mod n2)/L(gλ(n)
mod n2) mod n.
The semantic security of Paillier scheme is equivalent to decisional composite residuos-
ity assumption (DCRA), which denotes the problem of nth residuosity [Paillier, 1999].
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The encryption cost is not too high. Decryption needs one exponentiation modulo n2
to the power λ(n), and a multiplication modulo n. Paillier showed in his paper how to
manage decryption efficiently through the Chinese Remainder Theorem. With smaller
expansion and lower cost compared to Goldwasser-Micali encryption, this scheme is
really attractive.
2.7.4 ElGamal Encryption Scheme
• Keygen: An authority chooses and publishes a cyclic group G of prime order q
together with a generator g of the group. Here, k = |q| denotes the security
parameter. The secret key is sk = x ← Zq and the corresponding public key
pk = y = gx.
• Encrypt: To encrypt a message m ∈ G, one randomly selects r ← Zq and com-
putes (u, v) = (gr, yrm). The ciphertext is c = (u, v) ∈ C.
• Decrypt: To decrypt c = (u, v), one computes m = vu−x.
ElGamal cryptosystem [Gamal, 1984] is one-way secure based on the CDH problem,
IND-CPA secure based on theDDH problem and OW-PCA secure if theGDH problem
is hard. In many practical protocols G would be the group of multiples of a point P
on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. In [Tsiounis and Yung, 1998, Katz,
2002], non-malleable elgamal encryption secure against CCA attacks is presented by
combining non-malleable zero knowledge proof of plaintext knowledge with ElGamal
encryption.
2.7.5 Homomorphic encryption
All the above listed example PKE schemes have a common property. They are classified
as homomorphic encryption, which is defined as follows.
For a given cryptosystem with (Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt), the message space M and
the ciphertext space C that are groups, Decrypt(Encrypt(a) ⋆Encrypt(b)) = a ∗ b, where
a, b ∈ M , and ∗, ⋆ represent the group operations of M,C respectively. We say a
scheme is additively homomorphic if we consider addition operators, and multiplica-
tively homomorphic if we consider multiplication operators.
It should be emphasized that a homomorphic encryption cannot have the non-malleability
property. By knowing c, we can compute c′ = c ⋆ c and deduce, by the homomorphic
property, that c′ is a ciphertext of m′ = m ∗m. Thus, the highest security level it can
reach is IND-CPA.
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ElGamal encryption scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic property
Encrypt(a)× Encrypt(b) = Encrypt(a× b)
The modified ElGamal encryption presented in [Cramer et al., 1997] generates the
ciphertext c = Encryptpk(m) = (g
r, pkrGm) instead of c = (gr, pkrm), where G is
a fixed generator of G and m is the message. Thus, the homomorphic property is
additive as
Encrypt(a)× Encrypt(b) = Encrypt(a+ b).
The homomorphic property of Goldwasser-Micali Scheme is as
Encrypt(a)× Encrypt(b) = Encrypt(a⊕ b)
Paillier Cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. Hence, we have
Encrypt(a)× Encrypt(b) = Encrypt(a+ b).
Additionally, for Paillier Cryptosystem, we have
Encrypt(a)× gb = Encrypt(a+ b).
2.8 Tools for CCA security
It is conceptually much harder to achieve IND-CCA security than to achieve IND-CPA
security. The technical difficulty in reducing an IND-CCA attack is that the adversary
has access to a decryption oracle, which cannot be easily implemented without knowing
the secret key. However, there are several strategies to make a reduction possible.
2.8.1 Generic Transforms
Fujisaki and Okamoto proposed a simple conversion scheme called as a hybrid scheme
εhy from weak asymmetric-key encryption (AE) and symmetric-key encryption (SE)
schemes into a public-key encryption scheme which is secure in the sense of IND-CCA.
Basically, εhy is defined in [Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999] as follows.
εhy(m; σ) = < AEpk(σ;H(σ,m)||SEG(σ)(m) >
In εhy, σ is generated at random, H and G are two cryptographic hash functions
with H: AKMS × SKMS → COINS and G: AKMS → SKS, where AKMS denotes
asymmetric-key message space, SKMS denotes symmetric-key message space, and SKS
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is the symmetric-key space. The idea is, first encrypt the redundancy σ with the
random coin H(σ,m) under public key pk using the weakly secure probabilistic scheme
AE and then encrypt the message under the symmetric key G(σ) using the weakly
secure scheme SE. In [Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999], it is proven that if AE is an one-
way encryption scheme, then εhy is IND-CCA secure in ROM. However, it is shown that
if AE scheme satisfies IND-CPA security, then there is a significant improvement in the
security reduction. The same hybrid scheme is defined in [Boneh and Franklin, 2003]
as εhy(m) = < εpk(σ;H(σ,m), G(σ) ⊕ m > and is applicable to the Boneh-Franklin
IBE since it is IND-ID-CPA secure which implies also one-way encryption.
2.8.2 Double Encryption
This paradigm starts from an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, which is used to
encrypt the same message under two different public keys pk1 and pk2 that are contained
in the public key pk of the double encryption system. Next, the encryptor attaches a
proof that the two encryptions really contain the same message. This proof is denoted
as a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof.
2.8.3 Zero Knowledge Proofs
A proof of knowledge is an interactive proof in which the prover P succeeds “convincing”
a verifier V that it knows something. Specifically, a zero knowledge proof (ZKP) allows
a user to have a private data, and prove its possession without releasing it. P is modeled
by a probabilistic Turing machine whereas V is modeled by a polynomial probabilistic
Turing machine. During a ZKP, the parties exchange a sequence of messages called
the proof transcript. A zero-knowledge proof must satisfy three properties:
• Completeness: If the statement is true, the honest verifier (that is, one following
the protocol properly) will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover.
• Soundness: If the statement is false, no cheating prover can convince the honest
verifier that it is true, except with some small probability.
• Zero-knowledge: If the statement is true, no cheating verifier learns anything
other than this fact. This is formalized by showing that every cheating verifier
has some simulator that, given only the statement to be proven (and no access
to the prover), can produce a transcript that “looks like” an interaction between
the honest prover and the cheating verifier.
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Example of a ZKP
The Schnorr identification protocol was proposed by Schnorr in [Schnorr, 1991] for a
real-world (smart card-based) application. This protocol operates in a cyclic group G
of prime order d which is generated by some element g. The common input of the
prover P and verifier V is an element y of unknown discrete logarithm in base g, and
the private input of the prover is this very discrete logarithm, say x. That is, P proves
to V that he knows x. This scheme can be applied for identification w.r.t passive
adversaries and using random oracle model, the protocol can be made non-interactive
as in any Σ protocol.
• Statement: P knows discrete log of y w.r.t. g, where these are members of some
group G of order d, and g is a generator.
• Public input: g, y
• Prover’s private input: x such that y = gx.
• P → V: P chooses random k ∈ Zq, and sends t = gk.
• P ← V: V chooses c R← {0, 1}l and sends c to Alice.
• P → V: P sends r = k + cx (mod d) to Bob.
• Verification: V verifies that tyc = gr.
The completeness of the protocol is trivially achieved with probability 1. For the
soundness, we have the Σ condition: if c 6= c′ then given t and c 6= c′ and r 6= r′









but since we know c, c′ we can take this to the power (c− c′)−1 (mod d)
to get an equation of the form y = gx. In particular, suppose that the cheating prover
P ′ is able to successfully carry out the above protocol without knowing x. That is,
P ′, after having committed to a t, is able to answer the challenge c with a response r
satisfying gr = tyc. Note that, for a fixed t, the last equation corresponds each challenge
c to a unique response r. Thus, provided the discrete logarithm problem is hard in
G, P ′ needs to guess c correctly beforehand in order to provide an accepting answer;
P ′ will first choose r
R← Zd, then computes t = gry−c and sends it as a commitment
in the first step of the protocol. In this way, when P ′ receives the correctly guessed
c, he will simply answer with r. This results in a soundness error equal to 2−l, which
corresponds to the probability of correctly guessing the challenge c. As a consequence,
the higher the parameter l, the better for the soundness of the protocol. However,
we cannot increase this parameter indefinitely since this would compromise the zero
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knowledgeness of the protocol. Finally, for the zero knowledge property, we want now
to prohibit the verifier from learning anything from the prover apart from the validity
of the statement. For this, we provide the following simulator:
1. Generate uniformly a random challenge c′
R← {0, 1}l. Choose a random r R← Zd,
compute t = gry−c
′
, then sends it to the verifier.
2. Get c from the verifier.
3. If c = c′, the simulator sends back r. Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the
verifier).
The prover’s first message in the protocol is a random value t in G, and so is the
simulator’s. Moreover, the distributions of the responses of the prover and of the
simulator are identical. Finally, we observe that the simulator runs in expected time
2l and adjusting l to a factor logarithmic in the security parameter ensures that the
simulator will run in expected polynomial time.
Non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK)
This notion consists of a prover who tries to convince a verifier of the validity of
some assertion in one move, i.e. without interaction with the verifier. The basic
zero knowledge requirement for such proofs consists in exhibiting an efficient simulator
outputting messages indistinguishable from the prover’s. It is worth noting here that
the definition of the zero knowledge requirement for these proofs is simplified because
the verifier cannot affect the prover’s actions. The most famous technique to obtain
NIZK from their interactive variants is known as the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [Fiat and
Shamir, 1986]. It consists of letting the prover compute the verifier’s challenge himself
as a hash of the statement to be proved and of the first message. The security of this
construction is provided only in the random oracle model.
CCA vs. ZKP
In an encryption scheme, the adversary may be given access to a decryption oracle
which takes as input any ciphertext C and returns the underlying plaintext. In partic-
ular, the adversary receives the ciphertext C. Then, the adversary may interact with
the decryption oracle, obtaining the plaintext corresponding to any ciphertext(s) C ′
of the adversary’s choosing. The encryption scheme is said to be “chosen-ciphertext
secure” if the contents of C remain hidden from the adversary even after interaction
with the decryption oracle.
45
In order to achieve chosen-ciphertext-secure (interactive) public-key encryption, we
can use interactive (zero-knowledge) proofs of knowledge. A message m is encrypted
using public key pk via C = Encrypt(m, r) for random r, and then executing an in-
teractive proof-of-knowledge (with the receiver) of m and r. Unfortunately, while this
construction is sufficient to achieve non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext security, it does
not guarantee adaptive chosen-ciphertext security when the proof of knowledge is mal-
leable [Katz, 2002] since there is nothing in the definition of a zero knowledge proof
that prevents an adversary from mutating a proof of knowledge of m into a (zero
knowledge, but still valid) proof of knowledge for some other message m′, for which a
decryption of the corresponding ciphertext yields information about m. As shown by
[Katz, 2002, Sahai, 1999], it is possible to construct zero knowledge proofs having the
property that a proof of one statement cannot be adapted or mutated into a proof of
another statement (a property known as non-malleability). Using non-malleable zero
knowledge proofs, it is then possible to construct cryptosystems which avoid the above
flaw and hence achieve CCA security [Jao, 2009].
2.8.4 Plaintext-Awareness
In [Bellare and Rogaway, 1994], a new notion for encryption schemes is defined as
plaintext-awareness (PA), which is further refined in [Bellare et al., 1998]. The idea
is that an adversary is aware of the decryption of the messages which she encrypts
in the sense that she cannot produce a ciphertext without knowing the corresponding
plaintext. The notion requires that some (universal) algorithm K (the knowledge
extractor) can usually decrypt whatever ciphertext an adversary B may output, just
by watching the hash function queries which B makes.
An adversary B for plaintext awareness is given a public key pk and access to the
random oracle H and an encryption oracle εHpk. The adversary outputs a ciphertext y,
which is not equal to the output of the εHpk oracle. To be plaintext aware the adversary
B should necessarily know the decryption x of its output y. To formalize this, it
is demanded there exist some (universal) algorithm K (the plaintext extractor) that
could have output x just by looking at the public key, B’s H-queries and the answers
to them, and the answers to B’s queries to εHpk [Bellare et al., 1998].
Let Π = (Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt), be an encryption scheme, let B be an adversary,
and let K be an algorithm (the knowledge extractor). For any l ∈ N define
SuccK,B,Π(l) = Pr[H ← Hash; (pk, sk)← Keygen(1l); (hH,C, y)← runBH,εHpk(pk) :
K(hH,C, y, pk) = DecryptH(sk, y)]
Here, runBH,ε
H
pk(pk) means: Run B on input pk and oracles H, εHpk, and record B’s
interaction with its oracles, form it into a list hH all of B’s H-oracle queries and
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the corresponding answers, form it into a list C all of B’s εHpk-oracle answers (i.e. the
ciphertexts received, but the messages that formed the actual queries are not recorded).
Finally, record B’s output, y.
We say that K is a λ(l)-extractor if K has running time polynomial in the length of its
inputs and for every adversary B, SuccK,B,Π(l) ≥ λ(l). We say that Π is secure in the
sense of PA if Π is secure in the sense of IND-CPA and there exists a λ(l)-extractor K
where 1− λ(l) is negligible.
We comment that the above stated definition of plaintext awareness is only achievable
in the random oracle model. However, in [Bellare and Palacio, 2004], the authors
defined plaintext awareness in the standard model and in [Teranishi and Ogata, 2006],
it is shown that combining a one-way secure encryption and plaintext awareness implies
IND-CCA security. In the random oracle model, we can show that a plaintext-aware
scheme is non-malleable and also secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Thus,
CCA will not help because the adversary already knows the plaintext of any ciphertext,
whose decryption she might request from an available decryption box.
2.9 Identity Based Cryptography
Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) is invented by Adi Shamir [Shamir, 1984]. In his
paper, the author was only able to present an application of Identity Based Signature
(IBS), although it was an open problem until 2001, when the first practical and secure
IBE scheme is constructed in the pioneering work of Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara
[Sakai et al., 2000], where they presented a non-interactive key agreement scheme in
identity-based setting using bilinear pairings.
Identity based cryptography can be specified as a special form of public key cryptog-
raphy with a difference: There is no need for the binding of the peer identity and
its public key as in public key cryptography, where this binding is provided through
the certification authority (CA) that is part of a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). In
identity-based setting, the public key of a user is simply his identity, simplifying the
PKI requirements. The corresponding secret key is issued by a trusted Private Key
Generator (PKG), who derives it from a master secret that only the PKG knows, and
who is assumed to have an out-of-band way to verify the identity of the user. This
eliminates some of the costs associated to PKIs and certificates, and opens the way
to more efficient schemes. Since the public key of an entity can be his email address,
IP address or his identity, there is no need for a PKI, a CA and/or CA hierarchy,
key directory, centralized online authority and pair wise pre-shared secrets among all
involved parties. Only the offline authority PKG is necessary for keying and for adding
a timestamp or a sequence number to the identity proposed by the entity when joining
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the system, to avoid collisions in name space. Since the public key of an entity is equal
to its identity, there is no need for a trusted third party to certify its public key or an
online PKI to generate, verify and broadcast the public key. After the private-key is
extracted, an entity has no need to communicate with the PKG, so the PKG is kept
offline.
2.9.1 Identity Based Signature
Digital signatures are among the most basic primitives in cryptography, providing
authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation in an asymmetric setting. In their most
basic form, each user in the system generates his own key pair consisting of a public key
and a corresponding secret key, and the user is assumed to be uniquely identified by his
public key. In the real world however, users are generally not identified by randomly
generated keys, but by more meaningful identities like their names or email addresses.
To map public keys to real-world identities, the PKI needs to be set up, for example
involving a hierarchy of trusted certification authorities (CAs) that can certify public
keys as belonging to a certain user [Kiltz and Neven, 2009].
From a security point of view, the major drawback of identity-based cryptography is
the inherent key escrow property: the PKG can derive the secret keys of all users in
the system, and must therefore be trusted not to abuse this power. This is unlike a
traditional PKI, where the CA only issues certificates on user-generated public keys, but
does not know the corresponding secret keys. While most people find it a discomforting
thought that a malafide PKG can sign any message on their behalf, one should be
aware that the same type of fraud is possible in the public-key setting as well. Namely,
since the certificate is usually sent along with the signature, a cheating CA can always
generate a fake certificate for a public key of which it knows the corresponding secret
key, and thereby create valid signatures. The victim could try to prove his innocence
by showing his real certificate to a judge, but nothing prevents the CA from claiming
that the user registered two different public keys. The escrow property is therefore
not so much an issue for signatures as it is for encryption, where a malafide PKG can
actually decrypt ciphertexts intended for any of its users. So even though there is no
legitimate use for escrow of signing keys, a limited form of key escrow is inherently
present in both PKI-based and ID-based signature schemes [Kiltz and Neven, 2009].
An IBS scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify. The first
three may be randomized but the last is not.
• Setup: The trusted key distribution center runs the setup algorithm Setup on
input 1k to obtain a master public key Mpk and the master secret key Msk,
where Msk is only known to PKG. (Here, 1
k is the unary notation of the security
parameter k.)
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• Extract: Given an arbitrary identifier string ID = {0, 1}∗ andMsk, the algorithm
returns the signing key dID associated to the given identity. The signing key is
assumed to be securely communicated to the user in question.
• Sign: Given the signing key of identity ID, and a message m ∈M , the algorithm
returns the signature σ on the message m.
• Verify: Given σ, the message m, identity ID and Mpk, the algorithm returns
either 1 if σ is valid for ID and m, or 0.
To be consistent, an IBS scheme must satisfy Verify (σ, ID,m,Mpk) = 1 with proba-
bility one for all messages m ∈M and k ∈ N, ID,M whenever the keys Mpk,Msk, dID
are generated as indicated above.
The securit notion for an IBS scheme is defined as existential unforgeability under cho-
sen message and chosen-identity attack (EUF-CMA). This notion is described through
an experiment with a forger F parameterized with the security parameter k. The ex-
periment begins with the generation of a fresh master key pair (Mpk,Msk)← Setup(1k).
The forger F is run on input the master public key Mpk, and has access to the oracles:
• Extract: On input identity ID, this oracle returns a secret signing key dID.
• Sign: On input ID and message m ∈M , this oracle returns a signature σ.
At the end of its execution, the forger outputs identity ID∗, message m∗ and a forged
signature σ∗. The forger is said to win the game if Verify (σ∗, ID∗,m∗,Mpk) = 1 and
F never queried Extract (ID∗) or Sign(m∗, ID∗).
The advantage AdvIBS,F (k) is defined as the probability that F wins the game, and IBS
is said to be EUF-CMA secure if AdvIBS,F (k) is negligible in k for all polynomial-time
forgers F . As noted before, the first IBS scheme is described by Shamir [Shamir, 1984]
that is summarized as below.
• Setup: This algorithm returns an RSA key pair as described in section 2.7.1.
Next, we set Mpk = (n, e) and Msk = (n, e, d). Also, H : {0, 1}∗ → HRange and
G : {0, 1}∗ → GRange are hash functions, modeled as random oracles.
• Extract: Compute x = H(ID)d mod n and return the signing key dID = (n, e, x).
• Sign: Randomly select t ← Z∗n and compute T = te mod n, c = G(T ||m) and
s← xtc mod n. The signature is σ = (T, s).
• Verify: If se = H(ID)TG(T ||m) mod n then return 1, else return 0.
This scheme is EUF-CMA secure under the RSA assumption [Kiltz and Neven, 2009].
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Forking Lemma
Forking Lemma was introduced by David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern [Pointcheval
and Stern, 2000], which is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital
signature scheme instantiated in the random oracle model. The forking lemma states
that if an adversary (typically a probabilistic Turing machine), on inputs drawn from
some distribution, produces an output that has some property with non-negligible
probability, then with non-negligible probability, if the adversary is re-run on new
inputs but with the same random tape, its second output will also have the property.
They show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability,
then there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random
tape can create a second forgery in an attack with a different random oracle. The
forking lemma has been used to prove the security of a variety of digital signature
schemes and other random-oracle based cryptographic constructions.
The forking Lemma of [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000] is designed for the generic digi-
tal signature schemes that are based on any three-pass honest-verifier zero-knowledge
identification protocol. Let (σ1, h, σ2) be a round of the identification protocol, we get
a digital signature scheme by replacing the query of the verifier by the hash value of
the message m to be signed together with the commitment σ1 which is bound not to
change, namely, h = H(m,σ1), where H is the hash function. Thus, a signature of
a message m is a triple (σ1, h, σ2), where σ1 is the commitment sent by the prover,
h = H(m,σ1) is the random challenge chosen by the verifier and σ2 is the answer of
the prover, which satisfies the verification test for the signature scheme.
Theorem 2.2. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine whose in-
put only consists of public data. We denote respectively by Q and R the number of
queries that A can ask to the random oracle and the number of queries that A can
ask to the signer. Assume that, within a time bound T , A produces, with probability
ǫ ≥ 10(R+1)(R+Q)/2k, a valid signature (m,σ1, h, σ2). If the triples (σ1, h, σ2) can be
simulated without knowing the secret key, with an indistinguishable distribution proba-
bility, then there is another machine which has control over the machine obtained from
A replacing interac- tion with the signer by simulation and produces two valid signatures
(m,σ1, h, σ2) and (m,σ1, h
′, σ′2) such that h 6= h′ in expected time T ′ ≤ 120686QT/ǫ.
Here the hash functionH outputs k-bit long elements, where k is the security parameter
of the signature scheme.
In [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000] an application of the forking lemma to the Schnorr
Digital Signature Scheme is presented, where the authors only have to prove that
the triples (σ1, h, σ2) produced by the signer and the random oracle can be simulated
without the knowledge of the signer’s secret.
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The forking lemma was later generalized in [Bellare and Neven, 2006], which is defined
on input the public parameters x as follows.
1. Pick a random tape r for A.
2. Pick h1, ..., hq uniformly from H.
3. Run A on input (x, h1, ..., hq; r) to produce (J, σ2).
4. If J = 0, then return (0, 0, 0).
5. Pick h′J , ..., h
′
q uniformly from H.
6. Run A on input (x, h1, ..., hJ−1, h
′
J , ..., h
′
q; r) to produce (J
′, σ′2).
7. If J ′ = J and hJ 6= h′J then return (1, σ2, σ′2), otherwise, return (0, 0, 0).
For example, let A be an algorithm for breaking a digital signature scheme in the
random oracle model. Then x would be the public parameters (including the public
key) A is attacking, and hi would be the output of the random oracle on its i
th distinct
input. The forking lemma is of use when it would be possible, given two different
random signatures of the same message, to solve some underlying hard problem. An
adversary that forges once, however, gives rise to one that forges twice on the same
message with non-negligible probability through the forking lemma. When A attempts
to forge on a message m, we consider the output of A to be (J, σ2) where σ2 is the
forgery, and J is such that m was the J th unique query to the random oracle (it may be
assumed that A will query m at some point, if A is to be successful with non-negligible
probability). (If A outputs an incorrect forgery, we consider the output to be (0, σ2))
By the forking lemma, the probability of obtaining two good forgeries σ2 and σ
′
2 on
the same message but with different random oracle outputs (that is, with hJ 6= h′J is
non-negligible when the probability of forging a signature is also non-negligible. This
allows us to prove that if the underlying hard problem is indeed hard, then no adversary
can forge signatures.
2.9.2 Identity Based Encryption
Identity-based encryption was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [Shamir, 1984], which
aims to encrypt a message by just using the identity of the intended recipient. Several
partial and inefficient solutions were proposed after Shamir’s initial challenge but it
was only in 2000 that Sakai et al. [Sakai et al., 2000], Boneh and Franklin [Boneh
and Franklin, 2003], and Cocks [Cocks, 2001] came up with very practical solutions.
Although [Sakai et al., 2000]’s work is the first practical IBE scheme that is almost
51
identical to the scheme presented in [Boneh and Franklin, 2003], the work of Boneh-
Franklin included also a security reduction, appropriate assumptions, definitions, the
choice of right curves, how to encode and map elements into points, etc. Besides Cocks’
scheme is the first IBE that does not use pairings but rather it works in standard RSA
groups and its security relies on the standard quadratic residuosity assumption. The
scheme of [Cocks, 2001] encrypts the message bit by bit and thus it is considered very
bandwidth consuming, however it can be used in practice to encrypt short session keys.
An IBE scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, Setup generates the parameters of the
scheme, master public key Mpk and the master secret key Msk, where Msk is only
known to PKG. In addition, the description of a finite message space M and the
description of a finite ciphertext space C are part of the scheme parameters.
• Extract: Given an arbitrary identifier string ID = {0, 1}∗ and the system param-
eters, the algorithm returns the private key dID associated to the given identity.
• Encrypt: Given the system parameters, a message m ∈ M and an identity ID,
the algorithm returns a ciphertext c ∈ C
• Decrypt: Given a ciphertext c ∈ C, and a private key dID of identity ID, the
algorithm returns either ⊥ or the message m.
To be consistent, an IBE scheme must satisfy the following condition for all messages
in M . ∀ m ∈M Decrypt (c, dID) = m where c = Encrypt(ID,m).
In IBE, an arbitrary string is given as a public key, which is input to the extract
algorithm to generate the corresponding secret key. When joining the system, identity
Idk of an entity k which is unique and easily verifiable by the PKG, could be the
email address of k with temporal or spatial properties (e.g.,a@b.com@date@site). For
instance, by using a hash function H1 and a specific IBE scheme called Boneh-Franklin
IBE [Boneh and Franklin, 2003], PKG extracts the secret key only one time from the
master secret key x of the system and Idk, namely dk = xH1(Idk) which is sent back to
k in a secure, out-of-band side channel. If the identity of k has the form user@time, the
PKG can proactively refresh the identity of the entity by updating the time portion
of the identity and generate a new private key using the updated identity in case
of exposure of the private key. Thus, ephemeral identities like user@time cause key
updating process to be very easy. Due to compromise of the secret key, Bob requests
a new secret key with a partial update in the time portion of the identity bob@time.
The same update method could be applied in proactive refreshing of identity and secret
key, since the time portion determines valid period of the secret key.
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Let us describe the advantages of IBE when used in mobile ad hoc networks. First,
there is no need for certificates, which results in better performance than other CA
based systems when the bandwidth is limited as in the case of mobile ad hoc networks.
Also, the computing complexity is much more low in IBE compared to RSA-based
systems due to the use of elliptic curve cryptography. For instance a public key in
RSA is a number several thousand bits long without a concept of identity, requiring
a certificate to tie the public key to an identity, whereas the public key of Bob in
IBE is like bob@b.com. Also, by adding different parameters to the identity, namely
bob@b.com@date@site, Bob can use the same identity in different systems with dif-
ferent life time of keys, which provides advantages in case of compromise of his secret
keys. This representation provides high semantics due to the date and the location in-
formation, it suggests a routing path and an easier resource discovery of special nodes
in the ad hoc network. Moreover, if an entity is malicious or compromised, the PKG
leaves the peer out of the system either by making its identity or key invalid. A sender-
only-user does not need to request any private key, only users who wants to receive
information from other nodes need to pass by the offline PKG regularly to request
keying. To avoid that the PKG becomes a single point of failure, a group of n PKGs
could be used to share the system’s master secret key x so that any node can derive
its secret key by combining the shares of its secret key from any t PKGs. Hence, if
the number of compromised PKGs does not exceed the threshold value, the privacy of
the nodes is protected. Thus, multiple PKGs enabled by threshold cryptography or
hierarchical PKGs could provide secret keys to avoid single point of failure of one PKG
and decrease the effect of compromised PKGs. Also to support large ad hoc networks,
hierarchical PKG structures could be employed, which is also useful for nodes changing
their locations frequently between different systems. The offline entity PKG can have
different policies depending on the behaviors of the nodes, namely cooperativeness in
relaying, reputable or badly behaving nodes. This may include extracting keys valid
for different time periods, excluding peers from the system by identity blacklisting or
key expiring. A peer can join, leave, change location or status anywhere and anytime in
the network because it has a time and location invariant identity uniquely identifying
itself within the system.Asynchronous communication is enabled since any node can
receive information from other nodes before obtaining his private key or if it is in idle
state to save energy. Any form of communication is possible such as relayed, multi-hop
communication.
Classification of IBE systems
In [Boyen, 2007], a classification of the known identity-based encryption schemes is
presented, which we summarize as below.
• Quadratic Residuosity IBE (without pairings): Cock’s IBE that is secure in the
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Random Oracle Model, and further extensions of it presented in [Boneh et al.,
2007, Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] both secure in ROM. Except for this class, the
rest of the IBE schemes are based on pairings.
• Full Domain Hash IBE: This is the class of the Boneh-Franklin IBE [Boneh and
Franklin, 2003], and to which the earlier Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara identity-based
key exchange [Sakai et al., 2000] also belongs. Both secure in the random oracle
model.
• Exponent Inversion IBE: This approach to IBE can be traced to an idea of Mit-
sunary, Sakai, and Kasahara in the context of traitor tracing. A benefit of this
type of construction is that there is no need to hash directly on the curve. This
category includes the Sakai-Kasahara scheme originally described in [Sakai and
Kasahara, 2003] and later proven secure in [Chen and Cheng, 2005] in the ran-
dom oracle model. The category also includes the second of two IBE schemes
proposed by Boneh and Boyen [Boneh and Boyen, 2004], which has a selective-
identity proof of security in the standard model. All these schemes rely on the
BDHI complexity assumption called Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (BDHI).
• Commutative Blinding IBE: The last category of IBE systems descends from
Boneh and Boyen’s scheme, the first scheme given in [Boneh and Boyen, 2004].
It is actually this scheme that is the basis for the first fuzzy IBE scheme described
in [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. The systems in this category are based on the same
BDH assumption as the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme.
2.9.3 Bilinear Groups and Maps
Pairing-based IBE systems makes use of a bilinear map or pairing, which is implemented
using a weil or a tate pairing on elliptic curves. For a more detailed explanation on
pairings the reader is referred to [Galbarith et al., 2006]. We briefly review the necessary
facts about pairings and the groups over which they are defined. For a prime p, we
denote the finite field of order p by Zp. Wet let Z
∗
p denote the multiplicative group of
order p − 1 consisting of the elements in Zp \ {0}. Let G1 and G2 be two (possibly
distinct, but isomorphic) cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 be
respective generators of G1 and G2. A pairing is a bilinear function eˆ : G1 × G2 → F
that maps pairs of elements in G1,G2 to elements of a group F, where F is another
multiplicative group of order p. eˆ and the group operations in G1,G2, and F can be
performed efficiently. The identity elements are denoted by 1G1 , 1G2 and 1F respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that:
• Bilinear: The map eˆ : G1 × G2 → F is bilinear if eˆ(ua, vb) = eˆ(u, v)ab ∀u ∈ G1,
∀v ∈ G2 and ∀a, b ∈ Z.
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• Non-degenerate: For u ∈ G1, eˆ(u, v) = 1F ∀v ∈ G2 iff u = 1G1 . Non-degeneracy
means the mapping cannot be the trivial map which sends every pair of elements
of G1 and G2 to the identity element of F. Because all are groups of prime order,
it follows that if g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of G2, then e(g1, g2)
is a generator of F.
• Computable: eˆ(u, v) is efficiently computed ∀u ∈ G1, ∀v ∈ G2
We say that G1,G2 forms a bilinear group pair, and that eˆ is a bilinear map from
(G1,G2) into F. The above definition is general in the sense that no special constraint
is placed on G1 and G2 other than having prime order p. In a number of applications,
however, it is important to require that G1 and G2 be the same group (i.e. G1 = G2);
this leads to the notion of symmetric bilinear pairing eˆ : G×G→ F. The designers of
encryption schemes have tended to prefer symmetric pairings, favoring simplicity over
generality [Boneh and Boyen, 2004]. In order to be consistent with the notation of
the current IBE and fuzzy IBE schemes, we opt for the simple symmetric formulation.
Despite the fact that CDH is hard to solve in G, the decisional DH can be easy in G.
Indeed, there is an important class of groups in which the DDH is easy and the DH
and DL problems are believed to be hard. These are the “Diffie-Hellman gap groups”
that are used in pairing-based cryptography [Koblitz and Menezes, 2010]. To prove
that we define a bilinear map eˆ : G × G → F, where G is an additive group of points
of an elliptic curve and F is an multiplicative group of a finite field.
Given (g, gx, gy, gz), where z = xy mod q, distinguishing between the distributions
(g, gx, gy, gz) and (g, gx, gy, gr) is easy since eˆ(g, g)z = eˆ(g, gz) = eˆ(gx, gy), which can
easily be computed whereas eˆ(g, g)r = eˆ(g, gr) 6= eˆ(gx, gy).
Hence CDH is a stronger problem than DDH due to some particular groups for which
detectingDDH tuples is easy, but solving CDH problems is hard. If the Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard on a group G with an easily computable pairing, then G is a DH gap
group. In fact, groups with pairings are the only known examples of gap groups. For
all other groups we solve DDH simply by finding discrete logs; there is no known way
to solve DDH that is faster than that [Koblitz and Menezes, 2010].
2.9.4 Assumptions based on Bilinear Pairings
For the following assumptions, we have the following notation. G∗ = G \ {1G}, where
1G is the identity element of the bilinear group G and g denotes the generator of G. If
S is a set, then |S| is its cardinality and x R← S denotes the operation of assigning to
x an element of S chosen uniformly at random.
Assumption 2.8. (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)). Let x, y, z
R← Z∗q, g be a generator
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of G and eˆ : G × G → F be a bilinear map. Given (g, gx, gy, gz), computing eˆ(g, g)xyz
is hard.
It can be easily seen that CDH assumption in G or F implies the BDH assumption in
< G,F, eˆ >. However, the reverse implication is still an open problem. The BDH
problem can be reduced to the CDH problem in G by giving the oracle CDH for the
group (g,G). With the input (g, gx, gy) to the CDH oracle, the oracle returns gxy.
Having this value, the BDH problem can be solved easily since eˆ(gxy, gz) = eˆ(g, g)xyz.
Furthermore, the BDH problem can be reduced to the CDH problem in F by defining
k = eˆ(g, g) ∈ F, which implies kx = eˆ(g, gx), ky = eˆ(g, gy) and kz = eˆ(g, gz). The input
kx, ky given to the CDH oracle for the group (k,F) results in the value of kxy, which
is again given as input to the oracle with kz to receive the value kxyz. Having obtained
this value, the solution to the BDH problem is found since kxyz = eˆ(g, gxyz).
Assumption 2.9. (Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH)). Let x, y, z
R← Z∗q, g
be a generator of G and eˆ : G×G→ F be a bilinear pairing. Given (g, gx, gy, gz) dis-
tinguishing between the distributions (g, gx, gy, gz, eˆ(g, g)xyz) and (g, gx, gy, gz, eˆ(g, g)r)
is hard.
Assumption 2.10. (Diffie-Hellman Inversion (DHI)). Let x
R← Z∗q and g be a gener-
ator of G. Given gx ∈ G computing g 1x ∈ G is hard.
It can be shown that the DHI problem can be easy with an oracle access to a CDH
oracle that can compute for any pair of gx, gy ∈ G the value gxy ∈ G. Hence, given an
instance of the DHI problem, one can compute g
1
x ∈ G in polynomial time as follows.
Computing (gx)ϕ(q)−1 is the solution of the problem where tϕ(q) ≡ 1 mod q, ∀t ∈ Z∗q due
to the Euler theorem, which implies tϕ(q)−1 ≡ 1
t
mod q. If t = x then, (gx)ϕ(q)−1 = g
1
x .
The value (gx)ϕ(q)−1 is computed using the CDH oracle and repeated squaring method.
Assumption 2.11. (Collision Attack-1 (k-CAA1)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be a
generator of G. Given (g, gx, h0, (h1, g
1
(h1+x) ), ..., (hk, g
1
(hk+x) )) where hi ∈ Z∗q that are
chosen uniformly random and distinct for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, computing g 1(h0+x) is hard.
Assumption 2.12. (Collision Attack-2 (k-CAA2)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be a gen-
erator of G. Given (g, h0, (h1, g
1
(h1+x) ), ..., (hk, g
1
(hk+x) )) where hi ∈ Z∗q that are chosen
uniformly random and distinct for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, computing g 1(h0+x) is hard.
In [Chen and Cheng, 2005], it is proven that (k − 1)−DHI ⇔ k − CAA2.
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Assumption 2.13. (Strong CAA (k-sCAA1)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be a generator
of G. Given (g, gx, h0, (h1, g
1
(h1+x) ), ..., (hk, g
1
(hk+x) )) where hi ∈ Z∗q that are chosen
uniformly random and distinct for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, computing [h, g 1(h+x) ] for some h ∈ Z∗q
but h /∈ {h1, ..., hk} is hard.
It is vital that the value of h in the computation for (h, g
1
(h0+x) ) must be output,
otherwise the problem is not hard since one only needs to find an r ∈ Z∗q in the form of
r = 1
(h+x)
mod q where h and r are not shown in the problem above [Chen and Cheng,
2005].
Assumption 2.14. (Strong DH (k-sDH)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be a generator of G.




) computing [h, g
1
(h+x) ] for some h ∈ Z∗q is hard.
In [Chen and Cheng, 2005], it is proven that (k − 1)− sCAA1⇔ k − sDH.
Assumption 2.15. (Exponent Problem (k+1)-EP). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be a gener-







Again it is proven that k −DHI ⇔ k + 1− EP .
Assumption 2.16. (Bilinear DH Inversion (k-BDHI)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be




In [Chen and Cheng, 2005], it is proven that BDH ⇔ (1−BDHI).
Assumption 2.17. (Decisional Bilinear DH Inversion (k-DBDHI)). Let k ∈ Z, x R←
Z∗q, g be a generator of G and eˆ : G×G→ F a bilinear pairing. Distinguishing between












x ) is hard.
Additionally, there exists Gap-{.} assumptions, where {.} can be any of the computa-
tional problems that are listed in this chapter. Basically, they assume that a computa-
tional problem is still hard despite the fact that the corresponding decisional problem
is solvable.
Assumption 2.18. (Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (Gap BDH)). Let k ∈ Z, a, b, c R←
Z∗q, g be a generator of G and eˆ : G × G → F a bilinear pairing. Given ga, gb and gc,
computing eˆ(g, g)abc with the help of the DBDH oracle is hard.
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Let us recall the public key encryption scheme called Bilinear ElGamal. Given the
bilinear group (g,G,F) and a pairing eˆ : G×G→ F, choose Q ∈ G, s ∈ Z∗q uniformly
at random and compute T = gs, where s is the secret key and the rest of the values is
the public key. To encrypt a message m ∈ F, we choose r ∈ Z∗q at random and compute
(U, V ) = (gr,meˆ(Q, T )r). To decrypt this ciphertext, m = V/eˆ(U,Q)s.
It is easy to see that the above Bilinear ElGamal scheme is OW-PCA secure assuming
that the Gap-BDH problem is intractable. Here, the plaintext checking (PC) oracle
checks on input of a certain message m′, the public parameters g,Q, T and a cipher-
text (U, V ), whether (g, U,Q, T, V/m′) is a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman tuple. Hence, the
running time and advantage of the OW-PCA attacker is exactly the same as those of
Gap-BDH attacker.
2.9.5 Security Notions of IBE
Similar to the security notions described for public key encryption schemes, Indistin-
guishability is also the right formalization of the security goal for IBE schemes since it
is equivalent to semantic security and it is simple, easy to use and appealing. When
combined with the means of the adversary, we obtain two security notions, where the
weaker notion of security is called as IND-ID-CPA.
IND-ID-CPA security
Here, the adversary is not allowed to issue any decryption query. IND-ID-CPA game
between the adversary and challenger is defined as follows.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with the security parameter k
and returns the adversary the system parameters and the master public keyMpk.
• Phase 1: The adversary issues private key extraction queries adaptively and the
challenger responds with the private keys corresponding to the public key IDi.
Any query made in this phase cannot be presented as the challenge identity in
the next stage.
• Challenge: The adversary outputs equal length plaintexts m0,m1 ∈ M and an
identity IDch, provided that it was not queried in Phase 1. The challenger picks
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends the adversary the encryption of mb under IDch
and Mpk as the challenge.
• Phase 2: The adversary issues extraction queries as in Phase 1, with the restriction
that IDch is not queried.
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• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b′ = b.
Such an adversary is called an IND-ID-CPA adversary A, and its advantage against
the scheme Π with security parameter k is defined as below. The random bits used by
the adversary and challenger defines the probability.
AdvΠ,A(k) = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 | < negl(k)
Since, IND-ID-CPA provides a weak security level, the standard notion of security for
IBE is IND-ID-CCA, which is a natural extension of IND-CCA notion of PKE. The
only difference is that the adversary is allowed to issue decryption queries, with the
restriction that the challenge identity-ciphertext pair is not queried.
Further Attack models
Although the security notions of PKE and IBE are in parallel, IBE schemes have
additional attack models that provide the adversary with more power than in PKE
schemes. This difference is caused by the adversary’s attack on the arbitrary public
key, namely the identity. The adversary is allowed to run the adaptive identity attack or
the selective identity attack, where the former one is stronger than the latter one since
the adversary obtains any private key of the corresponding identity he wishes other than
the challenge identity. This model is called as adaptive chosen identity attack or full
identity attack. However, in selective chosen identity attack, the challenge identity has
to be selected in advance by the adversary before the public parameters are generated.
Although selective identity attack is a weak model, it is the standard attack model for
fuzzy IBE schemes due to the structure of the identity of the users.
IND-sID-CPA
Basically, an IBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure, if no polynomially bounded adversary
A has a non-negligible advantage against the Challenger in the following IND-sID-CPA
game.
• Select: The adversary A selects a target identity ID∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with the security parameter k
and returns the adversary the system parameters and the master public keyMpk.
• Phase 1: The adversary issues private key extraction queries and the challenger
responds with the private keys corresponding to the public key IDi 6= ID∗.
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• Challenge: The adversary outputs equal length plaintexts m0,m1 ∈ M . The
challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends the adversary the encryption
of mb under ID
∗ and Mpk as the challenge.
• Phase 2: The adversary issues adaptively extraction queries as in Phase 1, with
the same restriction on ID∗.
• Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b′ = b.
Such an adversary is called an IND-sID-CPA adversary A, who successfully breaks the
scheme if he guesses the random bit correctly with a probability significantly better
than just random guessing.
Current pairing based fuzzy IBE schemes are proven secure according to this model. To
obtain a higher security level, namely, IND-sID-CCA, it is suggested to use a generic
construction that converts an IND-ID-CPA secure scheme to an IND-ID-CCA one.
2.10 Fuzzy IBE
In Eurocrypt’05, Sahai and Waters [Sahai and Waters, 2005] proposed a new Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) system called fuzzy IBE that uses biometric attributes as the
identity instead of an arbitrary string like an email address. Besides, fuzzy IBE could
be applied in the context of Attribute-Based Encryption [Pirretti et al., 2006, Sahai
and Waters, 2005], where the sender encrypts data using a set of attributes such as
{university, faculty, department} and the ciphertext could only be decrypted if the
receiver has the secret key associated to all of these attributes or sufficient number
of them. The properties of this new system is summarized in section 2.2.7. Although
introduced as a new concept in [Sahai and Waters, 2005], current fuzzy IBE schemes are
based on previous constructions on Hierarchical IBE (HIBE), multi-receiver identity
based broadcast encryption and Boneh-Franklin IBE. These constructions are combined
with Shamir’s secret sharing scheme that provides the error-tolerance property. We
review this scheme as below.
2.10.1 Shamir’s secret sharing
A (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is a method for n parties to carry shares si of
a message s such that any t of the them to reconstruct the message, but so that no
t− 1 of them can easy do so. The threshold scheme is perfect if knowledge of t− 1 or
fewer shares provides no information regarding s.
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Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold scheme provides an elegant construction of a perfect (t, n)-
threshold scheme using a classical algorithm called Lagrange interpolation. First we
introduce Lagrange interpolation as a theorem.
Theorem 2.3. (Lagrange interpolation). Given t distinct points (xi, yi) of the form








xi − xj . (2.1)
Shamir’s scheme is defined for a secret s ∈ Zp with p prime, by setting a0 = s, and






for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The shares (i, f(i)) are distributed to the n distinct parties. Since
the secret is the constant term s = a0 = f(0), the secret is recovered from any t shares








j − i .
Properties: Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is (1) perfect — no information is leaked by
the shares, (2) ideal — every share is of the same size p as the secret, and (3) involves
no unproven hypotheses.
Current fuzzy IBE/IBS schemes combine pairing based encryption/signature schemes
and Shamir’s secret sharing in order to achieve error-tolerant encryption for biometric
identities. Briefly, the first construction of fuzzy IBE for small universe of attributes
is simplified version of threshold bilinear ElGamal encryption and the large universe
construction is almost identitical to the Boneh-Boyen IBE [Boneh and Boyen, 2004]
scheme. In [Pirretti et al., 2006], the large universe construction of Sahai and Waters
is used by replacing the computationally expensive T function with a hash function to
design an efficient Attribute based encryption scheme in the ROM. The third paper
on fuzzy IBE is almost identitical to the broadcast IBE scheme of [Baek et al., 2005]
and finally, the only scheme that considers the anonymity of the fuzzy IBE is based on
Boneh-Franklin IBE. In the following sections, we summarize the base IBE schemes of
current fuzzy IBE systems.
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2.10.2 Based on Boneh-Boyen IBE
In [Boneh and Boyen, 2004], the authors construct a selective identity secure Hierar-
chical IBE (HIBE) without random oracles, where selective identity secure IBE is a
slightly weaker security model than the standard security model for IBE. In a Hierar-
chical IBE, identities are vectors. A vector of dimension n represents an identity at
depth n.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k0 that determines the size of the group,
the parameters of the scheme are generated as follows. Choose a bilinear group
(G,F, eˆ) where G,F are of prime order p and g is a generator of G. For now,
we assume identities (ID) of depth of n are vectors of elements in Znp . We write
ID = (w1, ..., wn) ∈ Znp . The j-th component corresponds to the identity at
level j. We also assume messages to be encrypted are elements in G. The HIBE
system works as follows:
To generate system parameters for an HIBE of maximum depth n, select a random
generator g ∈ G, a random α ∈ Zp, and set g1 = gα. Next, pick random elements
t1, ..., tn ∈ G and a random element g2 ∈ G. The public parameters params and
the master secret key are given by params = (g, g1, g2, t1, ..., tn) and Msk = g
α
2 .
For j = {1, ..., n} we define Fj : Zp → G to be the function: Fj(x) = gx1 tj.
• Extract: To generate the private key dID for an identity ID = (w1, ..., wj) ∈ Zjp
of depth j, pick random r1, ..., rj ∈ Zjp and output






rk , gr1 , ..., grj)
• Encrypt: Given the plaintextm ∈ G, params and identity ID = (w1, ..., wj) ∈ Zjp ,
pick a random s ∈ Zp, and output
c = (A,B,C1, ...Cj) = eˆ(g1, g2)
s ·m, gs, F1(w1)s, ..., Fj(wj)s
• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext (A,B,C1, ...Cj) encrypted using the public key ID
and dID = (d0, ..., dj), the receiver decrypts as



















Boneh-Boyen IBE is IND-sID-CPA secure based on the decisional BDH problem.
The first paper on fuzzy IBE describes two schemes, where the first scheme is designed
for small universe of attributes (i.e. biometric features) based on a threshold version
of bilinear ElGamal, and the second scheme is designed for large universe of attributes
based on the Boneh-Boyen scheme with slight modifications. In particular, we replace
the identity vector, by the feature vector of the user, and choose a random polynomial







2.10.3 Based on Boneh-Franklin IBE
The fuzzy IBE scheme of [van Liesdonk, 2007] is based on the multi-receiver version
of Boneh-Franklin IBE [Boneh and Franklin, 2003] and shamir’s secret sharing. Let us
briefly review Boneh-Franklin IBE, which is also called as BasicIdent.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, the parameters of the scheme are generated
as follows.
1. Choose a bilinear group (G,F, eˆ) where G,F are of prime order q and g is a
generator of G.
2. Choose s ∈ Z∗q and compute Ppub = gs ∈ G∗ as the master public key.
3. Select two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗ and H2 : F →
{0, 1}n for some n.
The message space is M = {0, 1}n and the ciphertext space is C = G∗ × {0, 1}n.
The system parameters are (q,G,F, eˆ, n, g, Ppub, H1, H2).
The master public key is Ppub = g
s ∈ G∗ and the master secret key is Msk = s.
• Extract: Given an identifier string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the master secret key s,
the algorithm returns the private key dID = Q
s
ID ∈ G∗ associated to the given
identity, where QID = H1(ID) ∈ G∗.
• Encrypt: Given the plaintext m ∈ M , Ppub and identity ID compute QID =
H1(ID) ∈ G∗ choose r ∈ Z∗q uniformly at random and compute the ciphertext as
c = (gr,m⊕H2(eˆ(QID, Ppub)r)
• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext c = (U, V ) ∈ C encrypted using the public key ID
and dID, the receiver decrypts as m = V ⊕H2(eˆ(U, dID)) since
eˆ(dID, U)) = eˆ(Q
s
ID, g
r) = eˆ(QID, g)
rs = eˆ(QID, g
s)r
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For the security reduction in ROM, a public key encryption scheme called BasicPub is
defined and an IND-ID-CPA attack on BasicIdent is converted to a IND-CPA attack
on BasicPub to show that private key extraction queries are useless for the adversary.
Finally the reduction from the BDH assumption into an IND-CPA attack on BasicPub
is shown.
Since BasicIdent is malleable, it is not secure in the sense of IND-ID-CCA. In [Boneh
and Franklin, 2003], BasicIdent is converted into IND-ID-CCA scheme by applying the
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, which results in the FullIdent scheme in the ran-
dom oracle model. Hence, BasicIdent is converted to the IND-ID-CCA secure scheme
FullIdent.
2.10.4 Based on Baek et al.’s IBE
An obvious way to construct an IBE scheme for the multi user setting is simply en-
crypting a message n times using BasicIdent, where n is the number of receivers.
Written in additive notation, the message m is encrypted as
{(r1P,m⊕H2(eˆ(H1(ID1), Ppub)r1), ..., (rnP,m⊕H2(eˆ(H1(IDn), Ppub)rn)} where ri ∈ Z∗q
are uniformly chosen at random. However, the performance of that construction is very
bad since, one needs n pairing computations to compute eˆ(H1(IDi), Ppub), n scalar
multiplications with elements in G to compute riP , n exponentiations in group F to
compute (eˆ(H1(ID1), Ppub)
rn and finally the evaluations of the hash function H1 are
done on the points of an elliptic curve. The ciphertext length is n(l1 + l2) where l1
is the length of an element of the group G and l2 is the length of the message. It is
exactly this construction that is used in [van Liesdonk, 2007] to design an anonymous
fuzzy IBE scheme, since Boneh-Franklin IBE guarantees recipient anonymity.
In [Baek et al., 2005], to improve the performance of the multi-receiver Boneh-Franklin
IBE, the randomness re-use technique is proposed to decrease the number of multiplica-
tions in the group G, namely instead of having a different riP for each user, a common
rP can be used, which results in n − 1 less multiplications. However, this does not
effect the exponentiations and pairing computations, where each paring computation
is equal to roughly 10 exponentiation computations.
In [Baek et al., 2005], the selective multi identity attack (sMID) is chosen as the main
attack model to prove an IBE scheme in multi-user setting. This attack model is a weak
model where the attacker commits ahead of time the list of identities of the receivers
that it intends to attack, whereas in full identity attack (MID) model, the attacker
adaptively chooses the identities that will be challenged.
In [Baek et al., 2005], the following scheme is proven secure in the sense of indis-
tinguishability of encryptions under selective multi-ID, chosen plaintext attack (IND-
sMID-CPA) based on the BDDH problem in ROM. To be consistent with the notation
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of the scheme, we continue with the additive notation.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, the parameters of the scheme are generated
as follows.
1. Choose a bilinear group (G,F, eˆ) where G and F are of prime order q and
P is a generator of G.
2. Choose s and Q uniformly at random s ∈ Z∗q, Q ∈ G∗ and compute T = sP .
3. Select a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗.
The message space is M = {0, 1}l and the ciphertext space is C = (G∗)n+1 × F.
The system parameters are (q,G,F, eˆ, P, T,Q,H) and the master secret key is
Msk = s.
• Extract: Given an identifier string IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the master secret key s, the
algorithm returns the private key di = sH(IDi) ∈ G∗ associated to the given
identity.
• Encrypt: Given the plaintext m ∈ M , the system parameters and a list of iden-
tities ID∗ = (ID1, ..., IDn) choose r ∈ Z∗q uniformly at random and compute
the ciphertext as c = (U, V1, ..., Vn,W, L) = (rP, rH(ID1) + rQ, ..., rH(IDn) +
rQ, eˆ(Q, T )rm,L),
where L is a label that contains information about how Vi is associated with each
receiver. There is no need for the sender to perform a pairing computation if
eˆ(Q, T ) is precomuted and provided as a PKG’s common parameter.
• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext c = (U, V1, ..., Vn,W, L) ∈ C encrypted using ID∗















The idea of the proof is again to construct an adversary B that tries to solve the
BDDH problem using an adversary A that attacks the above scheme.
As noted before selective multi-identity attack model is a weak model compared to the
fully adaptive model, where the attacker adaptively chooses which identity to attack
and outputs the list of challenge multiple identities in the challenger phase after it sees
public parameters instead of ahead of time. The cost of this stronger attack model
is the inefficient reduction in the security proof due to the difficulty in generating
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a challenge ciphertext while handling the random oracle and key extraction queries,
whereas in selective attack model every phase of the game could be programmed at
the beginning according to the BDDH parameters. Consequently, the probability that
the list of identities A chooses before the challenge phase to be challenged on matches
the guess of B is at least ( 1
qH
)n where n denotes the number of receivers.
By integrating the shamir’s secret sharing into this scheme, we obtain the fuzzy IBE
schemes described in [Baek et al., 2007].
2.10.5 Based on Sakai-Kasahara IBE
In [Sakai and Kasahara, 2003], the authors describe efficient identity based cryptosys-
tems including an efficient IBE scheme, which could only be proven secure in 2005 by
the authors of [Chen and Cheng, 2005]. The main difference of Sakai-Kasahara Key
Construction to the above presented schemes is that it does not require a MapToPoint
hash function. A MapToPoint hash function converts a user’s identity to a point on
the underlying elliptic curve in IBE schemes. The above presented IBE schemes and
current efficient fuzzy IBE schemes [Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007] employ this
special function, which is usually implemented as a probabilistic algorithm and is more
expensive than a point scalar multiplication in terms of computation time [Chen and
Cheng, 2005, Chen et al., 2006]. This operation is also time consuming and cannot be
treated as a conventional hash operation which is commonly ignored in performance
evaluation. It is known that the cost of a MapToPoint hash operation is bigger than one
inversion in Zp. Besides, as it is noted in [Barreto et al., 2005, Smart and Vercauteren,
2007], it is difficult to find groups as the range of the MapToPoint hash function and
to define an efficient isomorphism at the same time.
Briefly, we review the setup and key generation of Sakai-Kasahara IBE scheme [Sakai
and Kasahara, 2003] as below. Since our new constructions for biometric IBE/IBS
is based on this efficient key construction, detailed analysis is presented in the corre-
sponding chapters.
• Generate two cyclic groups G and F of prime order p, and a bilinear pairing map
eˆ : G×G→ F. Pick a random generator g ∈ G.
• Pick a random s ∈ Z∗p to compute gs and pick a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p .
Here, Msk = s.




Remark 2.1. The secret key is a short signature dA on the message IDA signed under
the private signing key s, which is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attack
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in the random oracle model, provided that the k-sCAA1 assumption is sound in G [Chen
and Cheng, 2005].
Also, based on this key construction, the authors of [Barreto et al., 2005] designed
an IBS scheme, which is shown to be EUF-CMA (Existential Unforgeability under
Chosen Message Attack) secure based on the k−DHI problem. Moreover, the scheme
of [Barreto et al., 2005] is currently the most efficient pairing-based IBS scheme in the
literature.
• Setup: Given the security parameter 1k, generate two cyclic groups G and F
of prime order p, and a bilinear pairing map eˆ : G × G → F. Pick a random
generator g ∈ G and two hash functions H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H4 : {0, 1}∗×F→ Z∗p.
• Extract: The signing key is d = g1/(x+H3(ID)), where Msk = x.
• Sign: In order to sign the message m,
1. Pick at random r ∈ Z∗p and compute h = H4(m, eˆ(g, g)r) ∈ Z∗p.
2. Compute S = dr+h.
Hence, the signature on m is σ = (h, S).
• Verify: To verify a signature σ = (h, S) on m, compute
V = eˆ(S, gH3(ID) · gx) · eˆ(g, g)−h
= eˆ(Dr+h, gH3(ID) · gx) · eˆ(g, g)−h
= eˆ(g(r+h)/(x+H3(ID)), gH3(ID)+x) · eˆ(g, g)−h
= eˆ(g, g)r+h · eˆ(g, g)−h = eˆ(g, g)r





In this chapter, we describe the components of biometric-based remote authentication
and focus on a special type of system introduced by Bringer et al., where the server-
side functionalities are performed in a distributed fashion using a detached biometric
database DB and non-colluding system components.
We start with the review of the security notions (i.e. identity privacy and transaction
anonymity) and analyze existing schemes designed according to this security model.
We show that the schemes differ from each other based on the homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme chosen, incorporation of a secure sketch scheme, the biometric storage
mechanism and whether an additional security factor is required as in the case of
multi-factor biometric authentication. Next, we propose a new and efficient biometric
storage mechanism, where the biometric features of the users are stored at the DB as
a random pool of features instead of storing each complete reference template. This
way, common features belonging to different users are not stored multiple times, which
results in a reduced storage cost. Besides, the DB and the authentication server AS do
not know which set of features belong to which user, since the indices of the database
locations of a user’s features are stored in the smartcard of the user, thus the index
list of each user is kept secret from the DB and AS. In current authentication systems
that provide a security reduction, biometrics is assumed as a binary string such as a an
2048 bits iris code, whereas the general representation of biometrics is a set of features
that can be either ordered such as face, voice, handwritten signatures or unordered
such as fingerprint minutia. For this general representation, we describe a new bio-
metric remote authentication scheme based on this new storage method. To guarantee
the security notions, we present the security reductions, which prove that using an
adversary breaking the identity privacy (and transaction anonymity) notion, one can
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construct another adversary that breaks the semantic security of ElGamal encryption
scheme (and user privacy of PIR protocol).
Secondly, we analyse the security model of distributed biometric remote authentication
(DBRA). By considering the schemes designed according to this model, we prove that
identity privacy can never be achieved for the existing schemes, if biometrics is assumed
as public data and a publicly stored sketch is employed for improved accuracy. Besides,
a statistical attack is shown that is effective even if the sketch is stored as encrypted.
To prevent statistical attacks, we propose a weaker notion of identity privacy, where
the adversary has limited power. In view of our attacks, we describe a new biometric
remote authentication system by combining distributed biometric authentication and
cancelable biometrics, where the new system is also applicable for biometrics repre-
sented as a set of features. Next, we define “identity privacy for cancelable biometrics”
as a new notion and show that existing schemes vulnerable to our attacks are secure
in the cancelable biometric setting if the new notion is assumed.
This chapter is based on our work presented in [Sarier, 2009a,b, 2010b, 2011a].
3.1 Introduction
Biometric-based authentication systems can be classified as remote or local authenti-
cation, where the former system authenticates a user over a network by performing
the matching of his transmitted fresh biometrics to his stored biometric data at the
remote server. Here, the client side is only responsible from capturing the fresh bio-
metrics of the user through a biometric sensor and transmitting the extracted features
to the remote server. Hence, the client side does not require sophisticated devices such
as match-on-card (MOC) systems that store a biometric template and perform the
matching on card, whereas the remote server should store the biometric templates of
the users centrally and performs the matching. The advantage of remote authentication
is that the user does not need to store any biometric data on an IC card that can be
lost easily and matching at the server allows for an complex matching algorithm that
may not be implemented on card, in particular, as a MOC system. Also, MOCs are
more expensive than the traditional template-on-card systems as they require smart
cards with embedded microprocessor and operating systems to run the match appli-
cation. Other MOC systems that release the biometric template to another device
(either directly or over a network) to perform the matching function may compromise
the security [Heyer, 2008].
In ACISP’07, a special type of biometric remote authentication system and a new
security model is introduced by Bringer et al., where security against insider attacks are
considered. In this model, the server-side functionalities are performed in a distributed
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fashion using a detached biometric database and non-colluding system components.
Basically, this system is composed of three entities, the authentication server AS, the
sensor S capturing the biometrics and the detached biometric database DB. AS only
stores the identity information of the users and provides the communication between
S and DB. Besides, AS does not have access to the reference biometrics that is stored
as encrypted using homomorphic encryption, thus all the computations performed by
AS,S and DB stay in the encrypted domain. This leads to a new security notion called
identity privacy that guarantees the privacy of the link between the identity (name) and
the biometrics of the user although biometrics is assumed as public data. The intuition
of this notion is that a malicious AS that generates two templates for a user, cannot
identify from the protocol runs, which of the two biometric templates is registered to
the DB with probability significantly better than that of random guessing. Moreover,
AS performs the matching after a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol that
prevents a curious DB from tracking the user that authenticates to the system. Thus,
transaction anonymity against a (malicious) database is satisfied which is the second
notion for biometric remote authentication.
3.1.1 Motivation and Contributions
As it is noted in the previous chapter, the first biometric-based authentication system
that assumes biometrics as public data and that presents a security is analysis from
a cryptographic point of view is described in 2007, although automated biometric
authentication systems are employed for more than two decades. Despite the fact
that systems of Bringer et al. provide a security reduction, recently, different attacks
have emerged that break the security notions with a simple brute-force attack. Thus,
a thorough analysis of the schemes and the security notions is required. Besides,
one should also consider the efficiency of these systems, especially for the large scale
deployment of them.
We start with the review of the security notions (i.e. identity privacy and transaction
anonymity) and analyze existing schemes designed according to this security model.
Basically, these systems are based on the primitives of homomorphic encryption, Pri-
vate Information Retrieval (PIR) and secure sketch. In this framework, we propose
a new and efficient biometric storage mechanism, where the biometric features of the
users are stored at the DB as a random pool of features instead of storing each com-
plete reference template. This way, common features belonging to different users are
not stored multiple times, which results in a reduced storage cost. Besides, the DB
and the authentication server AS do not know which set of features belong to which
user, since the indices of the database locations of a user’s features are stored in the
smartcard of the user, thus the index list of each user is kept secret from the DB and
AS. In current authentication systems that provide a security reduction, biometrics
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is assumed as a binary string such as a an 2048 bits iris code, whereas the general
representation of biometrics is a set of features that can be either ordered such as
face, voice, handwritten signatures or unordered such as fingerprint minutia. For this
general representation, we describe a new two-factor biometric remote authentication
scheme based on this new storage method. Our system can easily and securely inte-
grate a sketch for improved accuracy since it is designed as a two-factor authentication
system, where the second factor is the smartcard of the user that stores some secret
data. In the second part of this chapter, we will show why this additional factor is
required in order to achieve the security notions.
Following Bringer et al.’s security model, we present the security reductions, which
prove that using an adversary breaking the identity privacy (and transaction anonymity)
notion, one can construct another adversary that breaks the semantic security of El-
Gamal encryption scheme (and user privacy of PIR protocol).
Next, we consider DBRA schemes that require a fuzzy sketch scheme for improved
accuracy. We analyze the security based on the model of Bringer et al., where we
prove that if biometrics is assumed as public data and the fuzzy sketch required for
error-correction is stored publicly, the notion of identity privacy against a malicious
authentication server AS can never be satisfied. Basically, this notion guarantees the
secrecy of identity-biometrics relation through a security game between the (malicious)
AS and a simulator (i.e. challenger) C. If AS can correctly distinguish the registered
reference template ∼that is one of the two templates output by AS∼ by listening to
the protocol runs, AS wins this game, thus breaks the scheme in the sense of identity
privacy.
In identity privacy game, the malicious AS has to output two biometric templates
describing the user U . Since the definition of this notion does not restrict AS on how
he chooses the two biometric templates, AS can output a pair of templates (b1, b2) for U ,
where the distance between the two templates is either dis(b1, b2) < t or dis(b1, b2) > t.
Here, t is the error correction threshold of the secure sketch scheme that is used to
correct the errors given a similar biometrics and a public helper data PAR. For the two
cases, we prove separately that the adversary can easily compute the exact biometric
template that is registered by the challenger C of the game using the helper data PAR
of the secure sketch that is publicly available. Thus, the schemes of [Bringer et al.,
2007c, Tang et al., 2008] and any biometric remote authentication scheme that assumes
biometrics and the required secure sketch as public data are vulnerable to this attack
and cannot satisfy identity privacy. Although the scheme of [Bringer and Chabanne,
2008] stores the helper data PAR as encrypted, we propose a statistical attack to break
identity privacy, where the adversary uses the (known) distribution of U ’s biometrics
and outputs the two templates (b1, b2) for U in a special way. To our knowledge, no
concrete attack has been presented against the sketch-based schemes of [Bringer and
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Chabanne, 2008, Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008], although [Simoens et al.,
2011] presents attacks against the schemes in [Bringer et al., 2007b, Barbosa et al.,
2008].
Thus, we observe that the security model of Bringer et al. does not consider the attacks
that reveal the cleartext of the stored reference biometrics with the help of the public
sketch. Besides, if the sketch is stored secretly, then identity privacy game should be
modified so that there is a restriction on the templates generated by the adversary
AS to prevent AS breaking the notion with statistical attacks. Thus, we describe a
new notion called Weak-Identity privacy that does not allow the adversary to generate
the possible templates for a particular user, instead the templates are given to him by
the challenger. Under this new notion, the scheme of [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] is
resistant against our statistical attacks.
Secondly, we discuss alternative solutions to guarantee the security of DBRA schemes
requiring public sketches. The trivial solution for the schemes [Bringer et al., 2007c,
Tang et al., 2008] is to store the sketch PAR secretly, namely, in the tamper-proof
smartcard of the user. This will result in a two-factor authentication scheme, thus,
the system is not anymore a pure biometric-based authentication scheme. Besides, if
these systems are implemented for biometrics that are represented as a set of features,
this solution still does not cover brute-force attacks for biometrics with a small feature
space. We note that current provably secure schemes are only defined for biometrics
represented as a fixed length binary string such as an 2048 bits long Iris code except
for the schemes of [Sarier, 2010b, Barbosa et al., 2008] that assume biometrics as a set
of features, i.e. k-tuple of integers.
As a first solution, we describe a new DBRA protocol where we combine cancelable
biometrics and distributed remote authentication. Briefly, cancelable biometrics per-
form a distortion of the biometric image or features before matching. The variability
in the distortion parameters provides the cancelable nature of the scheme. Distortion
(i.e masking) is performed either using a one-way transformation or a high entropy
randomness that is stored in the user’s smart card to be used later for authentication
in the transformed space. Our protocol is applicable for biometrics represented as a
set of features and resistant against brute-force attacks if the feature space is small.
Next, we define a stronger notion as “Identity privacy for cancelable biometrics”, where
breaking this notion implies breaking the underlying encryption scheme in the sense of
indistinguishability. The schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] that are
vulnerable to our attack are secure in cancelable biometric setting based on this new
notion.
Finally, we employ the detached biometric storage in DBRA, which is not considered
in current cancelable biometric systems and in their security analysis. Thus, a trusted
biometric database can serve different service providers due to its distributed structure.
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Besides, a major difference of our model to existing schemes of Bringer et al. [Bringer
et al., 2007b, Bringer and Chabanne, 2008, Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] is
the use of bilinear pairings, which allows the AS to compute the final authentication
decision without any decryption operation. Thus, AS does not need to store a secret
key, whose leakage endangers the system’s security drastically.
3.1.2 Related Work
Existing distributed biometric remote authentication (DBRA) schemes differ from each
other based on the homomorphic encryption scheme chosen, incorporation of a secure
sketch scheme, the biometric storage mechanism and whether an additional security fac-
tor is required as in the case of multi-factor biometric authentication. DBRA schemes
that are designed according to the security model of Bringer et al. [Bringer and Cha-
banne, 2008, Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] combine homomorphic encryption,
secure sketches and Private Information Retrieval (PIR) to achieve the security notions
of identity privacy and transaction anonymity. The first biometric system in this model
[Bringer et al., 2007b] employs Goldwasser-Micali encryption and a special PIR in order
to compare two binary biometric strings in encrypted domain using hamming distance.
Next, the systems of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] require a secure sketch
scheme to error-correct the biometric string such as an 2048 bits Iris code and use
ElGamal encryption for equality testing [Gamal, 1984] together with an efficient PIR
scheme. Similarly, the work of [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] combines a secure sketch,
Goldwasser-Micali and Paillier encryption in Lipmaa’s PIR protocol to prevent the at-
tacks against the scheme in [Bringer et al., 2007b]. Besides, in [Sarier, 2010b], elliptic
curve ElGamal and a PIR scheme is employed together with a special secure sketch
scheme applicable to an ordered biometric feature set. Another work that assumes
biometrics as a set of features [Barbosa et al., 2008] provides a secure biometric iden-
tification scheme using a Support Vector Machine and Paillier encryption by adapting
the security notions for biometric features (usually an k-tuple of numbers). A survey
of these systems is given in [Sarier, 2009b]. Recently, [Simoens et al., 2011] presents a
survey of attacks against the schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007b, Barbosa et al., 2008]
and some other biometric schemes. No attacks are known for the schemes presented in
[Bringer and Chabanne, 2008, Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008], which require
the use of secure sketches. Except for the works of [Barbosa et al., 2008, Sarier, 2010b,
2009a], the biometrics is assumed as a binary string such as a an 2048 bits iris code,
whereas the general representation of biometrics is a set of features that can be either
ordered such as face, voice, handwritten signatures or unordered such as fingerprint
minutia.
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3.2 Architecture of the System
The system structure for biometric-based remote authentication schemes designed ac-
cording to the security model of Bringer et al. consists of five components. Here, the
user U and the sensor S denote the client side and the remaining components denote
the server-side of the system.
• Human user U , which uses his biometrics to authenticate himself to an authen-
tication server. The user may possess a smart card for storing additional data
such as error correcting information or user specific data other than biometrics.
• Sensor client S, which captures the raw biometric data and extracts a biometric
template, and communicates with the authentication server by performing cryp-
tographic operations such as public key encryption. We also assume a liveness
link between the sensor and the server-side components, to provide confidence
that the biometric data received on the server-side is from a present living person.
• Authentication server AS, which deals with human user’s authentication request
by communicating with the user and organizing the entire server-side procedure.
The data stored at the AS consists of a list L= {ID1, ..., IDN} of user identities
IDl ∈ {0, 1}∗. The index of the user in this list will be j ∈ {1, ..., N}. In a
successful authentication the AS will obviously learn the user’s identity, which
means that it should learn nothing about the biometric data being submitted.
• Database DB, which stores biometric information for users, and works as a bio-
metric template matcher by providing the matching service to the authentication
server. Since the DB is aware of privileged biometric data, it should learn noth-
ing about the user’s identity, or even be able to correlate or trace authentication
runs from a given (unknown) user.
• Verification Unit VU that helps the authentication process by taking the output
produced by the DB and performing the intermediate operations to help for the
final decision. Again that it should not be able to learn anything about the
user’s real identity. This unit takes place in the schemes of [Barbosa et al., 2008],
in [Bringer et al., 2007b] under the name of matcher M, and in [Bringer and
Chabanne, 2008] under the name of Hardware Security Module (HSM). In our
new proposals, we will also employ this unit.
3.2.1 Authentication Workflow
Like most existing biometric-based cryptosystems, we also assume that a biometric-
based authentication scheme consists of two phases: an enrollment phase and a verifi-
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cation phase.
1. In the enrollment phase, user U registers his reference biometrics at the database
DB and his personalized username ID at the authentication server AS. The user
may have multiple registrations at the same AS under different usernames.
2. In the verification phase, user U issues an authentication request to the authenti-
cation server AS through the sensor client S. AS decides based on U ’s biometrics
with help from the database DB and the verification unit VU .
Figure 3.1: Overview of DBRA
3.3 Overview of the required cryptographic techniques
DBRA schemes that are designed according to the security model of Bringer et al.
combine homomorphic encryption, secure sketches and Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) to achieve the security notions of identity privacy and transaction anonymity.
The first biometric system in this model [Bringer et al., 2007b] employs Goldwasser-
Micali encryption [Goldwasser and Micali, 1982] and the PIR system of [Kushilevitz and
Ostrovsky, 1997]. Next, the systems of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] require
a secure sketch scheme to error-correct the biometric string such as an 2048 bits Iris
code and use ElGamal encryption for equality testing [Gamal, 1984] together with an
efficient PIR scheme such as [Lipmaa, 2005, Gentry and Ramzan, 2005]. Similarly, the
work of [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] combines a secure sketch, Goldwasser-Micali
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and Paillier encryption [Paillier, 1999] in Lipmaa’s PIR protocol [Lipmaa, 2005] to
prevent the attacks against the protocol in [Bringer et al., 2007b]. Another work that
assumes biometrics as a set of features [Barbosa et al., 2008] provides a secure biometric
identification scheme using a Support Vector Machine and Paillier encryption. In
order to analyse the differences between these biometric systems, we briefly define the
necessary components of these systems.
3.3.1 Homomorphic encryption
To make an authentication decision in the encryption domain based on a certain
metric or to construct a number-theory based PIR protocol, we need a secure cryp-
tosystem that is homomorphic over an abelian group. For a given cryptosystem with
(Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt), the message space M and the ciphertext space C that are
groups, Decrypt(Encrypt(a) ⋆Encrypt(b)) = a ∗ b, where a, b ∈M , and ∗, ⋆ represent the
group operations of M,C respectively. The homomorphic encryption scheme that is
employed in [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] and that we employ for our new
system is ElGamal encryption scheme with the homomorphic property
Encrypt(a)× Encrypt(b) = Encrypt(a× b)
We refer the reader to the section 2.7.5 of the background chapter for the details.
3.3.2 Secure Sketches
Let H be a metric space with distance function dis. A secure sketch scheme allows
recovery of a hidden value w ∈ H from any value w′ ∈ H close to this hidden value
with the help of some public value PAR, which does not leak too much information
about w. The reader is referred to the section 2.2.3 of the background chapter for
the details. The first scheme of [Bringer et al., 2007c] and the scheme of [Tang et al.,
2008] implement a secure sketch protocol to test for equality in the encryption domain
using the homomorphic property of the encryption system. An example sketch scheme
is given in [Tang et al., 2008] as follows. Let C be a [n, k, 2t + 1] error- correction
code over a field F. With input x ∈ Fn, PAR is computed by the function SS as PAR
= x − c, where c is a random codeword. With input (x′,PAR), Rec computes x′′ as
c′ = x′ − PAR, decode c′ to obtain c′′, and set x′′ = c′′ + PAR.
The fuzzy sketch for iris biometrics based on the code-offset construction is used in
the biometric authentication schemes of [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008]. Let C be an
(n, k, 2t + 1) binary linear error correcting code in Hamming space. Let PAR = c⊕ b,
where c is a random codeword in C. From the corrupted codeword c′ = PAR⊕ b′ = c⊕
(b⊕b′), one can recover c if the hamming distance disH between b and b′ is disH(b, b′) < t.
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For biometrics that can be represented as an ordered set of features such as face, iris,
voice, handwritten signatures [Li et al., 2006], we implement the white noise sketch
of [Li et al., 2006] that corrects the white noise on each quantized component (i.e.
quantized feature) wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k of the biometric vector is as follows:
• The SS function takes the quantized biometrics Qλ(b) = (w1, ..., wk) ∈ Mλ as
input and computes for each wi, ci = Cλ(wi) and outputs the public parameter
PAR= (∆1, ...,∆k) = (w1 − c1, ..., wk − ck). Here, Cλ(·) is the function that finds
the unique codeword c ∈ Cλ that is nearest to wi in the codebook Cλ [Li et al.,
2006].
• The Rec function takes a quantized fresh biometric Qλ(b′) = (w′1, ..., w′k) and
PAR as input and computes ci = Cλ(w
′
i−∆i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and outputs Qλ(b) =
(c1 +∆1, ..., ck +∆k).
3.3.3 Private Information Retrieval
In order to provide Transaction Privacy, the systems in [Bringer et al., 2007b,c, Bringer
and Chabanne, 2008, Tang et al., 2008, Sarier, 2009a, 2010b] employ a number-theory
based PIR system, which allows the AS to retrieve the i-th bit (more generally, the
i-th item) from the DB consisting of m bits while keeping the value i private, which
is defined as user privacy. The PIR of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005] has an additional
benefit of retrieving more then one bit, and in particular many consecutive bits. In this
context, a Private Block Retrieval (PBR) protocol enables a user to retrieve a block
from a block-database. For biometric authentication, [Bringer et al., 2007c] implements
a client/server architecture that consists ofDB containing a list ofN blocks (R1, ..., RN )
and the AS that runs an efficient PBR protocol (such as of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005])
to retrieve Rl for any 1 ≤ l ≤ N . Another advantage of the PBR protocol of [Gentry
and Ramzan, 2005] is the retrieval of many non-consecutive blocks efficiently.
Briefly, the PBR protocol of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005] works as follows.
1. The server partitions the m-bit database DB into t blocks DB= C1||C2....||Ct of
size at most l bits.
2. S = {p1, ..., pt} is a set of small distinct prime numbers.
3. Each block Ci is associated to a prime power πi = p
ci
i , where ci is the smallest
integer so that pcii ≥ 2l.
4. All parameters above are public
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5. Server precomputes an integer e that satisfies e = Ci mod πi using Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
6. To query for block Ci, the user generates an appropriate cyclic group G = 〈g〉
with order |G| = qπi for some suitable integer q and sends (G, g) to server, keeping
q private. G contains a subgroup H of smooth order πi, and that h = g
q is a
generator of H.
7. Server responds with ge = g
e ∈ G
8. To retrieve Ci it suffices to retrieve e mod πi by setting he = g
q
e ∈ H and
performing a (tractable) discrete logarithm computation loghhe, which occurs
entirely in the subgroup H of order pcii and can be quite efficient if pi is small.
Computational complexity for the Querier side is no more than 4
√
nl group operations
and for the Server side Θ(n) group operations. Communication complexity is 3lG bits,
where lG denotes the size of an element in the group G. The scheme can be converted
into a scheme that recovers d l-bit blocks with total communication complexity (2+d)lG
[Gentry and Ramzan, 2005].
Also, in [Ishai et al., 2004], the solution to the problem of retrieving k items that are
not necessarily consecutive is presented using hashing. This way, the complexity is
much smaller than the naive solution, namely s ·PIR, where s = σlog(kµ) for µ ∈ Z∗p.
Furthermore, better performance is derived via explicit batch codes instead of hashing,
since small values of k do not work with hashing. The reader is referred to [Ishai
et al., 2004] for a more detailed discussion of application of batch codes for amortizing
the time complexity of PIR. Recently, [Melchor and Gaborit, 2008] introduced an
efficient noise-based PIR scheme, which is 100 times faster than all of the number-
theory based PIR systems. The communication cost of [Melchor and Gaborit, 2008]
is not optimal as of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005], however, communication cost is not
the main performance measurement of PIR as shown in the following table due to the
enormous computational cost at the DB-end for number-theory based PIR schemes
[Melchor and Gaborit, 2008].
Scheme Query Download Bandwidth
size time time usage
Lipmaa’s PIR 162 Kb 0,16s 33h 0.003%
Gentry and Ramzan’s PIR 3Kb ≈ 0s 17h 0.016%
Noise-based PIR 19Mb 19s 10min 7.2%
Table 3.1: Comparison of different PIR systems [Melchor and Gaborit, 2008]
78
3.4 Security Model
The security model of the biometric remote authentication systems introduced by
Bringer et al. have the following properties.
3.4.1 Trust Relationships
Different from the local authentication environment, sensor client and authentication
server are assumed to be independent components in this model. In [Tang et al., 2008],
this is considered to be an appropriate assumption in the remote authentication envi-
ronment, where human users access the authentication server through sensor clients,
which are not owned by the authentication server but have a business agreement with
the authentication server.
• Liveliness Assumption: This is an indispensable assumption on the sensor client
S for any biometric system as it guarantees with high probability that the bio-
metrics is coming from a live human user.
• Security link Assumption: To provide the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
information, the communication channel between U , S, AS, DB and VU should
be encrypted using standard protocols.
• Collusion Assumption: Due to the distributed system structure, we assume that
U , DB,VU and AS are malicious but they do not collude. Additionally, the
sensor client S is always honest.
3.4.2 Security Notions
Identity Privacy
Informally, this notion guarantees the privacy of the sensitive relationship between
the user identity and its biometrics against a malicious authentication server even in
case of multiple registrations of the same user with different personalized usernames.
Briefly, it means that the authentication server or the database (or an attacker that has
compromised one of them) cannot recover the biometric template of the user [Bringer
et al., 2007b, Tang et al., 2008]. Here, l denotes the security parameter of the protocol
and the symbol ∅ means that there is no explicit output (besides the state information)
for the adversary.
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Given an adversary A running against the biometric authentication scheme and a chal-
lenger C that simulates the registration phase of the scheme, we consider the following










R← {b0i , b1i }
∅ ← Enrollment((IDj , bj)j)
β′ ← A(Challenger;V erification)
if β′ = β return 1 else return 0
A biometric authentication scheme satisfies the notion of Identity Privacy if
AdvA(l) = Pr[ExpA = 1|β = 1]− Pr[ExpA = 1|β = 0] (3.1)
is negligible for all PPT A. Here, the adversary A generates the authentication data




i for an additional
user Ui. The challenger C picks at random biometrics bi = bβi of Ui and simulates the
enrollment phase by registering the encryption of the biometrics of each user at the
DB. After running the verification protocol polynomially many times, A outputs a
guess for the biometrics of Ui that C has chosen. The intuition of this notion is that
a malicious authentication server, who knows that the registered biometric template
is one of the two templates that he has generated, cannot identify the random choice
β of the challenger from listening to the protocol runs with probability significantly
better than that of random guessing. Since the sensor is honest, independent and thus
not under the control of the adversary, A cannot guess the template by checking the
sensor.
Transaction Anonymity
Informally, transaction anonymity means that a malicious database cannot learn any-
thing about the personal identity of the user for any authentication request made to
the authentication server [Bringer et al., 2007b, Tang et al., 2008]. Formally, given an
adversary A running against the biometric authentication scheme and a challenger C
that simulates the registration phase of the scheme, we consider the following game.
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Experiment ExpA(l)
For 1 ≤ j ≤ N, (IDj , bj)← A(1l)
∅ ← Registration(IDj, bj)j
(i0, i1)← A(Challenger;V erification)
iβ
R← {i0, i1}
∅ ← V erification(iβ)
β′ ← A(Challenger;V erification)
if β′ = β return 1 else return 0
A biometric authentication scheme satisfies the notion of Transaction Privacy if equa-
tion (3.1) is satisfied for all PPT A.
Here, the adversaryA generates the authentication data forN users and C simulates the
registration phase. After running the verification protocol polynomially many times,
A outputs two users with indices i0, i1, where C picks a random user iβ to initiate the
verification for that user. After running the verification protocol polynomially many
times, A outputs a guess for the user that C has chosen.
3.5 The first protocol
The first remote biometric verification scheme for distributed environments is described
in [Bringer et al., 2007b], where the biometric template of user Ui is assumed as a fixed
(M bit) binary string bi=(bi,1, ..., bi,M ) that is stored as a plaintext in DB during the
registration phase. For authentication, each bit of the fresh biometrics b′i is encrypted
using the public key of the matcher M, where the encryption is performed using the
Goldwasser-Micali scheme that is homomorphic (i.e. ε(b′i,k, pk) · ε(bi,k, pk) mod n =
ε(b′i,k ⊕ bi,k, pk) ). Next, to provide transaction anonymity, AS runs a PIR protocol
to obtain Ui’s encrypted biometric template ε(bi) computed by the DB, where the
communication cost of the PIR is linear in the size N of the users in the DB. The
enrollment and verification phases are summarized as below:
Registration Phase: The user Ui registers his personalized identity at the AS and
his biometrics as a fixed binary string bi = (bi,1, ..., bi,M ) at the DB.
Verification Phase: The authentication protocol is summarized according to the
figure 2 of [Bringer et al., 2007b].
1. The sensor client S computes a fresh encryption of Ui’s biometrics
ε(b′i, pk)=(ε(bi,1, pk), ..., ε(bi,M , pk)) using the public key pk of the matcher M
and forwards it to AS.
2. AS runs a PIR protocol by sending ε(t1, pk), ..., ε(tN , pk) to DB, where tj = 1
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the protocol in [Bringer et al., 2007b]
for i = j, else tj = 0. Here, 1 ≤ j ≤ N .
3. DB computes ε(bi,k, pk) =
∏N
j=1 ε(tj, pk)
bj,k mod n, for 1 ≤ k ≤M .
4. AS computes νk = ε(b′i,k)ε(bi,k) mod n = ε(b′i,k ⊕ bi,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ M and sends
a permutation of νk’s (denoted by λk) to the matcher M.
5. The detached matcher M with the secret key of the Goldwasser-Micali scheme
decrypts the λk’s to compute the hamming weight and the decision based on a
predefined threshold.
6. Finally, DB forwards the OK/NOK decision to the AS [Bringer et al., 2007b].
3.5.1 Attacks against Bringer et al.’s scheme
The scheme of [Bringer et al., 2007b] is provably secure in the framework of Bringer et
al. [Bringer et al., 2007b]. However, an attack with complexity exponential inN against
this scheme is described in [Barbosa et al., 2008] that reveals the user’s biometric data
to AS. Thus, the authors of [Barbosa et al., 2008] suggest re-randomization of the
ciphertexts by the DB before sending them to the AS.
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At the question & answer session of BIOSIG 2009, David Naccache proposed another
attack against the scheme of [Bringer et al., 2007b], which is linear in M . The attack
can be described as follows:
1. Assume that the threshold of the system is 0, namely zero error tolerance is
applied. Since AS obtains an encrypted fresh biometrics ε(b′i,k) the user Ui, a
malicious AS replaces the first encrypted bit with the encryption of the plaintext
(i.e. 1) that he chooses and checks the verification result.
2. If the matcherM returns reject, than the first bit of the template of Ui is 0, else
if Ui is authenticated, AS obtains the first bit as 1.
3. AS fixes the obtained bit and continues with the next bit. InM queries, AS will
extract the biometrics of Ui, where M is the size of the biometrics.
For error tolerant systems, the number of attempts of the AS will be at most M − t,
where t > 0 denotes the threshold of the system.
3.5.2 Analysis of the Attack and its Extension
In this section, we present a new attack from the perspective of DB that will break
the transaction anonymity notion. As one can note from the step 3 of Bringer et al.’s
scheme [Bringer et al., 2007b], theDB computes the encryption of Ui’s stored biometrics
and sends it to AS. Since at the last step, the DB forwards the authentication result
based on the computations of the M, the DB can also replace the first encrypted bit
generated at step 3 of the verification protocol of [Bringer et al., 2007b] and depending
on the authentication result, DB can extract the template of the Ui. This way, DB
can track which user is authenticating, namely PIR protocol is useless and transaction
anonymity is not guaranteed.
The solution of [Barbosa et al., 2008], namely rerandomization of the ciphertexts by
the DB does not prevent the above stated attacks due to the nature of Goldwasser
Micali encryption system. However, we can fix the scheme of [Bringer et al., 2007b]
with a simple modification in the verification phase as below.
3.5.3 Modified Scheme
In this section we modify the scheme of [Bringer et al., 2007b] to avoid the above
presented attacks. The intuition of our proposal is that, the sensor S does not send
the fresh encrypted biometrics to the AS, but to the DB directly. Thus, AS cannot
modify the bits as in the attacks of David Naccache.
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1. The sensor client S computes a fresh encryption of Ui’s biometrics
ε(b′i, pk)=(ε(bi,1, pk), ..., ε(bi,M , pk)) using the public key pk of the M, signs the
hash of ε(b′i, pk) and forwards them together to DB.
2. AS runs a PIR protocol by sending ε(t1), ..., ε(tN ) to DB, where tj = 1 for i = j,
else tj = 0.




n, for 1 ≤ k ≤M . Next, DB computes νk = ε(b′i,k)ε(bi,k) mod n=ε(b′i,k ⊕ bi,k) for
1 ≤ k ≤M .
4. DB rerandomizes and permutes the ciphertexts before sending them to the M.
5. The detached unit M with the secret key of the Goldwasser-Micali scheme de-
crypts the ciphertexts to compute the hamming weight and the decision is for-
warded to the AS.
6. Finally, AS either rejects or authenticates Ui.
Lemma 3.1. The modified scheme guarantees Identity and Transaction Privacy based
on the semantic security of the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme.
Sketch of the Proof: Since AS only knows the index of the user Ui and the authen-
tication result, AS cannot extract the biometrics of Ui using the properties of the
Goldwasser Micali scheme. Similarly, DB does not have access to the secret keys of the
M and the authentication result of Ui due to the security link property, so DB can-
not identify which index i is trying to authenticate. This way, the security reduction
presented in [Bringer et al., 2007b] becomes valid. Although the communication cost
of the modified scheme is not optimal, the computation cost is only O(N) modular
multiplications for the DB instead of O(N) modular exponentiations as in [Bringer
and Chabanne, 2008], which combines Goldwasser Micali encryption with Paillier en-
cryption to implement the (communication efficient) PIR of Lipmaa [Lipmaa, 2005]
and store biometrics as encrypted sketches using a slightly different architecture than
[Bringer et al., 2007b] to provide security against malicious AS and DB.
3.6 Schemes based on ElGamal Encryption
In [Bringer et al., 2007c], the authors present another DBRA scheme based on the
ElGamal encryption and a PIR scheme. The main difference of this biometric au-
thentication system is the integration of a secure sketch scheme for error correcting a
biometric (binary) string such as an 2048 bits Iris code and the use of ElGamal en-
cryption. This way, there is no need for a similarity metric (i.e. hamming distance) for
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the final decision, instead the system is used for equality testing. Here, each biometric
string is stored at the DB as encrypted with the public key pk of the AS as opposed
to the scheme of [Bringer et al., 2007b], where each biometric string is stored as a
plaintext. Thus, AS generates an ElGamal key pair (pk, sk) during the setup phase of
the protocol, where pk = y = gx.
In the registration phase, the user U registers at the DB by sending R = (R1, R2) =
Enc(gb, pk) = (gr, yrgb), namely the ElGamal encryption of its biometrics b to DB
and the parameter PAR is publicly available for reconstruction of the same biometrics
b using the secure sketch scheme. The user also registers his unique pseudorandom
identifier ID at the AS.
For authentication, the following steps are performed.
• The sensor client S sends the user identity ID to the AS and the encrypted
fresh biometrics X = (X1, X2) = Enc(gb
′
, pk) to the DB using the PAR for error-
correction and ElGamal encryption.















where Rj, 1 ≤ j ≤ N is the ElGamal encryption of each user biometrics stored
in the system (DB).
• Finally, AS runs an efficient PIR protocol to obtain the value C corresponding to
the user U and decrypts it using his secret key sk. If Dec(C)=1, AS authenticates
U , else rejects.
In addition, [Tang et al., 2008] presents a slightly modified version of this scheme by
simplifying the randomization step of the DB. Again, the same components, namely
a PIR, secure sketch and ElGamal encryption scheme is considered. Apart from the
computational cost of the PIR, the number of exponentiations computed by the DB is
reduced from O(4N) as in [Bringer et al., 2007c] to O(2N) due to the use of a single
random number instead of two different random numbers for the randomization of the
ciphertexts. Also, as one can notice from the first step of the authentication phase of
[Bringer et al., 2007c], the sensor client S communicates with the DB to send the fresh
encryption of the biometrics, which could be impractical. In practice, there might be
only very few organizations that can be trusted by human users to store their biomet-
ric information though they may want to use their biometrics for the authentication
purpose at many authentication servers. Therefore, in [Tang et al., 2008], the authors
suggest a scenario like that of Single Sign-On systems, where biometric information
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for all authentication servers are centralizedly stored and managed. In this security
model the centralized database will not be a bottleneck in the sense of security [Tang
et al., 2008]. Specifically, each biometric string is stored at the DB as encrypted with
the public key pkAS of the AS as in [Bringer et al., 2007c], however, when the user
authenticates to the system, the sensor client first encrypts the fresh biometrics using
the public key pkAS of the AS and next re-encrypts the result with the public key pkDB
of the DB. Hence, the sensor does not need to communicate with the DB during the
verification phase as in [Bringer et al., 2007c], instead S only communicates with the
AS. AS and DB generate each an ElGamal key pair during the setup phase of the
protocol. The registration phase is the same as in [Bringer et al., 2007c].
For authentication, the following steps are performed in[Tang et al., 2008].
• The sensor client S sends the user identity ID and the encrypted fresh biometrics
Z = (Z1, Z2) = Enc(X, pkDB), where X = (X
1, X2) = Enc(gb
′
, pkAS) to the AS
using the PAR and ElGamal encryption. S also sends his signature σ on Z to
AS. Note that X has two components since the encryption scheme is ElGamal.
• AS first retrieves the index for ID and then forwards (Z, σ) to the database DB.
• DB first verifies the signature σ. If the verification succeeds, DB decrypts Z to
recover X. Next, for each entry 1 ≤ j ≤ N , the DB selects a random rj ∈ Zq and
computes Cj = (((X
1(R1j )
−1)rj , (X2(R2j )





where Rj is the ElGamal encryption of each user biometrics stored in the system.
• Finally, AS runs an efficient PIR protocol to obtain the value C corresponding
to U and decrypts it using his secret key sk. If Dec(C)=1, AS authenticates U ,
else rejects.
The security reductions of [Bringer et al., 2007c] and [Tang et al., 2008] are almost the
same and presented in the full version of the papers.
3.7 Schemes based on Paillier Encryption Scheme
In [Barbosa et al., 2008], the authors describe a new distributed remote identification
scheme for biometrics represented as a set of features (i.e. feature vector) after feature
extraction by integrating a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to work as a multi-class
authentication classifier. In pattern recognition and in image processing, feature ex-
traction is a special form of dimensionality reduction. When the input data to an
algorithm is too large to be processed and it is suspected to be redundant then the in-
put data will be transformed into a reduced representation set of features (also named
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features vector). Transforming the input data into the set of features is called feature
extraction. If the features extracted are carefully chosen it is expected that the features
set will extract the relevant information from the input data in order to perform the
desired task using this reduced representation instead of the full size input.
This system is actually the first system that works for any type of biometrics rep-
resented as a set of features (i.e. feature vector). Particularly, the |U|-class SVM
implemented in [Barbosa et al., 2008] is described as follows: For each user Ui ∈ U
with biometrics bi, a mono classifier is trained using the remaining users (U/Ui) as
the rejected class after extracting the biometric feature vector bi of Ui. Next, a user
profile w∗U for each user Ui is constructed. Each user profile w
∗
U consists of support
vectors SVi,j and their weights αi,j, where i = 1...S, j = 1...|U|. This will finish the
registration phase of the system. For identification, each component of the feature
vector bi is encrypted by S using Paillier encryption scheme and sent to the AS. AS
forwards the encrypted biometric data to DB, which computes the SVM classification
values class in the encryption domain by using the homomorphic properties of Paillier
encryption system. Specifically, DB takes the profile data w∗|U| and computes for each
class 1 ≤ j ≤ |U| the distance of bi to the w∗|U| in the encryption domain. Next, DB
re-randomizes the resulting ciphertexts and sends the final vector class of size |U| to
AS, which permutes and re-randomizes this vector to sclass. Next, VU decrypts each
component of sclass and finds the index d of the maximum positive scaler contained
in the decrypted vector. If there exists not such a positive index, VU sends ⊥ to AS,
else it sends d. Finally, AS recovers the identity of Ui using d and the inverse of the
permutation used in sclass. The communication cost of this scheme is O(N) (N = |U|)
and the computation cost is O(N) exponentiations mod q2. Thus, the system is not
an efficient solution in terms of both communication and computational cost.
Secondly, [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] uses Goldwasser-micali encryption and the
PIR scheme of [Lipmaa, 2005] that is based on Paillier encryption scheme for storing
biometrics as encrypted sketches, which we summarize as below.
In the enrollment phase, the user U registers at the DB by sending R = (R1, R2) =
Enc(PAR, pk) and H(c), namely the encryption of its biometric sketch PAR = c ⊕ b
using Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme and the hash of the codeword c, i.e. H(c)
to DB, where the parameter PAR is not publicly available as in [Bringer et al., 2007c,
Tang et al., 2008]. The user also registers his pseudorandom identifier ID and H(c) at
the AS. For authentication, the following steps are performed.
• S sends the user identity ID to the AS and the encryption of the fresh biometrics
X = (X1, X2) = Enc(b′, pk) using Goldwasser-Micali encryption.
• S integrates the encrypted biometrics of the user into the PIR request that is
sent to the DB, which returns the encryption of c⊕ b′ ⊕ b and the encryption of
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H(c) to the AS.
• Finally, AS decrypts the values with the help of the hardware security model
that stores the secret keys of the system and obtains c′ = c⊕ b′ ⊕ b and H(c). If
dis(b, b′) < t, then AS is able to decode c′ and obtains a codeword c′′. Next, he
checks H(c) = H(c′′) to accept/reject the authentication request of U .
3.8 A first attempt for an efficient Biometric Remote
Authentication
In this section, we present our first protocol that combines ElGamal encryption, the
PIR of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005] and an efficient biometric data storage mechanism
different from the systems described previously. We note that the systems of [Bringer
et al., 2007b, Bringer and Chabanne, 2008, Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] are
only applicable to biometrics that can be represented as binary strings in the Hamming
space in order to perform the authentication through a binary string matching. For
example, iris is one type of such biometrics, but for other biometrics, how to construct a
secure authentication scheme in this security model is left as an open problem in [Tang
et al., 2008]. The scheme of [Barbosa et al., 2008] is designed for biometrics represented
as short sequences of integer numbers (i.e. features), but its efficiency is incomparible
to Bringer et al.’s schemes since both the communication and computational cost of
[Barbosa et al., 2008] is of O(N). An overview of the existing schemes are presented
in table 3.3. Thus, our protocol is designed for the more general representation of
biometrics, i.e. which can be an ordered/unordered set of features, however, we will
introduce a more efficient storage mechanism compared to the previous schemes. The
architecture will be the same of [Bringer et al., 2007b, Barbosa et al., 2008, Bringer
and Chabanne, 2008], where the systems employ an independent verification unit VU .
In order to improve the accuracy, we employ the secure sketch scheme of [Li et al.,
2006] scheme that corrects the white noise in biometrics, where biometrics is assumed
as a k-tuple of ordered features.
3.8.1 An efficient storage mechanism for biometrics
In [Li et al., 2006] it is observed that many biometric templates can be represented in
a general form: The original biometrics can be considered as a list of k points that can
be ordered. Under noise, each point can be perturbed by a distance less than δ, and
on top of that, at most t points can be replaced. Here, the first noise is defined as the
white noise, and the second noise as replacement noise. We note that this similarity
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measure can be applied to handwritten online signatures, iris patterns, voice features,
and face biometrics [Li et al., 2006].
However, the schemes designed according to the model of Bringer et al. all require a
secure sketch for correcting a binary string such as an Iris code, thus the systems are
only applicable to biometrics that can be represented as a binary string. Although
the first scheme in this model [Bringer et al., 2007b] does not employ a secure sketch,
the system also assumes biometrics as a binary string. Consequently, [Tang et al.,
2008] leaves the design of a secure remote biometric authentication scheme for other
biometric modalities as an open problem.
In our design, we assume biometrics as a set of ordered biometric features [Li et al.,
2006, Sutcu et al., 2007, Chang and Li, 2006] where we map each feature to an element
of a finite field (for instance using a hash function as in [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek
et al., 2007]). Thus any type of biometrics that can be represented as a set of ordered
features is suitable for our system. Next, we design the biometric database as a random
pool of features, which is a new storage mechanism introduced in [Sarier, 2009a] and
further developed in [Sarier, 2010b]. Hence, instead of storing at each database index
the complete biometric template of a user (either in encrypted form or in clear), we
store a single feature without the information to which user it belongs. We store
each feature after the mapping as in [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007], in
form of gwi , namely as exponentiations of the generator of the ElGamal group. Thus
an attacker who compromised the server-end or colluding authentication server and
database cannot obtain the identity-biometrics relation. During the registration phase,
the user registers each feature at a random database location and stores the index of the
database location at his tamper-proof smart card as encrypted. If some of the features
of his biometrics are already stored at the database, than the user does not need to
re-register these common features. Also, each feature wi is stored at the DB as gwi and
no further encryption is performed, which prevents ciphertext expansion. This way, the
storage cost of the database reduces as the common features are not stored more than
once and ciphertext expansion is avoided. To quantify this storage cost, [Sarier, 2010b]
presents a simple analysis by referring to the experiment in [Mansukhani et al., 2007],
which measures minutiae pair matches for fingerprint verification on a small fingerprint
database of 100 users with 8 prints of the same finger as shown in table 3.2. In this






= 1225 comparisons of fingerprints belonging to 50 different users.
Since a fingerprint is represented by 30-50 minutiae [Mansukhani et al., 2007], one can
easily compute that when our system is applied even on such a small database, we can
reduce the storage cost approximately by 10% (i.e, 3991/(50 · 1225− 3991)). In case of
large identification systems, the storage cost will decrease much more [Sarier, 2010b].
Besides, since no biometric template is stored as an entry, there is no need to apply a
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Table 3.2: The number of common features [Mansukhani et al., 2007]
No.of No. of Fingerprint Total Matched
Users Pairs Compared Point Pairs
Same User 50 1400 37705
Diff. User 50 1225 3991
homomorphic encryption scheme to store the biometric template as encrypted, where
the ciphertext size is twice the plaintext size as in [Tang et al., 2008, Bringer et al.,
2007c] and the storage cost of each user in [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] is given as
128kbytes as each bit of the sketch of the 2048-bits Iris code is stored as encrypted using
Goldwasser-Micali scheme. Finally, the choice of the system parameters of [Bringer
and Chabanne, 2008, Bringer et al., 2007b] results in a constraint on the size of DB.
However, the database storage cost of our system is (k − c) · P for each user due to
the c common features that are not stored twice, where P is the size of an element of
the elliptic curve ElGamal group G and k is the number of biometric features of each
user. For instance, P = 171 bits for a 160-bit elliptic curve on which the ElGamal
encryption is implemented.
To improve the accuracy further, our system can also incorporate a secure sketch for
ordered feature sets, which is described in section 3.8.5.
3.8.2 A concrete scheme based on ElGamal
In this section, we present our new protocol that implements a new and more efficient
storage mechanism for the biometric database and results in a reduced storage cost and
applicable for various biometric modalities that can be represented as an ordered set
of features opposed to the schemes of Bringer et al. An overview of the authentication
flow of the new protocol is given in figure 3.3.
Registration Phase
• The sensor client S generates a key pair (pkS , skS) for a signature scheme and
publishes the public key pkS .
• The authentication server AS generates an ElGamal key pair (pkAS , skAS), where
pkAS = (G, g, yAS), yAS = g
xAS and skAS = xAS and publishes pkAS .
• The verification unit VU generates an ElGamal key pair (pkVU , skVU), where
pkVU = (G, g, yVU), yVU = g
xVU and skVU = xVU and publishes pkVU .
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Figure 3.3: Overview of the protocol in [Sarier, 2010b]
• The user U generates his personalized username ID and registers it at the AS,
and registers his biometric features in form of gwi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k at the DB by
choosing a random location si for each feature. If some of the features wi of the
user is already stored, than the database returns the indices of these features
so that no feature is stored twice. The indices of these locations {s1, ...sk} are
stored at the tamper-proof smartcard of U as encrypted with the public key of
VU , namely as Indexi = Enc(si, pkVU) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Verification Phase
• The sensor client S sends the user identity ID to AS to start an authentication
request. Next, S computes the encrypted fresh biometrics B′ of user U , i.e. for
each feature w′i ∈ B′, Zi = (Z1i , Z2i ) = Enc(Xi, pkVU), where Xi = (X1i , X2i ) =
Enc(gw
′
i , pkAS) using the ElGamal encryption. Also, S retrieves from the smart-
card of the user the encrypted indices Indexi and sends Zi’s and Indexi’s to
the VU together with his signature on (Z1||...Zk||Index1||...||Indexk||T ). Here T
denotes the time stamp.
• VU first verifies the signature of the sensor S. If the verification succeeds, VU
decrypts Zi to recover Xi. VU also decrypts Indexi = Enc(si, pkVU) to obtain
the indices of the user for the PIR protocol.
• Next, for each entry 1 ≤ j ≤ N , the DB computes Rj = Enc(gwj , pkAS), where
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Rj is the ElGamal encryption of each biometric feature stored in the DB.
• VU runs the PIR protocol of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005] to obtain the values Ri
corresponding to the user U ’s biometrics. Next, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the VU selects
a random ri ∈ Zq and computes Ci = (((X1i (R1i )−1)ri , (X2i (R2i )−1)ri)), where Xi
is the ElGamal encryption of the fresh biometric feature of the authenticating
user U . The Ci’s are permuted before sending them to the AS.
• Finally, AS obtains the permuted Ci’s from the VU and decrypts them using
his secret key. If most of the Ci’s satisfy Dec(Ci)=1 out of k features of user U ,
namely the total number of matching features of user U is above the system’s
threshold, AS authenticates U , else rejects.
Remark 3.1. By considering the authentication workflow of [Tang et al., 2008], we
can also allow the sensor to communicate only with the AS instead of communicating
both with the detached VU and AS. The signature of the sensor and the time stamp
prevents a malicious AS from replay attacks and brute-force attacks in order to obtain
some information about the reference template of the user.
3.8.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 3.1. The proposed scheme achieves identity privacy against a malicious AS,
based on the semantic security of the ElGamal encryption scheme.
Proof. If the proposed scheme does not achieve identity privacy against malicious AS
or an attacker who has compromised it, we construct an algorithm A′, which receives
a public key pk from the ElGamal challenger and runs A as a subroutine to break
the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme. Here, A denotes AS or the attacker
who compromised it. For the security reduction, we will use the same technique as in
[Bringer and Chabanne, 2008].
The reduction A′ sets pkVU = pk which is obtained from its challenger. Next, the
adversary A generates two possible templates B0e , B
1
e , where B
0
e = {wi}1≤i≤k and B1e =
{w′i}1≤i≤k describe the same user Ue. Thus, |B0e ∩B1e | ≥ t, where t denotes the system’s
error tolerance threshold. Also, A generates the reference templates of the remaining
users in the system and forwards them to A′.
A′ sends the reference templates generated by A and the two possible templates B0e , B
1
e
for user Ue to his challenger. Since the templates are first encrypted with the public








R← Zq corresponding to the challenge user Ue and
sends m0i ,m
1
i to its challenger.
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Suppose A′ receives the challenge c∗i = Enc(m
β
i , pk), where β is the coin toss of the
challenger. The indices of the database locations of each user in the system are only
known to the challenger of A′.
A′ answers the Verification queries from A as follows:
• For any user Ul, 1 ≤ l ≤M ,
If l = e, A′ randomly selects ri
R← Zq and generates for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (Z1i , Z2i ),
where Z1i = Enc(g
ai+ri , pk) and Z2i = c
∗
i ⊗ Enc(yriAS , pk). Here, for any two
ElGamal ciphertexts (c1, c2) and (c3, c4), the operator ⊗ is defined as follows:
(c1, c2)⊗ (c3, c4) = (c1c3, c2c4).
If l 6= e, A′ generates for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (Z1i , Z2i ) by directly following the protocol
specification.
We note that some of the features of a user’s biometric template that are selected
randomly can be corrupted by A′ to simulate the white noise in the biometrics.
The total number of the corrupted features is less than the system threshold.
• A′ sends (Z1i , Z2i ) to VU together with the encrypted indices of user Ul obtained
from his challenger. The signature of the sensor is also simulated by A′.
• To simulate the result of the computations performed by VU , A′ picks at random
some values ti
R← Zq and returns A (Enc(Ci, pkAS)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where Ci = gti ,
ti
R← Zq for the features that are corrupted by A′ at the first step of the game to
simulate the noise. For the majority of the features we have Ci = 1.
After listening to polynomially many authentication runs, A outputs β′. A′ terminates
by outputting β = β′. Since A′ uses the same coin toss as the ElGamal challenger,
then A′ wins the game against the semantic security of ElGamal scheme with the same
advantage of A.
It is clear that the verification unit VU and the database DB have zero advantage in
distinguishing between (IDe, B
0
e ) and (IDe, B
1
e ), because they have no access to any
information about the users’ identities [Bringer et al., 2007b].
Theorem 3.2. The proposed scheme achieves transaction anonymity against malicious
DB, based on the security (user privacy) of the PIR protocol.
Proof. If the proposed scheme does not achieve transaction anonymity against mali-
cious DB, then we can construct an algorithm A′, which receives the public parameters
from the PIR challenger and runs A as a subroutine to break the user privacy of the
PIR scheme. Here, A denotes DB or the attacker who compromised it that tries to
break the transaction anonymity of the biometric scheme.
93
A generates the reference templates of the users in the system and returns these data
to A′. A′ forwards them to his PIR challenger and receives the public parameters of the
PIR protocol from his PIR challenger and faithfully answers the Verification queries
from A. Since the database only communicates with the VU , the reduction A′ has
to simulate the VU that runs the PIR protocol. If we instantiate the PIR protocol
with the protocol of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005], the challenger returns A′ the public
parameters generated before querying for the blocks.
• On receiving (e0, e1) from A, A′ forwards this to his PIR challenger that flips
a coin β and gives the (public) PIR parameters for the retrieval of the feature
set of the randomly picked user to the A′ so that A′ simulates the VU that runs
the PIR protocol to retrieve the data from DB. For the protocol of [Gentry and
Ramzan, 2005], the challenger generates the cyclic group G and its generator g
and sends them to A′. The challenger keeps the factorization of the order of G
as secret.
• A′ faithfully answers the oracle queries of A by forwarding these requests to his
challenger and simulating VU with the parameters obtained from his challenger.
A finally outputs β′ and A′ forwards this to his challenger.
The simulation is faithful, and the advantage of A in attacking the transaction privacy
of the biometric system is equal to the advantage of A′ that runs against the user
privacy of the PIR protocol.
3.8.4 Efficiency Analysis
In table 3.3, we summarize various remote biometric-based authentication schemes
that satisfy the security model of Bringer et al. [Bringer et al., 2007b, Bringer and
Chabanne, 2008, Tang et al., 2008]. When we take typical values for the parameters
as listed in table 3.3, we obtain the following relations. For biometric modalities with
M=512 bytes template sizes [Itakura and Tsujii, 2005] and for 160-bit elliptic curves,
we have M ≈ kP , if 20 ≤ k ≤ 30 as implemented in [Li et al., 2006, Mansukhani
et al., 2007]. Also, for current PIR systems with communication cost PIR, we have
PIR << O(N).
3.8.5 Improving the accuracy
In order to improve the accuracy of our biometric scheme, we use of a secure sketch
that error-corrects the white noise in biometric that is represented as a set of ordered
biometric features. Face is an example of such biometrics [Li et al., 2006]. Here, white
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Table 3.3: Comparison of various biometric authentication systems
Scheme
Computation Storage Storage Comm.
Cost at DB-index per user cost
[Bringer et al., 2007b]
M exp +
M bits M bits O(N)
(MN)/2 mult
[Barbosa et al., 2008] O(N) exp |n|k bits |n|k bits O(N)
[Bringer et al., 2007c]* O(N) exp 2M bits 2M bits PIR
[Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] O(N) exp |n|M bits |n|M bits PIR
[Tang et al., 2008] O(N) exp 2M bits 2M bits PIR
[Sarier, 2010b] O(N) exp P bits (k − c)P bits PIR
*The first biometric scheme
Abbreviations: N= number of entries in DB; k=dimension of the feature vector; M= size of the
biometric template; P=size of a single stored feature; c= number of common features of a user;
|n|=size of an RSA modulus
noise means that each point (i.e. feature) can be perturbed by a distance less than δ.
In our biometric remote authentication protocol [Sarier, 2010b], the replacement noise
is tolerated by the threshold t of the set difference metric.
Secure Sketch for ordered biometrics
                                                    
 
 
Figure 3.4: Sketch Generation and Reconstruction [Sutcu et al., 2007]
The secure sketch of [Li et al., 2006, Sutcu et al., 2007, Chang and Li, 2006] assumes
that many biometric templates can be represented as a sequence of points in some
bounded continuous domain. (e.g., real numbers resulted from some signal processing
techniques). To handle points in some continuous domain, the authors of [Li et al.,
2006, Sutcu et al., 2007] quantize (discretize) the points such that they become points
in a discrete domain so that a known sketch scheme in discrete domain is applicable to
construct the sketch. When a fresh measurement of the same biometrics is given, it is
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quantized using the same quantizer and the corresponding reconstruction algorithm in
the discrete domain is used to recover the quantized version of the original data points,
thus only the quantized original is reconstructed. There are two types of noise that can
occur. The first noise, white noise, perturbs each points by a small distance δ, and the
second noise, replacement noise, replaces some points by different points, whose number
is blow a threshold t. We summarize the properties of the sketch described in [Li et al.,
2006] as follows. Each biometrics can be written as a sequence b = (ν1, ..., νk), where a
feature ν is an element of the universe U such that ν ∈ R and 0 ≤ ν < 1. R denotes
a similarity relation R ⊂ U × U on U , where U is a set that may be uncountable. For
each pair of biometrics (b, b′), one can write (b, b′) ∈ R, if there exists a set S ⊂ b ∩ b′
with |S| ≥ t for some threshold t, and for every ν ∈ S, |ν − ν ′| < δ for some threshold
δ. Let M be a set of finite points, and let Q : U →M be a function that maps points
in U to points in M . We will refer to such a function Q as a quantizer. The quantizer
Qλ is a member of a family of quantizers Q parameterized by the step size λ, which
is defined as Qλ : U → M . In other words, a quantization is applied to transform the
points in the continuous domain to a discrete domain and the step size λ ∈ R as a
measure of the precision of the quantized biometrics. We assume that 0 < λ ≤ δ.
Let us give an example. For a feature ν ∈ R we employ a scalar quantizer Qλ with
step size λ = 0.001 to map the feature to an integer in [0,1000], such that Qλ(ν) = w.
The quantization of b is defined as Qλ(b) = 〈Qλ(ν1), ..., Qλ(νk)〉 and the corresponding
quantized domain isMλ = [0, ⌈ 1λ⌉]. Thus, λQλ(νi) ≤ νi ≤ λ(Qλ(νi)+1) for each ν ∈ U .
Similar to the case in the continuous domain, we have |w − w′| < δλ in the quantized
domain, where δλ = ⌈ δλ⌉. Thus, under white noise, a point w in the quantized domain
can be shifted by a distance of at most δλ.
Furthermore, for each quantized domain Mλ we consider a codebook Cλ, where every
codeword c ∈ Cλ has the form c = z(2δλ + 1) for some non-negative integer z. We use
Cλ(·) to denote the function such that given a quantized feature w, it returns a value
c = Cλ(w) such that |w − c| ≤ δλ. Here, Cλ(·) is the function that finds the unique
codeword c ∈ Cλ that is nearest to w in the codebook Cλ [Li et al., 2006].
• The SS function takes the quantized biometrics Qλ(b) = (w1, ..., wk) ∈ Mλ as
input and computes for each wi, ci = Cλ(wi) and outputs the PAR= (∆1, ...,∆k) =
(w1 − c1, ..., wk − ck), In other words, for every wi, the encoder SS outputs the
distance of wi from its nearest codeword in the codebook Cλ.
• The Rec function takes a quantized fresh biometric Qλ(b′) = (w′1, ..., w′k) and
PAR as input and computes ci = Cλ(w
′
i−∆i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and outputs Qλ(b) =
(c1 + ∆1, ..., ck + ∆k). In other words, the decoder Rec shifts every w
′
i by ∆i,
maps it to the nearest codeword in Cλ, and shifts it back by the same distance.
The encoders and the decoders work only on the quantized domain.
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The details of the construction of the codebooks, the computations and selection of
the parameters for a concrete application of face biometrics are presented in [Li et al.,
2006, Sutcu et al., 2007].
3.8.6 The concrete protocol with improved accuracy
Registration Phase
• S, AS, VU generate their keys (pkS , skS) and publishes them as in section 3.8.2.
• The user U generates his personalized username ID and registers it at the AS,
computes his quantized biometricsQλ(b) = (w1, ..., wk) and registers his biometric
features gwi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k at the DB by choosing a random location si for each
feature. The indices of these locations {s1, ...sk} are stored at the tamper-proof
smartcard of U as encrypted with the public key of VU , namely as Indexi =
Enc(si, pkVU) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Finally, the encoder SS of the sketch computes for
each wi, ci = Cλ(wi) and outputs the public parameter PAR= (∆1, ...,∆k) =
(w1 − c1, ..., wk − ck) that is stored in the smartcard of the user. We will explain
in the next section why the helper data PAR should be stored in the smartcard
of the user.
Verification Phase









i ) = Enc(g
wi , pkAS) to the
AS using the PAR and ElGamal encryption. Here, wi’s are computed using the




k) and PAR as described in section
3.8.5. The rest of the operations are as in section 3.8.2.
• Finally, AS obtains Ci’s from the VU and decrypts them using his secret key. If
Dec(Ci)=1 and the total number of matching features is above the threshold t of
the set difference metric, AS authenticates U , else rejects. Hence, the threshold
t allows the protocol to tolerate the replacement noise in the biometrics using the
set difference metric.
3.9 New Attacks
As it is described in section 3.4.2, identity privacy notion means that a malicious











R← {b0i , b1i }
∅ ← Enrollment((IDj , bj)j)
Use public data of IDi: PARi = c⊕ bβi
Compute b1i ⊕ PARi = c′
If Decode(c′) = c′
Return β = 1
Else if Decode(c′) = b0i ⊕ PARi










R← {b0i , b1i }
∅ ← Enrollment((IDj , bj)j)
Use public data of IDi: PARi = c⊕ bβi
Compute b1i ⊕ PARi = c′
If Decode(c′) =⊥
Return β = 0
Else If Decode(c′) = b1i ⊕ PARi
Return β = 1
even though AS knows that the stored biometrics is one of two possible templates
generated by AS. This notion is actually the analogue notion of indistinguishability of
ciphertexts defined for encryption systems, where the adversary A generates two equal
length messages and has to distinguish from the ciphertext that is the encryption of
one of these two messages generated by A.
Considering the security model for identity privacy as described in section 3.4.2, we
first assume that the adversary produces two biometric templates (b0i , b
1
i ) for the target




i ) < t, where t is the error correction threshold of
the secure sketch scheme. We call this first attack as Atk1A, which successfully dis-
tinguishes the template that was registered for the challenge user IDi using the public
helper data PARi, which is the output of the secure sketch in order to be used to error
correct the biometrics.
For the attack Atk1A, the adversary can easily distinguish which template was chosen
by the challenger to be registered for Ui by looking at the output of the decoding func-
tion of the secure sketch. If he correctly guessed the template b1i , then the computation
of b1i⊕PARi will result in a correct codeword, which does not need to be error corrected.
Otherwise, he returns β = 0.
The second case we consider is that the adversary produces two biometric templates
(b0i , b
1




i ) > t, which we call as Atk2A. We note
that this pair of templates still describe the same user Ui, since the variation of the
biometrics can be larger then the error-correction capacity of the secure sketch. Our
attack successfully distinguishes the template that was registered for the challenge user
IDi using the public helper data PARi. The difference to the previous attack is that, if
b1i is not the template that was registered by the challenger C, then, since the distance
between the two templates (b0i , b
1
i ) is above the error-correction capacity, the decoding
procedure will not work. Thus, the registered template is b0i , and A returns β = 0.
The reason that the public data PAR of the secure sketch scheme helps the adversary
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in the identity privacy game is due to the fact that for secure sketch construction the
standard notions of security do not fit. The statement “PAR leaks no information
about the biometric template b” is normally formalized by requiring that b and PAR be
almost statistically independent. Even the analogue requirement for computationally
bounded adversaries, semantic security, is impossible here: if Eve knows that b is one
of two similar strings (b1, b2), then she can compute b from PAR and b1. The difficulty,
then, is that the standard definitions of security require secrecy even when Eve knows
a lot about b, which is in contrast to the security of sketches, where Eve is sufficiently
uncertain about b, since biometrics is assumed as secret data. In [Dodis and Smith,
2005], it is shown that secure sketches can only guarantee entropic security, which
assumes that the adversary is sufficiently uncertain about the user’s biometrics, which
implies that secure sketches can never guarantee the notion of indistinguishability for
computationally bounded adversaries. Thus, the schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang
et al., 2008] and any biometric remote authentication scheme that assumes biometrics
and the required secure sketch as public data are vulnerable to this attack and cannot
satisfy identity privacy.
As opposed to the schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008], the scheme
of [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] stores the sketch as encrypted in the DB. Thus, a
malicious AS has only access to different corrupted codewords c′ik = PARi⊕ b′ik, where
b′ik is the fresh biometrics of the user Ui at the k
th authentication run. However, this
data can also help the malicious AS when playing the identity privacy game, since
there is no restriction on the two templates the adversary generates for the challenge
user Ui. Assume that the adversary knows that biometrics of Ui behaves according to
some distribution, and has determined the mean of this distribution after taking enough
samples; a well-motivated adversary can take more measurements, and thus determine
the mean more accurately. Let the adversary set one of the two templates he generates
in the game as equal to the mean value of this distribution, i.e. b0i = µ and the
second template he has to output equal to the value that is the maximum (allowable)
distance to the mean, i.e. b1i = µ+ δ, where 2δ denotes the variability of the biometrics
of Ui with identity IDi, namely the range of Ui’s biometrics. Enough number of
samples {bSir}1<r<N of Ui’s biometric data bi allows the adversary to compute this range
information. Since the malicious AS performs the decoding of the corrupted codeword
c′i for user Ui and obtains the correct codeword ci that was used in PARi = ci⊕ bβi , AS
has access to c′ik’s for 1 < k < M obtained at the k
th authentication run of Ui and the
unique codeword ci after decoding each corrupted codeword c
′
ik. The attack is denoted
by Atk3∗A.
The intuition of this attack is that by setting one of the templates to the mean of
the distribution of Ui’s biometrics, and the other template to the maximum value
of its range, listening to enough protocol runs (polynomially many) of Ui allows the











R← {b0i , b1i }
∅ ← Enrollment((IDj , bj)j)
At the kth authentication run of IDi, where 1 < k < M :
Obtain the data of IDi, PARi ⊕ b′ik = ci ⊕ bβi ⊕ b′ik = c′ik
If Decode(c′ik) = ci, store eik = c
′
ik ⊕ ci.
Compute a = Mean(HW (eik))
For 1 ≤ r ≤ N , compute b = Mean(HW (bSir ⊕ b0i )) and c = Mean(HW (bSir ⊕ b1i ))






i , (IDj, bj){j 6=i})← A(1l) s.t. b0i = µ and b1i = µ+ δ
bβi




∅ ← Enrollment((IDj , bj)j)
Compute b2i ≈ µ+ δ/2
At the kth authentication run of IDi, where 1 < k < M :
Obtain the data of IDi, PARi ⊕ b′ik = ci ⊕ bβi ⊕ b′ik = c′ik
If Decode(c′ik) = ci, store eik = c
′
ik ⊕ ci.
Compute a = Mean(HW (eik), b = (HW (b
2
i ⊕ b0i ))
If a < b return β = 0, else return β = 1
errors. Since the hamming weight HW of the error eik = b
β
i ⊕ b′ik when bβi = b0i will
be significantly less than the hamming weight of the error when bβi = b
1
i , we can make
various statistical analysis by comparing the errors obtained from the authentication
runs of Ui to the simulated errors based on the distribution of the Ui’s biometrics and
determine the value of β.
An alternative way to analyze the error and determine the value of β could be described
by the following algorithm Atk3∗∗A . Similar to the attack Atk3
∗
A, in this attack we expect
that the majority of the fresh templates presented to the sensor to be concentrated
around the mean template b0i of user Ui. Thus, computing an intermediate value b
2
i
can help us to determine the value of β. The exact value of b2i could be set based on
the distribution of the biometrics and other experiments.
Thus, the condition on the two templates generated byAmust be specified in a concrete
way to avoid such statistical attacks. However, with this current definition of identity
privacy, this is not possible since the generation of the two templates is controlled by the
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adversary. Hence, one should modify the identity privacy notion to avoid statistical
attacks. One possible solution is adapting a weaker security notion of public key
encryption to our setting. This weaker notion is called as Weak-Indistinguishability
where the adversary cannot select challenge plaintexts (m0,m1), instead the challenger
computes (m0,m1) and returns them to the adversary [Yang et al., 2010]. The same
idea could be applied to identity privacy notion, where the two possible templates for
Ui are computed by the challenger using the biometric template space BtSp associated
to the user Ui. Then, one of the two templates presented by the challenger to the
adversary is registered to the database. If the two templates {b0i , b1i } are chosen close
to each other, then we may refer to the notion of Indistinguishability of Errors, which
prevents an insider adversary to obtain some information about the reference template
of Ui based on the errors he collects. Weak-Identity Privacy is defined as follows:
Experiment ExpW−IPA (l)
(i, IDi, (IDj , bj){j 6=i})← A(1l)
{b0i , b1i } ← BtSp(Ui)
bβi




∅ ← Enrollment((IDj , bj)j)
β′ ← A(Challenger;V erification)
if β′ = β return 1 else return 0
A biometric authentication scheme satisfies Weak-Identity Privacy if equation (3.1) is
satisfied for all PPT A. Under this weaker notion, [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008] is
secure against statistical attacks. The security analysis based on this weaker notion is
identical to the analysis presented in [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008].
3.10 Preventing the Attacks
As we show in the previous section, for each different scheme, we have a different at-
tack based on the properties/architecture of the system. For statistical attacks against
schemes with encrypted sketches, we suggest to evaluate the security of the scheme
based on our new notion called Weak-Identity privacy. Other sketch-based schemes
used for equality testing can be made resistant against our attacks through the follow-
ing solutions. The first solution is to store the sketch PAR secretly for the schemes of
[Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008], for instance in the tamper-proof smartcard
of the user. This will result in a multi-factor authentication scheme, thus, the system
is not anymore a pure biometric based authentication scheme. Still, this solution does
not cover a brute-force attack if these systems are employed for biometrics that can be
represented as a set of features with a small feature space. Since encryption of each
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feature is performed individually, an insider adversary can try different feature sets to
obtain some information on the stored template of the user from the authentication re-
sult. For a large feature space, he can mount an attack similar to the statistical attack
of the previous section. Specifically, if the biometrics is represented as an ordered set of
features as in face biometrics, the adversary can generate the two templates in such a
way that the first template includes some particularly chosen features, whereas the sec-
ond template does not. By observing the matching/non-matching of these particular
features, the malicious server can distinguish which template is registered by the chal-
lenger. It is cancelable biometrics that can prevent this attack, if the stored template
is somehow distorted, where the distortion parameters are unknown to the insider ad-
versary. Specifically, if we define identity privacy in a different setting, then biometric
remote authentication schemes assuming biometrics as public data can achieve Iden-
tity privacy if they are combined with cancelable biometrics. The cancelable biometrics
system we use requires a high entropy randomness that is stored in the user’s smart
card to be used later for authentication in the transformed space. This way, biometric
data stored at the server is protected through this transformation and biometrics can
be updated by changing the transformation function or the randomness. This sys-
tem also prevents the user’s traceability across different biometric databases, even if
the (distorted) biometric templates are stored in clear. Example systems employing a
high entropy randomness stored in a smart card for cancelable biometrics are given in
[Hirata and Takahashi, 2009, Cambier et al., 2002, Sakashita et al., 2009].
Our proposed design is a multi-factor solution that requires each user to possess a
smartcard to store some high entropy randomness that will be hashed with the bio-
metrics before the encryption (and storage in the DB). So the same randomness is used
during verification by hashing it with the fresh biometrics and after that, the encryp-
tion of the result is transmitted to the server side for matching. If a secure sketch is
applied, then first biometrics are corrected with the help of PAR, then the randomness
is hashed with the corrected biometrics and encryption is performed afterwards. Also,
our proposal allows for the integration of a secure sketch without endangering the secu-
rity of the scheme, since the value PAR is only stored in the tamper-proof smart card of
the user. This way, the secrecy of the relationship between the identity and the stored
(distorted) biometrics of the user is maintained based on the privacy of the randomness
used in the distortion of the biometrics, which is stored in the tamper-proof smartcard
of the user. This solution guarantees the two security notions even if we employ a
secure sketch and biometrics with small feature space. Finally, we use a cryptographic
hash function for the computation of the distorted biometrics, thus, statistical attacks
are not possible as even one bit of change of the input of the hash function leads to a
complete different hash value.
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3.10.1 A New Protocol for Cancelable Biometric Setting
In this section, we describe an example scheme that achieves weak-identity privacy for
biometrics represented as an ordered set of features and (standard) identity privacy
for biometrics represented as a binary string. The new scheme is defined in cancelable
biometrics setting, where we assume biometrics as public data but the randomness used
in the distortion of the biometric features is kept as secret. We assume biometrics as an
ordered set of features such as face, iris, voice, handwritten signatures [Li et al., 2006],
however, the system also works for biometrics defined as a binary string such as an 2048-
bit Iris code. The matching of the fresh biometrics and the stored template is performed
as in [Sarier, 2010b] with the help of bilinear pairings, where the authentication server
AS does not need a secret key for its operations. This is an important difference to
the existing schemes [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008, Bringer and Chabanne,
2008], which store the biometrics as encrypted with the public key of the AS. Thus,
if the secret key of the AS is leaked, then each user in the system has to re-register in
the best case scenario, i.e. before the compromise of the DB, whereas the compromise
of the AS does not affect the security of our system as AS does not need its secret key
for its computations due to the use of bilinear pairings, hence, does not store any secret
key. Finally, we assume the general representation of biometrics, where a biometric
template Be consists of k features, i.e. Be = {wi}1≤i≤k. A possible attack for this type
of biometrics occurs when the feature space is small. A malicious AS may compare
the encryption of different features to the authentication data and using pairings, he
decides whether he correctly guessed the feature. Since we concatenate a different
random string to each feature, based on the secrecy of these distortion values applied
to each feature, the adversary cannot launch this brute-force attack. In our scheme,
we use the same architecture of [Tang et al., 2008] as summarized in section 3.6, which
does not require a detached verification unit VU and the sensor does not communicate
with the biometric database as in many real-life applications.
Enrollment Phase
• S generates his key pair (pkS , skS) and publishes them. In addition, AS is given
an elliptic curve ElGamal public key pkAS = g
y without the associated secret
key, for instance, a trusted third party can generate this public key. Finally, a
cryptographic hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ → G and a bilinear pairing eˆ : G×G→ F
is required.
• The user U generates his personalized username ID and registers it at the AS,
computes his distorted biometrics by picking at random ri ∈ Zq for 1 ≤ i ≤




i ) = (g
ri , gyriH(wi, ri)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k at the DB. The distortion numbers
{r1, ..., rk} are stored at the tamper-proof smartcard of U .
Remark 3.2. To further increase the accuracy, a secure sketch for ordered biometrics
can be used, whose public parameter PAR is only stored in the tamperproof smartcard of
the user together with the distortion numbers, thus PAR is not publicly available as in
the schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008, Bringer and Chabanne, 2008].
This is required to guarantee the identity privacy notion if a secure sketch is employed.
Verification Phase





i ) = Enc(H(w
′
i, ri), pkAS) = (g
xi , gyxiH(w′i, ri)) to the AS using
ElGamal encryption and the distortion values ri’s stored in the smartcard. S
sends his signature σ on X = {Xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} to AS.
• AS verifies the signature of S and communicates with the DB.
• DB computes for each entry 1 ≤ j ≤ N the rerandomization of Rji, where Rji
is the encryption of the ith feature of the jth user’s distorted biometrics. For
instance, the rerandomization for the user U ’s biometric template is computed




i ) = (g
βiR1i , g
yβiR2i ) = (g
βi+ri , gyβi+yriH(wi, ri)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
• AS first retrieves the index for ID and runs an efficient PIR protocol to obtain
the user U ’s rerandomized biometrics denoted as Ci for each feature of U . Next,
AS selects a random si ∈ Zq and computes for each biometric feature of U ,
Zi = (Xi⊘Ci)si , where, for any integer x and two ElGamal ciphertexts (c1, c2) and
(c3, c4), the operator ⊘ is defined as follows: ((c1, c2)⊘ (c3, c4))x = (( c1c3 )x, ( c2c4 )x).





i ) = ((g
xi · (gβi+ri)−1)si , (gyxi · (gyβi+yri)−1)si).
Finally, AS finds the total number matched features using bilinear pairings. Here,
AS obtains eˆ(pkAS , Z1i ) = eˆ(g, Z2i ) for the matching features by computing in
total 2k bilinear pairings. If the number of Zi’s satisfying this equation is above
the threshold, AS authenticates U , else rejects.
Theorem 3.3. The proposed scheme achieves identity privacy against the AS, based
on the Gap DH problem and the tamper-proofness of the user smartcard.
Proof. If the proposed scheme does not achieve identity privacy against malicious AS
or an attacker who has compromised it, we construct an algorithm A′, which receives
an Gap DH challenge from its challenger and runs A as a subroutine to solve the Gap
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DH problem. Here, the attacker A with advantage ǫ denotes AS or the attacker who
compromised it and the hash function H is controlled by A′.
A′ obtains from his challenger a Gap DH challenge (g, gx, gy)) and sets pkAS = g
y.
Next, A′ obtains the two possible biometric templates B0e , B
1
e generated by A for the
user with IDe. A
′ chooses random elements αi ∈ Zq and ξi ∈ G and computes c∗i =
(c1i , c
2
i ) = (g
xαi , ξi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Finally, A′ registers c∗i ’s to the DB as the distorted
biometric feature set of the user with IDe. Intuitively, ξi denotes g
xyαi multiplied by
the hash of the random distortion parameter (i.e. ri = xαi) and the biometric feature
wi, where the distortion parameter is not known by A and wi’s are chosen randomly
from the two biometric templates output by A. Thus, the challenge ciphertext is
random and independent from the biometric templates due to the random distortion
parameters.
A′ faithfully answers the verification queries by A as follows.
• Simulation of the sensor: For any 1 ≤ l ≤ M , A′ simulates the message (i.e. the
encrypted fresh biometrics) sent from the sensor as follows:
If l = e, A′ randomly selects di
R← Zq and generates for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (Z1i , Z2i )




di+xαi and Z2i = g
ydic2i = g
ydiξi, and σe
is the signature of the sensor on these data. Here, we basically compute the
rerandomization of the registered biometrics c∗i .
If l 6= e, A′ generates for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (Z1i , Z2i ) and (IDl, σl) by directly following
the protocol specification.
• Simulation of theDB: A′ simulates theDB by following the protocol specification.
• Simulation of the H-queries: Upon receiving a query (wj, sj),
1. If there exists (wj, sj, hj) in HList, return hj.
2. Else if wj ∈ B0e or wj ∈ B1e , A′ checks whether eˆ((gy)
sj−di
αi , g) = eˆ(gx, gy) for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If one of the equations is satisfied, A′ returns (gy)
sj−di
αi to
his challenger and finishes the game. Here, di is the randomness used during
the simulation of the sensor in the randomization of the challenge ciphertext
associated to the feature wi = wj. Additionally, eˆ((g
y)sj/αi , g) = eˆ(gx, gy)
could also be checked, again if the equation is satisfied, A′ returns (gy)sj/αi
to his challenger and finishes the game.
3. Otherwise, A′ picks a random hj ∈ G, adds the tuple (wj, sj, hj) in HList,
return hj to A.
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• If A outputs β′, then A′ terminates by picking a random entry sj from the HList
and returns (gy)
sj−di
αi to his challenger.
The intuition of this security game is that an attacker A has to query the random
oracle H in order to be able to distinguish the template stored in the database. Since
A only obtains the randomization of the challenge template c∗i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, from his
queries to the random oracle, A′ tries to solve the Gap DH problem. Let H be the
event that algorithm A issues the queries H(wj, sj) for wj ∈ Be at some point during
the simulation. By the definition of A, |Pr[β′ = β] − 1
2
| > ǫ. Pr[H] in the simulation
above is equal to Pr[H] in the real attack. Also, in the real attack we have Pr[H]≥ 2ǫ
due to the following facts.
If the HList does not contain the values for wj, sj’s, then we have Pr[β
′ = β|¬H] = 1
2
.
Combining all the results and defining the event E as E = Pr[β = β′], we obtain the
following as in [Boneh and Franklin, 2003]
E = Pr[β = β′|H]Pr[H] + Pr[β = β′|¬H]Pr[¬H]
⇐⇒ Pr[β = β′] ≥ 1
2
(1− Pr[H])
⇐⇒ Pr[β = β′] ≤ 1
2
(1 + Pr[H]).




Pr[H], namely Pr[H] ≥ 2ǫ
Following from the above claims, we have that A′ produces the correct answer with
probability at least 2ǫ/q2, where q2 denotes the total number of queries to the H-oracle.
We note that our scheme achieves weak-identity privacy for biometrics represented as
an ordered set of features and (standard) identity privacy for biometrics represented as
a binary string. This difference results from the fact that the adversary may arrange
the two possible biometric sets of the challenge user in a special way so that he can
distinguish the registered reference template from the matching results of the particular
features he arranged. The matching result analysis does not work for biometrics as a
binary string since there is a single authentication result: accept or reject.
Theorem 3.4. The proposed scheme achieves transaction anonymity against a mali-
cious DB, based on the security (user privacy) of the PIR protocol.
The proof is identical to the proof presented in section 3.8.3. The only difference is
that the entity VU is replaced by AS, as in this protocol we do not employ a detached
verification unit.
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3.10.2 Identity Privacy for Cancelable Biometrics
Our first solution presented in the previous section guarantees identity privacy due to
the one-wayness property of the cancelable biometrics and the secrecy of the helper
data PAR. Thus, in order to distinguish one of the biometric templates, the adversary
playing the identity privacy game as described in [Bringer et al., 2007b] has to break
the one-wayness of the cancelable biometrics, where one-wayness is a weaker security
notion than indistinguishability. To overcome this limitation, we define the following
notion, where breaking this new notion implies breaking the underlying encryption
scheme in the sense of indistinguishability, which is a stronger security notion.
Given an adversary A running against the biometric authentication scheme and a chal-
lenger C that simulates the registration phase of the scheme, we consider the following
game between A and C.
Experiment ExpA(l)
((IDj, bj , rj, PARj){j 6=e})← A(1l)
(e 6= j, IDe, be, r0e , r1e , PARe)← A(1l)
rβe
R← {r0e , r1e}
re ← rβe
∅ ← Enrollment∗(Distortion(bj, rj)j)
β′ ← A(Challenger;V erification)
if β′ = β return 1 else return 0
A biometric authentication scheme satisfies the notion of “Identity Privacy for Cance-
lable Biometrics” if equation (3.1) is satisfied for all PPT A. Here, the adversary A
generates the authentication data for N − 1 users together with the reference biomet-
rics bj, the secure sketch PAR, and two different distortion parameters for an additional
user Ue. C picks at random a distorion parameter re = rβe . Next, the chosen distortion
parameter is applied to the reference biometric template and the enrollment phase is
completed. The difference of our notion to the Bringer et al.’s identity privacy notion
[Bringer et al., 2007b, Bringer and Chabanne, 2008, Tang et al., 2008] is that the C does
not need to choose randomly one of the two similar biometrics generated by the ad-
versary A, since with the public value PAR, the error-corrected template can be easily
computed and a unique reference template be is obtained. Thus, C only needs to apply
the random distortion rβj to this reference template bj and then register the encryp-
tion of this distorted biometrics in the Enrollment∗ phase. This application could be
performed as in the protocol described in section 3.10.1, by simply picking at random
r1e , r
2
e ∈ Zq as input to the hash function. After running the verification protocol, A
outputs a guess for the distortion parameter that C has chosen. One can easily show
that the schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] achieve identity privacy
for cancelable biometrics against a malicious AS, based on the semantic security of the
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ElGamal encryption although the sketch PAR is public. The proof is identical to the
proofs presented in [Bringer et al., 2007c, Tang et al., 2008] for biometrics represented
as a fixed length binary string. If biometrics is represented as a set of features, a set
of randomly picked distortion parameters is applied instead of a single parameter.
3.11 Comparison
In this section, we present an overview of the protocols designed according to the model
of Bringer et al. We compare the schemes based on the security notions they achieve
and whether the schemes are still secure even if the secret key of the verification unit
in [Bringer et al., 2007b, Barbosa et al., 2008] or the secret key of the authentication
server in [Tang et al., 2008, Bringer et al., 2007c] is leaked, where this key is required for
the matching stage and the final decision. In our scheme the authentication server does
not know his secret key and uses bilinear pairings for the matching in the encrypted
domain, thus, our scheme is resistant against this attack. + denotes the first biometric
scheme.
Table 3.4: Properties of various DBRA schemes
Scheme
Identity Transaction Security against Current








[Barbosa et al., 2008] [Simoens et al., 2011]
System+3
No Yes No Atk1A, Atk2A[Bringer et al., 2007c]
System 4
No Yes No Atk3∗A, Atk3
∗∗
ABringer et al. [2008]
System 5
No Yes No Atk1A, Atk2A[Tang et al., 2008]
New System




In this chapter, we analyze the security model for distributed biometric remote authen-
tication (DBRA). We review different schemes that guarantee the security notions with
a security reduction and present a new protocol with a different biometric template
storage. Our first improvement is in terms of efficiency, i.e. reducing the database
storage cost significantly. Secondly, the compromise of the biometric database does
not allow an adversary to obtain the biometric templates of each user, as in our sys-
tem, the database stores only a random pool of biometric features. The database does
not know which feature belongs to which user, since the database locations of a user’s
feature set Index is stored only in the smartcard of that user.
Next, we focus on the notion of identity privacy and present three new attacks that
reveal the reference biometric template of the user to the malicious server. The first
type of attack applies to any system that assumes biometrics and the sketch as public
data since a secure sketch can only guarantee a weak level of security. However, if
the sketch is stored secretly, i.e. in a tamper-proof smartcard, then the systems are
secure for biometrics represented as a fixed length binary string. The second type of
attack is a statistical attack, which works even if the sketch is stored as encrypted
at the database. Consequently, the security of pure biometric remote authentication
schemes is questionable if they are evaluated in the framework of a realistic and strong
security model. Thus, we suggest that DBRA systems should be implemented as a
two-factor authentication system, which employs a tamper-proof smartcard for storing
additional data as the second factor. Besides, the current systems are not suitable
for other biometric traits that are represented as an ordered/unordered feature set,
whereas our new protocol for cancelable biometric setting is both secure against the
three types of attacks and resistant for attacks as a result of different representations
of biometrics. Finally, if identity privacy is redefined in cancelable biometric setting,





In this chapter, we evaluate the security properties of Multi-Factor Biometric Au-
thentication (MFBA), where biometrics is assumed as a set of features that can be
either ordered or unordered depending on the biometric modality. We propose efficient
schemes for MFBA that are suitable for a different template extraction method used in
bipartite biotokens. In particular, a bipartite biotoken describes the biometric template
of a user as two sets of data. The first set consists of the stable parts of the features
and the second set is the non-stable parts. By separating the stable and non-stable
parts of each feature, a cryptographic protocol is applied to encrypt the stable parts
and the matching score is computed in the encryption domain at the remote server,
whereas another (optional) matching can be performed at the client-side by checking
whether each non-stable part is within its predefined range. We formally describe the
security model for MFBA, where the server-side computations are performed in the
encrypted domain but without requiring a decryption key for the authentication de-
cision of the server. Thus, leakage of the secret key of any system component does
not affect the security of the scheme as opposed to the current biometric systems in-
volving cryptographic techniques. Finally, we reduce the security of our design to the
unforgeability of the Schnorr Signature Scheme according to our new security model
that captures simultaneous attacks against a MFBA. In this context, we define the
notion of user privacy, where the goal of the adversary is to impersonate a client to
the server. The adversary has access to different oracles that model the adversaries
capabilities such as eavesdropping on the communication channel -even in the case of a
compromised session key that is used to build a secure communication link before the
start of the protocol execution-, and compromise of either the sensor (namely biomet-
rics of the user) or the smart card of the user that stores the secret parameters used
in the stable/non-stable part separation.
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We note that, our design is the first biometric system based on a CCA secure encryption
system. However, when implemented on a pairing friendly elliptic curve, the server can
make the authentication decision without any decryption operation through the use of
bilinear pairings.
We also show that there is a tradeoff between the security the scheme achieves (OW-
CCA instead of IND-CCA) and the requirement for making the authentication decision
without using any secret key. For unordered biometrics such as fingerprint minutia,
we employ RSA encryption combined with a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of
plaintext for RSA. The results described in this chapter were published in [Sarier,
2010a].
4.1 Introduction
Biometrics provides a stronger authentication mechanism compared to password-based
systems, as passwords can be easily lost, forgotten or compromised using various at-
tacks. In addition to identification/authentication purposes, biometrics can also be
used for key release, key binding or key generation, where this key could be the input
to a symmetric cryptosystem such as AES. For different applications of biometrics, the
assumptions on the biometric data varies. Specifically, current biometric identifica-
tion/authentication systems that are provably secure in a cryptographic sense, assume
that biometrics is public data whereas the link between the identity of the user and
his biometrics should be kept secret. On the other hand, biometric cryptosystems that
lock/generate a secret key using biometric features assume that biometric template
of a user is secret data. Despite different views about the secrecy of biometrics, the
common principle is that biometrics is sensitive data and the privacy of biometrics
that is either stored on a central database or on a tamper-proof smart card should be
protected using cryptographic techniques.
To protect the privacy of biometrics in the above listed settings, we combine biometrics
and cryptography. There exists different types of biometric cryptosystems such as
fuzzy extractors, fuzzy vault and recently introduced bipartite biotokens, which could
be used for biometric key generation, key binding and key release, respectively. Also,
cancelable biometrics perform a distortion of the biometric image or features before
matching. The variability in the distortion parameters provides the cancelable nature
of the scheme. Besides, fuzzy vault is a key binding system that hides an encoded
secret among some chaff points, where the secret key is encoded as the coefficients of
a polynomial that is evaluated at the biometric feature locations such as fingerprint
minutia locations. Recently introduced bipartite biotoken is an extension of revocable
biotoken and fuzzy vault, where the stable parts of biometrics is stored as encrypted
and the evaluation points of the embedded polynomial are not stored as opposed to
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the fuzzy vault.
However, the implementation of these systems come along with various attacks that
question the security of them. For fuzzy vault, the broad categorization of these attacks
consists of known plaintext and ciphertext-only attacks, where the former assumes that
an attacker can gain access to the secret key hidden in the fuzzy vault, which leads
to the biometric template by verifying the secret polynomial on the points in the
vault. The second group of attacks, namely ciphertext-only attacks do not require any
insider knowledge and brute force attack or different instances of the vault encoded
with the biometrics of the same user is enough to obtain the biometric template of
that user. For fuzzy extractors, a similar attack based on the reusability of the same
(or a noisy variant) of the biometrics for multiple extractions of independent public
strings is described due to improper fuzzy sketch constructions or wrongly chosen error
correcting codes. From these public strings, an attacker can exactly regenerate the
corresponding secret keys that are output by the fuzzy extractor.
Apart from the application specific attacks, remote biometric authentication systems
are vulnerable to four classes of attacks: Attacks to the sensor via spoofing or compro-
mising the sensor, attacks to the database (tampering with the templates, substitution
attacks), attacks to the matcher and intercepting/eavesdropping to the communication
channel. The first and second classes of attacks can be avoided by additional security
factors (password, smart cards) and by storing the (cancelable) templates as encrypted
and signed. Also, if a decryption is performed during the matching stage a Trojan
horse type attack can lead to the disclosure of the raw biometric. Thus, the com-
parison should be made in the encrypted domain without any decryption operation.
Finally, the communication between the entities should be encrypted with session keys
to prevent the last classes of attacks. Clearly, all of these countermeasures assumes
the secrecy of the system’s private keys and session keys. Since, for biometric authen-
tication systems, although the encoding of the raw biometrics can be encrypted, if the
encryption is ever broken due to a leaked secret key or due to the leakage of the session
key of a previous authentication, the reference template is not anymore a secret, thus,
biometrics cannot provide a security factor on that application as it cannot be revoked.
New approaches for remote biometric based verification guarantee provable security
against these attacks, which consists of a hybrid protocol that distributes the server
side functionality in order to detach the biometric data storage from the service provider
SP . This is required as the biometric templates of each user is stored in the database as
encrypted using the public key of the service provider SP that only stores the identities
of each user (Name, personalized usernames). The main advantage of this approach is
that the user does not need to store any secret data and/or his biometric template in
a smart card as in match on card systems. However, the collusion of the server end
components results in the violation of the user privacy. Other attacks against this type
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of systems are presented recently in [Sarier, 2011a, Simoens et al., 2011].
Besides, multi-factor biometric authentication (MFBA) protocols that store the user’s
biometric template in a smart card combine a local authentication on the card by a re-
mote authentication at the server. For instance, the local matching of the fresh biomet-
rics to the stored template on card generates a biometric secret key that is used to sign
a challenge sent by the remote server for the remote authentication [Itakura and Tsu-
jii, 2005, Bringer et al., 2008]. Other multi-factor solutions combine this biometric key
with encryption or zero knowledge proofs for a remote verification [Bhargav-Spantzel
et al., 2006]. Cancelable biometrics is another approach that stores the masked bio-
metrics at the server, where the masking is performed using a one-way transformation
or a high entropy randomness that is stored in the user’s smart card to be used later for
authentication in the transformed space. This way, biometric data stored at the server
is protected through this transformation and biometrics can be updated by changing
the transformation function or the randomness [Ratha et al., 2001, Sakashita et al.,
2009].
4.1.1 Related Work
Juels and Wattenberg [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999] introduced the fuzzy commitment
scheme, which assumes biometrics as a binary string (for instance a 2048 bit Iris code)
and replaces biometric matching algorithms by error-correction techniques. Further
systems that follow the same approach are presented in [Boyen, 2004, Dodis et al.,
2004] which include secure sketches and fuzzy extractors that are used for biometric
authentication. Also, Juels and Sudan have developed the fuzzy vault [Juels and Su-
dan, 2006], which assumes biometrics as an unordered set of features and is designed
for the set difference metric in order to hide a secret key (i.e. an AES key) using
biometrics. Implementations of fuzzy vault for fingerprints are given in [Clancy et al.,
2003, Nandakumar et al., 2007a].
Attacks against biometric cryptosystems are presented in [Boyen, 2004, Mihăilescu
et al., 2009] and an overview of the attacks that are specific for traditional biometric
authentication systems are given in [Li and Jain, 2009]. Also, Scheirer and Boult
present three different attacks (including the correlation attacks) against the fuzzy
vault and biometric encryption [Scheirer and Boult, 2007] and in view of that, they
proposed revocable biotokens [Boult et al., 2007] and its implementation in [Scheirer
and Boult, 2009], where their system could be considered as an example of cancelable
biometrics, a concept that was introduced in [Ratha et al., 2001].
Besides, Bringer et al. [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008, Tang et al., 2008] defined the
security notions for biometric remote authentication and described a new architecture
based on homomorphic encryption, Private Information Retrieval (PIR), detached bio-
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metric storage and secure sketches for error correction of the biometric string. Also,
the authors of [Barbosa et al., 2008, Sarier, 2009a, 2010b] describe a secure remote
authentication scheme in the same framework assuming biometrics as a feature set.
A survey of these systems could be found in [Sarier, 2009b]. The common property
of these systems is the high computational costs due to the PIR systems and strong
assumptions on the server-end components resulting in small-scale biometric systems
with highest security. Although a simple client server biometric authentication system
is proposed in [Upmanyu et al., 2009], the decision can be computed after a decryption
operation similar to the schemes of [Tang et al., 2008, Bringer and Chabanne, 2008,
Barbosa et al., 2008], thus the leakage of the system’s secret keys endangers the security
of the system. Besides, MFBA systems are proposed in [Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2006,
Apampa et al., 2008, Sarier, 2009a, 2010b, Bringer et al., 2008, Itakura and Tsujii,
2005], where the last two schemes performs the matching on card for a local authen-
tication followed by a remote authentication. Also, cancelable biometrics is combined
with a smart card for storing only the helper information [Hirata and Takahashi, 2009,
Sakashita et al., 2009] resulting in a MFBA protocol.
4.1.2 Motivation and Contributions
When we analyse different biometric authentication systems, we see that the most dan-
gerous event is the leakage of the session keys encrypting the communication channel
between the client and the server. Similarly, the storage of the system’s secret keys
causes another bottleneck as they are required for decryption of the stored templates
at the matching stage or for decrypting the final decision when homomorphic encryp-
tion is used. The natural question that arises is whether it is possible to have user’s
privacy even if these keys are compromised. In other words, is there a way to store the
biometrics as encrypted and perform the matching in encrypted domain without any
decryption operation. Partially, current systems achieve this using homomorphic en-
cryption schemes, however, for the final decision, the system’s secret key is still needed.
Thus, we need a different encryption method that also determines the final decision
without using any secret key. Besides, an attacker that compromised the session key
between the server and client could eavesdrop to the communication channel and later
perform a replay attack by sending the same ciphertext (i.e. encrypted biometrics)
without even knowing the true biometrics of the user. How do we prevent replay at-
tacks? A solution could be attaching a proof of knowledge of the plaintext to the
ciphertext, which proves that the user knows the biometrics without revealing it to
the server. However, this zero knowledge proof (ZKP) must include a time stamp and
additional data such as user specific information to become non-malleable, namely we
require a non-malleable ZKP to avoid a replay attack that sends the ciphertext and
the corresponding ZKP obtained from a previous session or to prevent a more powerful
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attacker that transforms the (malleable) ZKP to a valid ZKP for the current session.
Besides, the combination of a (weakly secure) encryption scheme and a non-malleable
ZKP prevents Chosen Ciphertext Attacks as shown in [Sahai, 1999, Katz, 2002, Jao,
2009]. Another point one should consider is the compromise of the sensor. In this case,
can we have still privacy?
In this chapter, we try to answer these questions and design a new biometric verifica-
tion protocol that does not require additional detached components at the server end
and strong assumptions on the system. Instead, we propose a simple client server ar-
chitecture for a MFBA by combining bipartite biotokens and cryptographic techniques,
where the complete biometric template of the user is not stored in any system compo-
nent. We formally design the security model for MFBA based on the privacy/security
issues summarized as in figure 4.1, where we allow an adversary trying to impersonate
a user against a honest-but-curious server to access different oracles. Basically, these
oracles model the adversaries capabilities such as eavesdropping on the communication
channel -even in the case of a compromised session key that is used to build a secure
communication link before the start of the protocol execution- and compromise of ei-
ther the sensor (namely biometrics of the user) or the smart card of the user through
side channel analysis. We present a security reduction according to this strong model.
Firstly, we follow the biometric template extraction method used in bipartite bioto-
kens [Boult et al., 2007], where the biometrics is transformed using a scaling and a
translation in order to separate the stable and non stable part of each biometric fea-
ture. The encrypted stable parts and the signature of the user on this data are stored
at the service provider and the non-stable parts can be stored in clear together with
the separation (i.e. transformation) parameters in the tamper-proof smart card of the
user if a second check is performed. This operation results in a cancelable biometric
template as changing the parameters and/or the public key for encrypting the stable
parts will lead to a different template. In addition, security against the honest-but-
curious server is guaranteed by storing the stable parts as encrypted with the user’s
public key, where the corresponding secret key is not needed after the registration to
the server and thus not stored anywhere. Also, this storage mechanism at the server
avoids substitution/masquerade attacks due to the secret transformation parameters
and encrypted storage, and prevents tampering with the templates due to the signature
of the user on the encrypted template.
Our system is based on the signed ElGamal encryption scheme [Tsiounis and Yung,
1998], which is IND-CCA secure and plaintext aware in Random oracle model (ROM).
Due to the combination of a (weakly secure) encryption scheme and non-malleable proof
of knowledge of the randomness used, the adversary proves his knowledge of the (stable)
biometric features, thus a decryption oracle would be useless to the adversary. This
way, security against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA) is provided without loosing
115
the homomorphic property of the IND-CPA secure part of the scheme that encrypts
the message as opposed to the generalized signed ElGamal encryption [Schnorr and
Jakobsson, 2000] or padded ElGamal [Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999], which are also
CCA secure in ROM. We note that, our design is the first biometric system based on a
CCA secure homomorphic encryption system, i.e. non-malleable ElGamal encryption
that combines ElGamal encryption with a non-malleable zero knowledge proof [Tsiounis
and Yung, 1998]. However, when implemented on a pairing friendly elliptic curve, the
server can make the authentication decision without any decryption operation through
the use of bilinear pairings. In chapter 2, we presented the first biometric authentication
scheme [Sarier, 2010b] that is based on this method, namely, encrypting the biometric
templates using elliptic curve ElGamal and for verification, we use bilinear pairings
to test whether two biometric templates are equal in the encrypted domain. This
can be considered as an instance of a new concept called “PKE with equality testing”
introduced in a later publication of [Yang et al., 2010], where the authors describe a
slightly different scheme that is OW-CCA secure with a reduction to the CDH problem
in ROM and use bilinear pairings to test for equality. In this chapter, we show that
elliptic curve signed ElGamal achieves OW-CCA security in ROM if bilinear pairings
are used to test for equality of biometric data in the encrypted domain. We also show
that there is a tradeoff between the security the scheme achieves (OW-CCA instead
of IND-CCA) and the requirement for making the authentication decision without
using any secret key. Clearly, if the final decision is made by decrypting the resulting
computation as in current biometric authentication systems, our construction achieves
IND-CCA security. For unordered biometrics such as fingerprint minutia, we employ
RSA encryption combined with a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of plaintext for
RSA.
The main difference of our system to the previously defined systems is that we do not
need to use any decryption key at any stage of the protocol and the authentication
is performed in the encrypted domain. Currently, the systems perform authentication
in the encrypted domain using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme
but later require a decryption for the final decision as in [Hirata and Takahashi, 2009,
Barbosa et al., 2008, Tang et al., 2008, Bringer and Chabanne, 2008]. However, in our
design, the leakage of the secret key of any entity does not affect the security of the
system. Besides, we do not have to employ a secure sketch or error correcting procedure
to obtain the exact template that was stored in the biometric database of the service
provider. Since no template is stored in the server end in our system, there is no need for
a detached database and to employ the computationally expensive Private Information
Retrieval (PIR) system to retrieve any template from the database privately. Instead,
we propose a simple client server architecture for biometric verification that could be
implemented also for large scale systems such as border control applications.
Moreover, the stable parts of a user are stored as encrypted using the public key of
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that user, whereas currently defined provably secure systems store the templates of
each user at the detached database as encrypted using the public key of the service
provider. Hence, if the service provider and the database collude, identity (Name) and
biometrics relation cannot be kept secret and compromise of the systems secret key
requires all the users to re-register to the system with a new public key in the best-case
scenario (i.e before the compromise of the biometric database). In our system, the
server (or an adversary that compromised it) has to invert the encrypted stable parts
and compromise the smart card of the user at the same time in order to obtain this
relation.
Another difference to the previous systems is that our system can be implemented
a hybrid system that combines server-side matching and client side-matching, where
the matching score of the both sides cannot be obtained by a passive attacker due
to the use of a range proof that does not reveal the matching score but proves that
the score lies in a range based on a threshold. This way, attacks depending on the
matching score (for instance hill climbing attacks, Trojan horse attacks) are avoided.
Finally, revocation of the biometric templates can be easily performed by changing the
transformation parameters and/or picking a different public key for the user to encrypt
the stable parts.
4.2 Preliminaries and Definitions
In this section, we review the definitions of the primitives used in this chapter briefly.
The reader is referred to the background chapter for the details of ElGamal encryption,
Schnorr Signature, forking lemma, zero knowledge proof, plaintext awareness and the
presented definitions.
Definition 4.1. Bilinear Pairing:
Let G and F be multiplicative groups of prime order q and let g be generator of G. A
bilinear pairing is denoted by eˆ : G×G→ F if the following two conditions hold. 1G, 1F
denote the identity elements of G and F, respectively.
1. ∀ (u, v) ∈ G×G and ∀ (a, b) ∈ Z we have eˆ(ua, vb) = eˆ(u, v)ab
2. If eˆ(u, v) = 1F ∀v ∈ G, then u = 1G, namely the pairing is non-degenerate.
ElGamal encryption system can be implemented on elliptic curves, which allow for the
construction of a special map called bilinear pairing. Using bilinear pairings, one can
check the equality of two plaintexts without decrypting their corresponding ciphertexts.
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4.2.1 Forking Lemma
Forking Lemma was introduced by David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern [Pointcheval
and Stern, 2000], which is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital sig-
nature scheme instantiated in the random oracle model. The forking lemma states that
if an adversary (typically a probabilistic Turing machine), on inputs drawn from some
distribution, produces an output that has some property with non-negligible probabil-
ity, then with non-negligible probability, if the adversary is re-run on new inputs but
with the same random tape, its second output will also have the property. The authors
show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability, then
there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random
tape can create a second forgery in an attack with a different random oracle. The fork-
ing lemma has been used to prove the security of a variety of digital signature schemes
and other random-oracle based cryptographic constructions. The reader is referred to
the background chapter for the details of this method.
4.2.2 Zero Knowledge Proof
A proof of knowledge is an interactive proof in which the prover P succeeds “convincing”
a verifier V that it knows something. Specifically, a ZKP allows a user to have a private
data, and prove its possession without releasing it. As shown by [Katz, 2002, Sahai,
1999], it is possible to construct zero knowledge proofs having the property that a proof
of one statement cannot be adapted or mutated into a proof of another statement (a
property known as non-malleability). Using non-malleable zero knowledge proofs, it is
then possible to construct cryptosystems that achieve CCA security [Jao, 2009].
4.2.3 Plaintext Awareness
Plaintext-Aware encryption is means that an adversary is aware of the decryption of
the messages which she encrypts in the sense that she cannot produce a ciphertext
without knowing the corresponding plaintext. Plaintext awareness is defined both in
ROM and standard model. In [Teranishi and Ogata, 2006], it is shown that combining
a one-way secure encryption and plaintext awareness implies CCA security.
For our new MFBA scheme, we employ the non-malleable ElGamal encryption scheme
of [Tsiounis and Yung, 1998], which combines ElGamal encryption with non-malleable
ZKP based on the Schnorr Signature scheme. This CCA-secure encryption scheme
is also called as signed ElGamal and shown to be plaintext aware in [Schnorr and
Jakobsson, 2000]. This is achieved by a generic extractor that extracts the secret key r
from a signed ciphertext (u, v, c, z) = (gr, yrm, c, z) produced by the adversary. Given
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(r, u, v) the plaintext m can be extracted in one generic step. Thus, signed ElGamal
encryption is plaintext aware as defined in [Bellare and Rogaway, 1994].
4.3 A New Design for MFBA
In this section, we describe how to combine the ingredients defined in the previous
section to obtain a provably secure and efficient MFBA protocol. We start with a
simple client-server application and analyse its security against various attacks, that
are summarized in section 4.4.1. For better understandability of the security concepts,
we present different examples and their weaknesses step by step.
4.3.1 Choosing the cryptographic method
For simplicity, assume that biometrics b of user U is represented as an ordered set of
features, where each feature bi is stored as encrypted with U ’s public key y = g
x using
elliptic curve ElGamal as Encrypt(bi)=(ui, vi) = (g
ri , yribi).
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i), g) = eˆ(bi, g) due to the (1) property of the pairing. Lastly,
SP decides based on the number of matching features to accept or reject U .
However, ElGamal encryption system is malleable. For example, given an encryp-
tion (ui, vi) of some (possibly unknown) message m, one can easily construct a valid
encryption (ui, 2vi) of the message 2m. Or, assume that the attacker eavesdrops on the
communication channel and obtains the encryption (ui, vi) of each feature of the user.
At a later time, the attacker can use the same ciphertext (ui, vi) (or the re-encryption
of it via (gkui, y
kvi)) and authenticates to the system without even knowing the bio-
metrics. Thus, ElGamal encryption is combined with a zero knowledge proof (ZKP) of
plaintext (i.e. biometrics), which proves to the server that the user knows the biomet-
rics. In [Tsiounis and Yung, 1998], Schnorr proofs of knowledge (which is based on the
Schnorr signature) is combined with ElGamal encryption to obtain a non-malleable
encryption scheme that we present as an example as below.
Assume that each biometric feature bi of a user is stored as Encrypt(bi)=(ui, vi).








ib′i) and the Schnorr ZKP (zi, ci), where zi = g
ki , ci =
r′i · H(g, u′i, v′i, zi, U)+ ki. Here, U denotes a user specific data (i.e. name, identity
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i,zi,U) · zi. If this equality holds, then server computes the bilinear
pairings as before.
One should note that this non-malleable scheme is still vulnerable to replay attacks
as an attacker that compromised the session key and eavesdrop on the communication
channel, can obtain the encrypted biometrics and the corresponding ZKP of a user and
later impersonates this user. This can only be prevented by adding a time stamp t to
the ZKP in addition to the user specific data as H(g, u′i, v
′
i, zi, U, t), thus the attacker
cannot use the same ciphertext for a replay attack at a later time t′.
Besides, the systems of [Bringer and Chabanne, 2008, Tang et al., 2008] require the use
of secure sketches and store biometrics in the detached database as encrypted using
the public key of the service provider SP . If the secret key of SP is leaked, than every
user has to re-register to the system before the compromise of the database. Therefore,
the new design should store each biometrics as encrypted with the user’s public key.
4.3.2 Biometric Template Generation
Basically, biometrics of a user is represented as a set of features, where each feature can
be mapped to a finite field element [Juels and Sudan, 2006, Nandakumar et al., 2007a]
or error corrected using a secure sketch [Sutcu et al., 2006]. In our design, we represent
the biometrics of each user as a set of features, where k denotes the size of this set and
depending on the biometric modality chosen, the features could be ordered. Besides,
we do not have any assumption on the secrecy of the biometrics, whereas the biometric
template that is stored should be private but easily revocable.
In addition to the classical representation of biometrics, one can also implement the
biometric template extraction method of [Boult et al., 2007], where each feature is
transformed using a scaling and a translation in order to separate the stable ν and
non stable r part of each feature. This way, the stable part ν can be encrypted using
standard public key encryption schemes, as one bit of change in the plaintext (i.e.
nonstable biometrics) will result in a completely different ciphertext when encrypted
with standard cryptosystems. The encrypted stable parts are stored at the service
provider and the non stable parts can be stored as a plaintext in the smart card of
the user which is tamper proof. The main difference of this approach is that there is
no need to employ a secure sketch or error correcting procedure to obtain the exact
template that was stored in the biometric database of the service provider. Moreover,
this method of template generation applies to any type of biometrics that can be
processed as stable and non stable parts.[Boult et al., 2007, Scheirer and Boult, 2009]
implements this approach for fingerprints.
In our system, we store the non-stable (residual) part, the transformation (i.e. scaling
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and translation) parameters and the window parameter E in the user’s tamper proof
smart card. This is different from the systems of [Boult et al., 2007, Scheirer and Boult,
2009], which allow to send the biotoken over the network for authentication or key
release purposes. Assuming the biometric produces a value v′′ that is transformed via
scaling s and translation t to v′ = (v′′−t)s, the resulting v′ is split into the overall stable
component ν, and the the residual component r. The amount of stable/unstable data
is a function of the biometric modality. In [Boult et al., 2007], the separation parameter
E that depends on the expected variations on v′′ separates the stable (integer) part
ν = int(v′/E) and non stable part r = rmod(v′, E) using a simple mod operation:
r = rmod(v′, E) = v′%2E if (v′%2E) < E and
r = rmod(v′, E) = 2E − (v′%2E), otherwise
Other methods (if they exist) that separate stable/non stable parts of a feature are
also applicable in our setting.
4.4 Security Model
We propose a MFBA scheme that consists of three components, which communicate
via an encrypted channel.
• Sensor Client SC: This is the entity that obtains the fresh biometrics of the user
during verification. The liveliness assumption should be satisfied as it guarantees
with high probability that the biometrics is coming from a live human user. The
sensor client is always honest as in any biometric system and it is trusted by
everyone.
• Service Provider SP : This entity stores the identity information (name, person-
alized usernames...) for each user and the encrypted stable parts of each user’s
biometric template. Since no complete reference biometric template of a user
either as a plaintext or in encrypted form is stored at the SP , there is no need
for a detached biometric database.
• User U with a smart card: Each user possesses a tamper proof smart card that
stores the non stable parts of his biometrics (optional) and the parameters of the
biometric template extraction method. We emphasize that no complete template
is stored as in Match On Card (MOC) systems.
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Figure 4.1: Security and Privacy Issues of Multi-factor Biometric Systems
4.4.1 Adversarial Capabilities and Goals
In order to define the adversaries capabilities and goals, one has to determine the
security and privacy issues for MFBA systems, which is summarized in section 4.4.1.
In our security model, the goal of the adversary is to impersonate a user. We model the
adversary’s power by allowing him to interact with protocol instances through several
oracles as below.
• Reveal: This query models the leakage of information about the authentication
requests, where an eavesdropper listening to the communication channel can ob-
tain the encrypted stable parts if the session key is compromised. Namely, it
models the leakage of information about the session key agreed on by the sensor
client and the server as in the case of a misuse of it afterward. Moreover, the
authentication data of a user (i.e. encrypted stable parts) can also be leaked from
the server due to an insider attack.
• Corrupt: This query models corruption capabilities of the adversary. She can
indeed steal/break either one of the authentication factors of the user. In par-
ticular, the oracle can output the biometrics of the user. It models the attack
against the sensor client, i.e. the compromise of the biometrics of the user. Alter-
natively, the oracle can output either the transformation parameters (t, s, E) or
some part of the non-stable parts (rjs) that are stored in the tamperproof smart
card of the user. It models the side channel attack against the smart card of the
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user. Clearly, the adversary is restricted to query the corrupt oracle at most for
one authentication factor. Besides, no corruption can be performed during an
authentication session, but before a new session starts. For even higher security,
a user password can be added as a third factor. Then, we allow the adversary to
corrupt two authentication factors, one of which must be the password.
4.4.2 User Privacy
We define the security notion for MFBA as User Privacy. To formally model this
notion, we describe a security game between a challenger that simulates the server and
an adversary that tries to impersonate a user. The adversary can ask several queries,
but to the server only: We only consider adversaries whose goal is to impersonate a
client to the server. Briefly, user privacy means that the adversary cannot impersonate
a user to the server and thus cannot access user-specific applications. The formal
definition of user privacy is as follows:
Given an adversary A running against the MFBA scheme and a simulator S that
simulates the registration phase of the scheme, we consider the following game between
A and S. At the end of the game, A makes an authentication request for the user U .




∅ ← Registration(ID, pk, c,ZKP)
c′, ZKP′ ← AO1,O2(V erification, pk)
If c′ ≈ c and ZKP′ is verified, return 1, else return 0
A biometric authentication scheme satisfies the notion of User Privacy if
SuccA(l) = Pr[ExpA(l) = 1] < negl(l) for all PPT adversaries A.
Here, the simulator S simulates the enrollment phase by registering the encrypted
authentication data c and the corresponding zero knowledge proof ZKP. S registers the
encryption of the stable parts c = Encrypt(ν, pk) = 〈Encrypt(ν1, pk), ...,Encrypt(νk, pk)〉
and the corresponding proofs ZKP= 〈ZKP(ν1), ...,ZKP(νk))〉 of knowledge of plaintext
νjs. Having access to Reveal and Corrupt oracles denoted by O1 and O2 respectively,
the adversary A tries to impersonate the user U . If A succeeds, namely, impersonates
the user U to the simulator, A wins the game.
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4.4.3 The concrete scheme
In this section, we present our MFBA scheme, which consists of three components: The
user U with a smart card, a sensor client SC and a service provider SP . An overview
of the registration and verification phases are presented in figure 4.2 and 4.3. For the
first construction that is based on the elliptic curve ElGamal encryption scheme and
a non-malleable ZKP based on the Schnorr signature, we assume that biometrics is
represented as an ordered set of features such as face [Sutcu et al., 2006].
• Setup Phase: The parameters of the elliptic curve ElGamal encryption scheme
are initialized with pairing friendly elliptic curve group G and bilinear pairing
eˆ : G × G → F and a map G : {0, 1}∗ → G. Each user U posesses an ElGamal
key pair (pkU , skU) that is used to encrypt the stable parts of the biometrics. We
note that after the registration phase, the user does not need to store the secret
key in his card. Also, SP and SC generate their key pairs to build a secure
communication channel between the entities.
• Enrollment Phase: U registers to the system as follows:
1. SC extracts U ’s raw biometrics b and the raw data is transformed via a
translation and scaling as described in section 4.3.2. Next, each trans-
formed biometrics v′j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, is separated to fraction (residual parts)
rjs and integer (stable) part νjs using a reflected modulus rmod that does
not increase the distance between points [Boult et al., 2007, Scheirer and
Boult, 2009]. Each stable part νj is mapped using G and the resulting
value µj = G(νj) is encrypted using the public key pkU of the user U to




j ), whereas the residual rjs are stored
in the smart card in clear for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k. To enforce the secrecy of
the non-encrypted rjs, we use an approach similar to the Match On Card
(MOC) system [Bringer et al., 2008], where fresh biometrics are acquired by
the sensor client but the matching of the residual parts are made inside the
card. This way, the confidentiality of the rjs relies on inherent protections
of smart cards against physical threats, where rjs do not go out of the card.
2. U registers his ID and the encrypted stable parts together with the ZKPs
and his signature on wjs at the SP . U stores the parameters (i.e. transfor-
mation parameters, reflected modulus rmod, windowing parameter E) and
(optionally) the residual parts (i.e. rjs) in his smart card. U does not store
the secret key of his public key pkU as it will not be used after signing the
encrypted parts.
• Verification Phase: U authenticates to SP as follows:
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Figure 4.2: Registration Phase
1. The sensor client SC extracts U ’s fresh b′ and communicates with the smart
card of U to send b′.
2. The user’s smart card seperates the stable and residual parts of each feature
using the parameters stored in his card and encrypts the stable parts of
each feature using the ElGamal public key pkU of U . If the residual parts
are stored in U ’s smartcard, an additional check can be performed on card
by matching the fresh residuals to the stored ones based on the predefined





are sent to SC together with the associated ZKPs.
3. SC and SP agree on a session key. SC sends the encryption of the data
obtained from U using this session key.
4. SP decrypts the data using the session key, verifies the ZKPs and compares
the fresh encrypted stable parts w′j’s of U to the previously stored data wj’s
by using the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption scheme. For





















5. SP checks for 1 ≤ j ≤ k whether eˆ(gx, R1j ) = eˆ(g,R2j ) by computing 2k
pairings. Here, pkU = g
x is the public key of U .
6. Finally, SP counts the number of the equations satisfying the above condi-
tion and computes the matching score ms, which can be compared to the
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matching score mns of the non-stable parts stored on card. The comparison
is made by using an efficient range proof such as [Peng and Bao, 2010], which
does not reveal themns even to the server but proves thatmns ≈ ms. If the
user can prove to the server that the mns lies within the range determined
by the predefined threshold of the system, SP decides to authenticate U .
Figure 4.3: Verification Phase
Theorem 4.1. Assume that an attacker running against our protocol breaks the user
privacy by making at most two queries to the Corrupt, qH queries to the random or-
acle H and qR queries to Reveal oracle, then the simulator can break the existential
unforgeability of the Schnorr Signature scheme.
Proof. User privacy is achieved by playing a game between the simulator that simulates
the environment (i.e. the server) to the adversary A. The simulator generates a non-
malleable ElGamal ciphertext (i.e. an ElGamal encryption and the corresponding zero
knowledge proof based on Schnorr signature scheme) that represents the encryption
of the stable parts of the user U∗ with public key pkU∗ . Using the adversary running
against our MFBA, the simulator is able to obtain a forgery of the Schnorr signature.
• Simulation of the Enrollment: The challenger sets the (non-malleable) ElGamal
public key of U∗ as pkU∗ = pk and generates the registration data for U
∗ as c =
〈Encrypt(µ1), ...,Encrypt(µk)〉 encrypted with pk and the corresponding Schnorr
ZKP = 〈ZKP(Encrypt(µ1)), ...,ZKP(Encrypt(µk))〉. The simulator S registers this
data for the user U∗ and returns the adversary A the public key pkU∗ = pk.
Here, µi ∈ G denotes the stable parts of U∗’s biometrics, Encrypt(µi) = (ui, vi) =
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(gri , yriµi) and zi = g
ki , ci = ri·H(g, ui, vi, zi, U∗, tR)+ ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ k are
computed for the registration time tR.
• Simulation of the H oracle: At each new input (g, ui, vi, zi, U∗, t), the simulator
picks a random value hi, inserts the tuple (g, ui, vi, zi, U
∗, t, hi) to the HList and
returns hi to the attacker A.
• Simulation of the Reveal Queries: To simulate the past authentication requests
of user U∗, the attacker queries for the authentication data that was communi-
cated to the server at time t′. S generates a rerandomization of the challenge
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answer of A’s query to the reveal oracle.






























• Simulation of the Corrupt Queries: The attacker can either query for the true
biometrics of U∗ or for the transformation parameters stored at U∗’s smart card.
If a password is also used as a third factor, A can query for U∗’s password. Thus,
at most two queries are allowed to this oracle, one of which is for the user’s
password.
After polynomial number of queries to the oracles, the attacker impersonates U∗ by
returning the authentication data for U∗ for the current time t∗ as Encrypt(µi) =
(u∗i , v
∗
i ) = (g
r∗i , yr
∗
i µi) and the Schnorr ZKP z
∗
i = g
k∗i , c∗i = r
∗
i ·H(g, u∗i , v∗i , z∗i , U∗, t∗)+













∗, t∗) and breaks
the existential unforgeability of the Schnorr Signature Scheme. The intuition of the
game is that the adversary having access to either the biometrics or the transformation
parameters (translation, scaling,windowing parameter E) cannot compute the stable
parts µis, thus the only way for impersonating the user U
∗ is the forgery on the Schnorr
signature.
Hence, we can state that our protocol guarantees user privacy based on the existential
unforgeability of the Schnorr signature scheme. Although the security reduction for
Schnorr signatures are given in the random oracle model, recently, [Neven et al., 2009]
enhances confidence in the instantiation of Schnorr signatures, in particular its elliptic-
curve variant, with hash functions like SHA-1 and MD5 by analyzing its security in
another popular idealization, the generic group model.
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Corollary 4.1. Assume that an attacker running against our protocol breaks the user
privacy by making at most two queries to the Corrupt, qH queries to the random oracle
H and qR queries to Reveal oracle, then the simulator can solve the discrete logarithm
problem.
If we go one step further, we can solve the discrete logarithm problem using the security
proof of [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000] for Schnorr Signature scheme that is based on the
forking lemma technique. The intuition is that if the attacker A can forge a signature,
then the simulator can construct a modified adversarial algorithm which (1) constructs
a random oracle H and runs the attacker A until she produces a forged signature
(zi, ci) on the message m = (g, ui, vi, zi, U
∗, t∗), (2) fabricates a second random oracle
H ′ which is identical to H except for its output on m, i.e. H(m) 6= H ′(m) and re-runs
the adversary on the same inputs (i.e. m) to obtain another signature (zi, c
′
i). Finally,
the simulator obtains ri of the forged signature, namely, solves the discrete logarithm








i−ci). Hence, gri = g(c
′
i−ci)/(H
′(m)−H(m)) and ri = (c
′
i − ci)/(H ′(m)−H(m)).
The computation of the discrete logarithm is achieved using this oracle replay attack
[Pointcheval and Stern, 2000], which means that by the polynomial replay of the attack
with different random oracles, the simulator is able to obtain two signatures on the
identical message m = (g, ui, vi, zi, U
∗, t∗) and the value zi = g
ki but for different hash
values H(m) 6= H ′(m).
Hence, we can state that our protocol guarantees user privacy based on the difficulty
of solving discrete logarithms.
Clearly, from the value ri of the forged signature, the simulator computes the plain-
text (i.e. the stable parts of U∗’s biometrics), thus breaks the one-wayness of the
ElGamal encryption. Identical to the arguments of the proof for non-malleable ElGa-
mal [Tsiounis and Yung, 1998], since signed ElGamal encryption scheme is plaintext
aware [Schnorr and Jakobsson, 2000] with respect to the challenge time t∗ and user
U∗, the party that included t∗ and U∗ in the encryption (i.e. the party who produced
the Schnorr signature) can compute the value ri corresponding to the signature, and
from this compute the stable part µi = vi/y
ri , where y = pk is U∗’s public key. If
the attacker returned the data by changing any part of the previously obtained au-
thentication data after querying the Reveal oracle, she needs to obtain a signature on





∗, t∗) 6= (g, u′i, v′i, z′i, U∗, t′), which she has not seen before.
Thus, she has to know or efficiently compute ri. Thus, for any modified ciphertext, the
attacker knows the randomness ri he used in generating the authentication data, thus
knows the plaintext (i.e. stable parts of U∗’s biometrics). Hence, the attacker who can
generate a valid ZKP for the encrypted stable parts of U∗ for the authentication time
t∗, does actually know the underlying plaintext.
Lemma 4.1. For Signed ElGamal encryption implemented on a pairing friendly elliptic
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curve, achieving IND-ATK is impossible. However, the same scheme is an IND-CCA
secure PKE on a non-bilinear group.
Proof. When playing the indistinguishability game, the adversary knows the challenge
plaintexts m0 and m1, he does not even need to resort its plaintext choosing capability.
After challenge phase, what the adversary knows is the public key, challenge plaintexts
m0 and m1 and the challenge ciphertext. Using a bilinear pairing computation, he
can test whether the challenge ciphertext is an encryption of m0 or m1. However,
in a non-bilinear group, namely a group where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem
(DDH) is intractable, signed ElGamal is proven IND-CCA secure in the random oracle
model.
Lemma 4.2. Signed ElGamal encryption implemented on a pairing friendly elliptic
curve can only guarantee OW-CCA security in the random oracle model based on the
one-wayness of ElGamal encryption and strong EUF-CMA secure Schnorr signature.
Proof. Before presenting the proof, we note that EUF-CMA secure Schnorr signature
should be transformed so that strong EUF-CMA security is achieved. A signature sys-
tem is said to be strongly unforgeable if the signature is existentially unforgeable and,
given signatures on some message m, the adversary cannot produce a new signature on
m. Strongly unforgeable signatures are used for constructing chosen ciphertext secure
systems and group signatures. This is a stronger notion than (standard) EUF-CMA,
which basically requires the adversary to come up with any valid message-signature
pair that does not equal to the output of the signing oracle. There exists various
generic constructions that convert any EUF-CMA secure signature to a strong one,
both in ROM and standard model. The reader is referred for the details to [Liu et al.,
2010].
We make the proof by contradiction. Assume that elliptic curve signed ElGamal is
not secure against CCA attacks, which implies that the decryption oracle can help
the adversary to invert the challenge ciphertext. Thus, an attacker can construct a
ciphertext by adapting or mutating the challenge ciphertext so that the resulting signed
ElGamal ciphertext is a valid query to the decryption oracle. And from the answer of
the decryption oracle, the adversary is able to invert the challenge ciphertext. Again,
this requires to (strongly) forge a signature σ = (z, c) on the (modified) ElGamal
ciphertext m = (u, v). However, due to the strong EUF-CMA secure signature on the
message m, the adversary cannot even produce a new signature on m for which he has
a valid signature. Thus, we have a contradiction and the lemma follows. In [Schnorr
and Jakobsson, 2000], it is emphasized that a signed ElGamal ciphertext consists of an
ElGamal ciphertext (u, v) and a Schnorr signature (c, z) of the message m = (u, v) for
the public signature key u. The signature does not contain any information about m
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as (c, z) depends on m exclusively via some hash value that is statistically independent
of m.
As it is shown in [Tsiounis and Yung, 1998, Schnorr and Jakobsson, 2000], signed
ElGamal encryption is IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model (ROM) since
Schnorr signature is also proven secure in ROM. An alternative construction could
be the combination of ElGamal encryption with a strong EUF-CMA secure signature
scheme or with an interactive non-malleable ZKP of knowledge of plaintext as described
in [Katz, 2002], which results in an IND-CCA secure scheme in the standard model. We
note that ElGamal encryption on elliptic curve groups equipped with bilinear pairings
can only guarantee OW-PCA security based on the GDH problem in the standard
model. When this scheme is combined with a non-malleable ZKP, the construction
can achieve at most OW-CCA security in the standard model instead of IND-CCA
security. Hence, there exists a tradeoff between the security the scheme achieves and
the requirement for making the authentication decision without using any secret key.
The above described biometric scheme is partly based on an earlier publication of
[Sarier, 2010b], which constructs a remote biometric authentication scheme using OW-
PCA secure ElGamal encryption (due to the GDH problem) implemented on a pairing
friendly elliptic curve and for verification, the equality test of two encrypted biometric
templates is performed through bilinear pairings in the encrypted domain. This con-
struction can be considered as an instance of a later publication that introduced the
concept of “PKE with equality test” [Yang et al., 2010], which is very similar to our
application on biometrics if generalized to message encryption. In their system, the
authors design an encryption scheme on elliptic curves that is OW-CCA secure in the
random oracle model based on the CDH problem. Again, the equality test is performed
via bilinear pairings. The disadvantage of that scheme is that, when ElGamal encryp-
tion implemented on a pairing friendly elliptic curve is combined with a (interactive)
non-malleable ZPK of [Katz, 2002], OW-CCA security can be achieved in the standard
model, whereas the author’s scheme is secure in the random oracle model. However,
for efficiency reasons, our system based on signed ElGamal or the recently introduced
scheme of [Yang et al., 2010] that are both secure in ROM can be applied for biometric
setting.
4.4.4 Biometrics as an Unordered Set
Although some biometric modalities can be represented as an ordered set of features
such as face biometric, for fingerprints this is not a trivial task [Boult et al., 2007]. Fuzzy
vault based systems try to find a solution for biometrics that consists of an unordered
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set of features, however, as shown recently, there exists many attacks against these
systems that reveal both the secret used for authentication and the biometric template
that hides this secret. Since ordering or grouping of features are not possible for some
biometric modalities, we cannot use a probabilistic encryption scheme such as ElGamal
encryption system since the comparison cannot be made in the encrypted domain. Also,
the matching of the non stable part on card will not be consistent with the matching
of the encrypted stable parts at the remote server. (There could be accidental matches
on card that results in different matching scores). However, if we use a deterministic
scheme like RSA, the remote server can send the indices of the fresh encrypted parts
that exactly match the stored encrypted stable parts and thus, the match on card
system performs the matching according to the instruction of the remote server, which
will result in similar matching scores at the both entities. We note that the stored
stable features at the SP and the non-stable parts stored at the smart card share the
same order at the enrollment phase, i.e. if a specific feature is stored as the second
feature in the server, than the unstable part of this feature is also stored at the 2. place
on card. Besides, computing the indices of the matching stable parts is also possible
when elliptic curve ElGamal is used, however, the remote server has to compute in
worst case O(k2) bilinear pairings and modular divisions, where the computation of
one bilinear pairing is approximately 9 modular exponentiations. (k is the size of the
feature set). Thus, our previous system is impractical compared to a deterministic
encryption scheme for unordered biometric features. Finally, replay attacks should be
considered when a deterministic scheme is used as encryption of the same message
results in the same ciphertext, whereas the encryption of the same message results
in a different ciphertext due to the random coins used in the probabilistic encryption
scheme. Thus, the communication channel should be encrypted using a session key and
ZKPs designed for RSA [Rivest, 2001] should be attached to the ciphertext with a time
stamp as before. In [Katz, 2002], the author also presents an interactive non-malleable
ZKP of knowledge of plaintext for RSA encryption.
• Setup Phase: The RSA keys of each user is initialized, where pkU=(n, e) is the
public key of the user that is only used in the encryption of the stable part. Also,
SP and SC possesses two key pairs for an encryption and signature scheme to
generate the session keys.
• Enrollment Phase:
1. SC extracts U ’s raw biometrics b, which is processed as in the previous
section to obtain wj = (Encrypt(νj), pkU) and the corresponding ZKPs for
RSA such as the system described in [Rivest, 2001].
2. U registers his ID and the encrypted stable parts together with the ZKP
proof at the SP and U stores the residual parts (i.e. rjs) following the same
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order of their corresponding stable parts and the parameters (i.e. transfor-
mation parameters, reflected modulus rmod) in his smart card. We note
that, we cannot use the locations of the matched residual parts on card to
determine the corresponding stable parts at the server since there could be
accidental matches on card. The secret key of U that encrypts the stable
parts is not stored as it will not be used during matching.
• Verification Phase:
1. SC extracts U ’s fresh b′ and communicates with the smart card of U to send
the raw data b′.
2. The user’s smart card performs as before to compute the encrypted stable
parts w′j = (Encrypt(νj), pkU) and the corresponding ZKPs for RSA to send
to SC, which signs them before sending to SP .
3. SP verifies the signature and compares the fresh encrypted stable parts w′js
of U to the stored wjs.
4. If the number of matched stable features is above the threshold, SP sends
the signed order information of the matched stable parts to the SC. For
instance, if the first stable part in the fresh query matched the third stable
part stored in the gallery, than SP sends [1 → 3] to the SC. In order to
leak no information about the actual matching score, SP sends to the client
random order information for the non-matching parts.
5. SC checks the signature and forwards the order information to the smart
card, where the residual parts are matched on card to the fresh residual
parts following this order. For instance, if SP has sent [1 → 3], then the
smart card compares also the first non-stable part in the query to the third
non-stable part stored at the smart card.
6. Finally, the matching scorems computed by SP and the matching scoremns
of the non-stable parts stored on card are compared privately as before.
4.5 Discussion
In table 4.1, we analyze the success of the attacker against our system in case of 4
classes of attacks. In our security model, we only assume that the attacker cannot
compromise both the sensor and the smart card of the user, otherwise, the attacker
with the true biometrics of the user and the transformation parameters stored at the
card can impersonate a user trivially. We note that this assumption may be relaxed if
the user has its own biometric smart card reader, then we can obtain higher security
against sensor compromise.
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(1) Server Compromise × ×
(2) Side channel attack × ×
(3) Session key compromise × ×
(4) Sensor Compromise Unavoidable × if no (2)
Also, the server stores the encrypted stable parts together with the ZKPs, thus, tam-
pering with the stable parts is not possible since they are signed with the secret key of
each user (which is not required after this operation, thus not need to be stored in the
smartcard of the user) and the ZKPs are non-malleable i.e. cannot be modified to work
with the new stable parts. Another advantage of the new system is that revoking of
the templates is possible since the user can choose a different public key in the encryp-
tion of the stable parts and use different transformation parameters in the separation
of the stable/nonstable parts. This also prevents linkability of the stored templates
of the same user at different servers. We emphasize that the smart card of the user
does not output a matching score, but a range proof on this score, which does not
leak any information about the score and proves the server that the score lies within
a range that the server accepts. Thus, no information useful for a hill climbing attack
can be obtained. We note that, the second matching on card is optional, it may give
a higher confidence to the server and thus, it can be considered as a second layer of
authentication. Alternatively, SP can also store the non-stable parts and can perform
the matching of the two parts himself. This way, there is no need for a range proof
and a matching score, instead the server outputs an accept/reject decision. Thus, hill
climbing attacks are not applicable and the server cannot compute the true biometrics
of the user due to the encrypted stable parts and the secrecy of the the transformation
parameters that are stored in the tamperproof smart card of the user.
As a final note, the features of some biometric modalities (i.e. fingerprints) can take
small integer values or the feature space of some biometric traits could be a small
universe of features. Thus, an adversary can try to find out the stable parts of some
user by computing the stable parts using the captured biometric features of the user and
randomly picked transformation parameters. One can prevent this particular attack for
biometrics with small feature (and thus small universe of stable parts) by allowing each
user to implement a different map for encoding each stable part to a group element
before encrypting them. Specifically, in the registration phase of section 4.4.3, each
stable part νj is mapped using G : {0, 1}∗ → G before applying ElGamal encryption.
This randomized map prevents the adversary to perform a brute force attack on the
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stable parts since the randomization parameters are stored at each user’s smart card.
Alternatively, we can implement the same idea presented in section 3.10 of the previous
chapter to prevent attacks resulting from small feature space. Besides, encoding of
arbitrary bit sequences into sequences of group elements is easy for particular groups
such as Z∗q that correspond to an interval of integers. In [Tang et al., 2008], the encoding
problem is solved by mapping the biometrics to an element of Z∗q and the resulting value
b is encrypted as Encrypt(gb, pk).
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present the security model for MFBA and describe two schemes
for ordered/unordered set of biometric features that combine a different extraction
method, zero knowledge proofs and homomorphic encryption schemes. The security
notion for MFBA is defined as user privacy, which is achieved for our protocols even in
the case of simultaneous attacks against the system. Finally, our schemes are provably
secure in our security model but less complex than existing biometric schemes that
provide a security reduction.
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Chapter 5
Efficient Biometric Identity Based
Signature
In this chapter, we present a new biometric Identity Based Signature (IBS) scheme that
is applicable for any type of biometrics (i.e. represented as an ordered or unordered
set of features) and is more efficient compared to the current fuzzy IBS of [Yang et al.,
2008] and threshold Attribute Based Signature (t-ABS) scheme of [Shahandashti and
Safavi-Naini, 2009], when implemented for biometric identities. Moreover, the new
scheme could function as a fuzzy IBS or t-ABS scheme if the biometric features are
replaced by attributes defining the identity of the signer.
We prove the security of our new scheme in the framework of the exisiting adversarial
models for fuzzy IBS and t-ABS and additionally in the framework of a stronger model,
which basically simulates the leakage of partial secret key components of the challenge
identity. This property is not considered in the current security model of fuzzy IBS
(and t-ABS), which return to the adversary only the private key components belonging
to any identity other than (i.e. not similar to) the challenge identity. However, in our
stronger security model, we allow the adversary to query for some of the private key
components belonging to the challenge identity.
Our new scheme is based on the currently most efficient pairing based IBS scheme. In
order to show the efficiency of our new scheme, we first describe an intermediate scheme
called “modified t-ABS”, which is obtained by replacing the computationally expensive
T function in t-ABS of [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] with a MapToPoint
hash function similar to the conversion presented in [Pirretti et al., 2006] for fuzzy IBE
systems.
However, our new scheme is even more efficient since we do not require a MapToPoint
hash function as in the modified t-ABS instead we use only an ordinary hash function.
It is known that the cost of a MapToPoint hash operation is bigger than one inversion
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in Zq. Our scheme is compared to other error tolerant signature schemes and shown
to be much more efficient in terms of its each phase.
Based on the recently defined privacy notions, we show that our scheme achieves weak
signer-attribute privacy and our intermediate proposal modified t-ABS achieves full
signer attribute privacy if the additional protocols and architecture described in the
t-ABS scheme of [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] is employed. The contributions
of this chapter is based on the publication [Sarier, 2010c].
5.1 Introduction
Introduced in [Sahai and Waters, 2005], fuzzy IBE uses biometric attributes as the
identity instead of an arbitrary string like an email address. This new system com-
bines the advantages of IBE with those of biometric identities, where IBE avoids the
need for an online Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is the most inefficient and
costly part of Public Key Encryption (PKE). Fuzzy IBE could be used in an ad-hoc
setting where the users are unprepared, namely without having any public key or even
predefined e-mail addresses. Instead, the signer could present his biometrics to the
verifier, who can check the signature for validity using the biometric identity of the
signer. Besides, the use of biometric identities in the framework of IBE simplifies the
process of key generation at the Private Key Generator (PKG). Since biometric infor-
mation is unique, unforgettable and non-transferable, the user only needs to provide
his biometrics at the PKG under the supervision of a well-trained operator to avoid
biometric forgery and to obtain his private key instead of presenting special documents
and credentials to convince the PKG about his identity. It should be noted that bio-
metrics is assumed as public information, hence the compromise of the biometrics does
not affect the security of the system. This point of view is also accepted in the biomet-
rics community, where the raw biometric data is assumed as public data whereas the
revocable biometric template that is stored in a central database or on a smartcard for
biometric authentication is considered as private data. The reader is referred to the
next chapter for the other advantages of fuzzy IBE.
The signature analogue of fuzzy IBE is introduced in [Yang et al., 2008], where a
provably secure fuzzy Identity Based Signature (IBS) scheme is described. Since the
error tolerance property is satisfied, fuzzy IBS of [Yang et al., 2008] is applicable for
biometric identities and it shares the same advantages of fuzzy IBE. The private key
components of a fuzzy system are generated by combining the values of a unique
polynomial on each feature of the biometrics with the master secret key ms of PKG.
However, due to the noisy nature of biometrics, a fuzzy system allows for error tolerance
in the decryption stage for fuzzy IBE (or in the verification stage for fuzzy IBS).
Particularly, a signature constructed using the biometrics ID could be verified by the
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receiver using a set of publicly computable values corresponding to the identity ID′,
provided that ID and ID′ are within a certain distance of each other. Moreover, fuzzy
IBS could be considered in the context of Attribute Based Signature (ABS), which
allows the signer to generate a signature using the attributes she possess.
Another approach for incorporating biometrics into IBS is presented in [Burnett et al.,
2007], where the error tolerance is provided by a different identity structure compared
to fuzzy IBS, namely by integrating a fuzzy extractor into the IBS scheme. This way,
both the signer and verifier operate with the same public key, which is required for
standard cryptographic schemes. The limitation of this approach is that it requires
a special type of biometrics which can be represented as a binary string, which can
be error corrected and hashed to be used as a unique identity string. Thus, it is not
suitable for biometrics that can be represented as an unordered set of features such as
fingerprint minutia.
5.1.1 Related Work
The first fuzzy IBE scheme is described by Sahai and Waters in [Sahai and Waters,
2005] and the security is reduced to the MBDH problem in the standard model, where
the size of the public parameters is linear in the number of the attributes of the system
or the number of attributes (or features) of a user. More efficient fuzzy IBE and
biometric IBE schemes are achieved with short public parameter size by employing
the random oracle model (ROM) [Pirretti et al., 2006], [Baek et al., 2007], [Furukawa
et al., 2008], [Sarier, 2008]. The signature analogue of fuzzy IBE, i.e. fuzzy IBS is
first defined in [Yang et al., 2008]. Similarly, a threshold Attribute Based Signature
(t-ABS) scheme and its extension to threshold attribute based anonymous credential
systems is presented in [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], where the authors also
define the security notions of weak/full signer attribute privacy for t-ABS.
Burnett et al [Burnett et al., 2007] described the first biometric IBS scheme called BIO-
IBS for a biometrics that can be represented as a binary string such as Iris, where they
used the biometric information as the identity and construct the public key (namely
the identity) of the signer using a fuzzy extractor, which is then used in the modified
SOK-IBS scheme [Bellare et al., 2004].
Besides, the fuzzy IBS scheme of [Yang et al., 2008] is provably secure in the standard
model, where the scheme is based on the Sahai-Waters construction [Sahai and Waters,
2005] and the two level hierarchical signature of Boyen and Waters [Waters, 2005].
However, the scheme is very inefficient due to the d(n + 4) exponentiations and the
d+2 bilinear pairing computations during the verification process, where d is the error
tolerance parameter of the scheme and n is the size of the feature (i.e. attribute) set of
each user. Recently, a threshold ABS (t-ABS) scheme [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini,
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2009] with the same key generation phase as of fuzzy IBS and with threshold attribute
based verification is designed, which suffers from the same disadvantages described for
this fuzzy IBS. Due to the threshold verification, t-ABS can also be implemented as a
biometric IBS scheme as opposed to other ABS schemes [Maji et al., 2008], [Khader,
2007], [Shanqing and Yingpei, 2008], which are proven secure in the ROM or generic
group model. Thus, there is a need to devise an efficient and provably secure signature
scheme with error-tolerance property in order to integrate biometric data.
5.1.2 Our Contributions
Our new scheme is based on the Sakai Kasahara Key Construction [Sakai and Kasahara,
2003] and the security is reduced to the k-DHI computational problem in the ROM with
a more complex security reduction compared to [Chen and Cheng, 2005], [Chen et al.,
2006], [Barreto et al., 2005]. In order to show the efficiency of our new scheme, we first
describe an intermediate scheme called “modified t-ABS”, which is obtained by replacing
the computationally expensive T function in t-ABS of [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini,
2009] with a MapToPoint hash function similar to the conversion presented in [Pirretti
et al., 2006] for fuzzy IBE systems. Specifically, in previous fuzzy IBS (and fuzzy IBE)
constructions, there is a fixed value, n, on the number of attributes that is defined at
the setup in order to label a ciphertext. The setup function publishes values t1, ..., tn.
The function T (i) is computed in both the key generation and verify algorithms as:




j where N is the set {1, ..., n + 1}. By applying the conversion
presented in [Pirretti et al., 2006], the n + 1 exponentiations needed to solve T at
each verification have been replaced with a single MapToPoint hash function used as a
random oracle. Besides, each ciphertext does not have to contain exactly n attributes
to describe the identity of the user as in other fuzzy IBS and t-ABS schemes.
However, our new scheme is even more efficient since we do not require a MapToPoint
hash function as in the modified t-ABS instead we use only an ordinary hash function.
A MapToPoint hash function converts a user’s identity to a point on the underlying
elliptic curve in IBE schemes. Current efficient fuzzy IBE schemes [Pirretti et al.,
2006, Baek et al., 2007] employ this special function, which is usually implemented as
a probabilistic algorithm and is more expensive than a point scalar multiplication in
terms of computation time [Chen and Cheng, 2005, Chen et al., 2006]. This operation
is also time consuming and cannot be treated as a conventional hash operation which is
commonly ignored in performance evaluation. Besides, as it is noted in [Barreto et al.,
2005, Smart and Vercauteren, 2007], it is difficult to find groups as the range of the
MapToPoint hash function and to define an efficient isomorphism at the same time.
Our scheme is compared to other error tolerant signature schemes and shown to be
much more efficient in terms of its each phase. Specifically, the verification phase of
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the new scheme requires d exponentiations in group G and d pairing computations
instead of d(n + 4) exponentiations and d + 2 pairings as in the schemes of [Yang
et al., 2008], [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] and achieves much shorter public
parameter size, private key and signature sizes compared to these schemes. Also, we
have a structurally simpler key generation algorithm compared to [Yang et al., 2008],
[Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], where the number of exponentiations in the
group G is reduced from n(n+ 4) as in [Yang et al., 2008], [Shahandashti and Safavi-
Naini, 2009] to n and the cost of signing is half of the existing schemes. Based on
the recently defined privacy notions, we show that our scheme achieves weak signer-
attribute privacy and our intermediate proposal modified t-ABS achieves full signer
attribute privacy if the additional protocols and architecture described in the t-ABS
scheme of [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] is employed.
Finally, we present our arguments against the architecture of this scheme, which uses
an additional party called “signature holder” that has access to the (biometric) at-
tributes of the signer and the verification attribute set that is known by the verifier to
be used during the verification of the signature. By knowing the two similar (biomet-
ric) attributes, the signature holder determines the common biometric attributes, i.e.
performs an error correction based on set difference, and then communicates with the
verifier to send a converted signature using the common attributes. This new model is
designed in order to achieve weak and/or full attribute privacy, however, the model is
against the definition of fuzzy IBS, which does not allow a third party to compute an
error-corrected converted signature. Instead, the verifier should be able to verify the
fuzzy IBS without any help from a third party even if the signature is generated by
using an attribute set similar to the one the verifier. Thus, the t-ABS scheme of [Sha-
handashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] cannot be considered as a fuzzy IBS scheme with
this new model. This t-ABS scheme is actually identitical to the fuzzy IBS scheme
presented in 2008 by [Yang et al., 2008] without this new model.
5.2 Definitions and Building Blocks
In order to introduce the new biometric IBS scheme, at first, we review the defini-
tions and required computational primitives. The reader is referred to the background
chapter for the details of Shamir’s secret sharing, forking lemma and IBS based on
Sakai-Kasahara key construction. Given a set S, x
R← S defines the assignment of
a uniformly distributed random element from the set S to the variable x. Biometric
identities will be element subsets of some universe, U, of size |U|, where each element
is associated with a unique integer in Z∗p as in [Baek et al., 2007], [Sahai and Waters,
2005]. Finally, we define the Lagrange coefficient ∆µi,S for µi ∈ Zp and a set S of
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The security of our scheme is reduced to the well-exploited complexity assumption
(k-DHI), which is stated as follows.
Assumption 5.1. (DH Inversion (k-DHI)). For k ∈ N, and x R← Z∗p, eˆ : G1×G2 → F,
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Forking Lemma was introduced by David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern [Pointcheval
and Stern, 2000], which is specified in terms of an adversary that attacks a digital sig-
nature scheme instantiated in the random oracle model. The forking lemma states that
if an adversary (typically a probabilistic Turing machine), on inputs drawn from some
distribution, produces an output that has some property with non-negligible probabil-
ity, then with non-negligible probability, if the adversary is re-run on new inputs but
with the same random tape, its second output will also have the property. The authors
show that if an adversary can forge a signature with non-negligible probability, then
there is a non-negligible probability that the same adversary with the same random
tape can create a second forgery in an attack with a different random oracle. The fork-
ing lemma has been used to prove the security of a variety of digital signature schemes
and other random-oracle based cryptographic constructions. The reader is referred to
the background chapter for the details of this method.
5.2.2 Fuzzy Identity Based Signature
In [Yang et al., 2008], the generic fuzzy IBS scheme is defined as follows. The same
definition applies for t-ABS [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], where the identity
consists of a set of attributes such as {university, faculty, department, group}.
• Setup: Given a security parameter l, the PKG generates the master secret key
ms and the public parameters of the system.
• Extract: Given a user’s identity ID = {µ1, ..., µn} and the master secret key ms,
the PKG returns the corresponding private key DID. Here, n denotes the size of
the set ID.
140
• Sign: A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the private keyDID associated
to the identity ID, public parameters and a message m ∈ M and outputs the
signature σ.
• Verify: A deterministic algorithm that given an identity ID′ such that
|ID ∩ ID′| ≥ d, the signature σ together with the corresponding message m and
the public parameters, returns a bit b. Here b = 1 means that σ is valid and d
denotes the error tolerance parameter of the scheme.
Correctness: A fuzzy IBS scheme has to satisfy the correctness property, i.e., a
signature generated by a signer with identity ID must pass the verification test for any
ID′ if |ID ∩ ID′| ≥ d.
5.2.3 Security Model
A fuzzy IBS scheme is selectively unforgable under adaptive chosen message and given
identity attacks (SUF-FIBS-CMA) if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
A has a non-negligable advantage in the following game.
• Phase 1: The adversary A declares the challenge identity ID∗ = {µ∗1, ..., µ∗n}.
• Phase 2: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns the system pa-
rameters to A.
• Phase 3: A issues private key queries for any identity ID′ such that
|ID′ ∩ ID∗| < d. The adversary issues signature queries for any identity.
• Phase 4: A outputs a forgery (ID∗,m∗, σ∗), where A does not make a signature
query on (m∗, σ∗) for ID∗.
The success of A is defined as SuccSUF-FIBS-CMAA (l) =Pr[Verify(ID
∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1].
Collusion Resistance: It is important to note that the above definition of unforgeabil-
ity guarantees collusion resistance since users with common biometric features cannot
collude to generate a signature that is not generable by one of the colluders.
Remark 5.1. The second security reduction of our scheme allows the adversary A to
have as much power as possible by providing A with some of the private key components
of the challenge identity ID∗ except for the component µ∗ ∈ ID∗. Thus, our security
model is stronger than the (SUF-FIBS-CMA) model of [Yang et al., 2008], [Shahan-




In [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], privacy of the signer is guaranteed with an
additional algorithm that is run by an additional entity called “signature holder” which
knows the set of signer attributes that are known to the verifier, namely ID′ in our
setting. A signature holder can always check a signature against possible verification
attribute sets to deduce information about the signer’s attributes since it stores both
the ID that is used to sign the message and the verification attribute set ID′. To
preserve privacy of signers, the t-ABS scheme is equipped with an additional algorithm
for converting the signature to another signature that is verifiable against the verifier
and only reveals the d chosen attributes of the signer. This way, the converted signature
reveals only the d attributes of ID that are common with ID′ chosen by the signer at
the time of conversion. This property is defined as weak signer-attribute privacy and
it is achieved by the following algorithms for our setting.
• Convert: Given the public parameters of the fuzzy IBS, a message signature
pair (m,σ), and an identity ID′ (i.e. the verification attribute set), the signature
holder generates a converted signature σ˜ on the message.
• CvtVerify: An algorithm run by the verifier that given an identity ID′ (i.e.
the verification attribute set), a message converted-signature pair (m, σ˜) and
the public parameters, returns a bit b. Here b = 1 means that σ˜ is a valid
converted signature by a signer who has at least d of the attributes in ID′,
namely |ID ∩ ID′| ≥ d.
Weak signer-attribute privacy ensures that only the d attributes of the signer that are
chosen by the signature holder are revealed to the verifier given a converted signature.
In addition, the authors of [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] define the full signer-
attribute privacy, which guarantees that the verifier learns nothing more than the
fact that |ID ∩ ID′| ≥ d by combining the converted signature with an interactive
verification protocol, which is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a valid converted
signature with respect to the public inputs. Attribute privacy is obtained by using
an interactive verification protocol iVerify, that allows the signature holder to prove
possession of a valid converted signature without revealing the chosen d attributes in
common between the signer and the verifier.
5.3 A New Efficient Biometric IBS Scheme
The first idea for an efficient biometric IBS Scheme is to modify the t-ABS scheme of
[Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] by replacing T with a hash function used as a
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random oracle, which will reduce computational overhead in the key generation and
verification algorithms dramatically. The same approach was used in [Pirretti et al.,
2006] to obtain an efficient Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) scheme in the random
oracle model.
Since a new random polynomial is chosen for each private key, the modified t-ABS
is secure against collusion attacks. The n + 1 exponentiations needed to solve the
function T in [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], [Yang et al., 2008] have been
replaced with a single MapToPoint hash and signatures can contain a variable number
of attributes, rather than be required to contain n as in [Shahandashti and Safavi-
Naini, 2009], [Yang et al., 2008]. Verification can be optimized to reduce the number of
bilinear map operations by bringing the Lagrange coefficients in [Pirretti et al., 2006].
This optimization reduces the number of bilinear map operations from 3d to d + 2 at
the expense of increasing the number of exponentiations from d to 3d, thus the overall
speed of verification is improved. The modified t-ABS scheme [Sarier, 2010c] consists
of the following phases.
5.3.1 Modified t-ABS
• Setup: Given a security parameter l, the parameters of the scheme are generated
as follows.
1. Generate two cyclic groups G and F of prime order p > 2l and a bilinear
pairing eˆ : G×G→ F. Pick a random generator g ∈ G.
2. Pick randomly y ∈ Z∗p and h, g2 ∈ G and compute g1 = gy.
The public parameters are (g, g1, g2, h) and the master secret key is y.
• Extract: Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp be a collision resistant hash function and let
T : Zp → G be a MapToPoint hash function modeled as a random oracle. Let Γ
be the set defined as Γ =
⋃
µ∈IDH(µ). A new random degree d − 1 polynomial
q(·) over Zp is selected such that q(0) = y and ∀i ∈ Γ, a random ri is chosen and
DIDi = (g
q(µi)T (µi)
ri , gri) for each µi ∈ Γ
• Sign: Given a message m ∈M and DID, the following steps are performed.
1. Pick a random si ∈ Zp for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2. Compute σ1i = g
q(µi)T (µi)
ri(gm1 ·h)si , σ2i = gri , σ3i = gsi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The signature on the message m for identity Γ is σ = (σ1i, σ2i, σ3i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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eˆ(T (µi), σ2i)eˆ(gm1 · h, σ3i)
)∆µi,S(0)
The modified t-ABS scheme satisfies both weak signer-attribute and full signer-attribute
privacy if the additional protocols for signature conversion and interactive verification
are applied. The reader is referred to [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] for the
details of this application.
The main disadvantage of the modified t-ABS is the use of a MapToPoint hash func-
tion, which converts a user’s identity to a point on the underlying elliptic curve in IBE
schemes. Thus, our new biometric IBS scheme uses the Sakai Kasahara Key Construc-
tion [Sakai and Kasahara, 2003] for the generation of the private keys. This way, the
problems stated above for the modified t-ABS are prevented and better performance
is obtained due to the use of an ordinary hash function instead of MapToPoint hash
function, which is called n times for the key generation and verification algorithms, re-
spectively. Besides, the total number of exponentiations and bilinear pairings required
for the remaining phases are also reduced. Finally, the size of the public parameters
and the signature is also much shorter compared to the fuzzy IBS scheme of [Yang
et al., 2008], [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009]. The details of the new scheme
[Sarier, 2010c] is presented as follows.
5.3.2 Our Efficient Biometric IBS Scheme
• Setup: Given a security parameter l, the parameters of the scheme are generated
as below.
1. Generate three cyclic groups G1,G2 and F of prime order p > 2
l and a
bilinear pairing eˆ : G1 × G2 → F. Pick a random generator g1 ∈ G1 and
g2 ∈ G2 such that ψ(g2) = g1.
2. Pick random x, y ∈ Z∗p, compute Ppub = gx2 ∈ G2 and κ = eˆ(g1, g2)y.
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions H1 : Z
∗
p → Z∗p and
H2 : {0, 1}k1 × F→ Z∗p.
The message space is M = {0, 1}k1 . The master public key is (p,G1,G2,F, ψ, eˆ,
g1, g2, Ppub, κ,H1, H2) and the master secret key is ms = x, y.
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• Extract: First, the set of biometric attributes ID = {µ1, ..., µn} of the signer are
obtained from the raw biometric information as in [Baek et al., 2007], [Sahai and
Waters, 2005]. Next, the PKG picks a random polynomial q(·) of degree d − 1




1 for each µi ∈ ID. Here
ti = x+H1(µi).
• Sign: Given a message m ∈M and DID, the following steps are performed.
1. Pick a random z ∈ Z∗p and compute h = H2(m,κz) = H2(m, r)
2. σi = (D
ID
i )
z+h for each µi ∈ ID.
The signature on the message m for identity ID is σ = (Σ, h), where
Σ = {σi : µi ∈ ID}.
• Verify: Given σ,m and ID′, choose an arbitrary set S ⊆ ID ∩ ID′ such that





























Here, the polynomial q(·) of degree d− 1 is interpolated using d points by polynomial
interpolation in the exponents using Shamir’s secret sharing method [Shamir, 1979].
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the hash functions H1, H2 are random oracles and there exists
an adaptively chosen message and given identity attacker A that produces a forgery
within a time t and with probability ǫ ≥ 10(qs+1)(qs+ q2)/2l by making q1, q2 random
oracle queries, and qs signature queries. Then there exists an algorithm B that solves
the k-DHI problem for k = q1 in an expected time t
′ ≤ 120686q2(t + O(qsτp))/(ǫ(1 −
k/2l)) +O(k2τmult) where τmult and τp respectively denote the cost of a scalar multipli-
cation in G2 and the required time for a pairing evaluation.
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Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A produces a forgery, then using A,
we show that one can construct an attacker (i.e. a simulator) B solving the k-DHI




2 , ..., g
xk
2 ), B will
compute g
1/x
1 using A as follows.
• Phase 1: A declares the challenge identity ID∗ = {µ1, ...µn}.
• Phase 2: B picks a random feature µ∗ ∈ ID∗ and simulates the public parame-
ters for A. The following three steps are identical to [Chen et al., 2006].
1. B selects h0, ..., hk−1 ∈ Z∗p and sets f(z) =
∏k−1
j=1(z + hj), which could be
written as f(z) =
∑k−1
j=0 cjz
j. The constant term c0 is non-zero because
hj 6= 0 and cj are computable from hj. Here, h0 denotes the hash value of
the challenge attribute µ∗ ∈ ID∗, where µ∗ is picked at random by B.







2 ∈ G2 and p1 = ψ(p2) = gf(x)1 ∈ G1.







cj and px1 = ψ(p
x
2). The public key is fixed
as Ppub ∈ G2 = px−h02 . If p2 = 1, then x = −hj for some j, then k-DHI
problem could be solved directly [Chen et al., 2006].
























dj,v . This way, the
signature queries can be simulated for any identity chosen by A.
B picks a random y ∈ Z∗p to compute κ = eˆ(p1, p2)y and returns A the public pa-
rameters (G1,G2,F, ψ, eˆ, p1, p2, Ppub, κ,H1, H2), where H1, H2 are random oracles
controlled by B as follows.
• Phase 3: The reduction B continues this phase with the simulation of the oracles
that A has access to.
H1-queries: For a query on µi,
1. If µi ∈ ID∗ and µi = µ∗, return h0 and add 〈µ∗, h0,⊥〉 to H1List.
2. Else return hi + h0, add the tuple 〈µi, hi + h0, p1/(x+hi)1 〉 to H1List.
Key extraction queries: Upon receiving a query for ID such that |ID ∩ ID∗| < d,
we first define three sets θ, θ′, S: The first set is θ = ID∩ID∗, next denote with θ′
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any set such that θ ⊆ θ′ ⊆ ID and |θ′| = d−1, and finally, S = θ′∩{0}. In order
to understand why we define these sets and the intuition of this simulation, we
refer the reader to section 6.2.3 of the next chapter, which summarizes in detail
the small universe construction of the first fuzzy IBE system in the literature. If
the reader is familiar with the topic and this simulation of key extraction phase,
he may skip this summary presented in section 6.2.3 of chapter 6.
Next, we define the decryption key components, DIDi , for µi ∈ θ′ as:
If µi ∈ θ: DIDµi = psi1 where si is chosen randomly in Zp.
If µi ∈ θ′ − θ : DIDµi = pλi/(x+hi)1 where λi is chosen randomly in Zp.
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a ran-
dom d − 1 degree polynomial q(x) by choosing its value for the d − 1 points
randomly in addition to having q(0) = y.
For µi ∈ θ we have q(µi) = xsi and for µi ∈ θ′ − θ we have q(µi) = λi.
The simulator B can calculate the other DIDi values where µi /∈ θ′ since the




1 and y. The simulator makes the














Using interpolation the simulator is able to calculateDµi = p
q(µi)/(x+hi)
1 for µi /∈ θ′,
where q(x) was implicitly defined by the random assignment of the other d − 1
variablesDµi ∈ θ′ and the variable y. Therefore, the simulator is able to construct
a private key for the identity ID. Furthermore, the distribution of the private
key for ID is identical to that of the original scheme.
Signature queries: For a query on a message-identity pair (m, ID),
1. If |ID ∩ ID∗| ≥ d, for the first query on the challenge identity (or a similar
identity ID), B picks at random a d − 1 degree polynomial q(·) such that
q(0) = y. At each new query with |ID ∩ ID∗| ≥ d, B picks randomly
a, h ∈ Z∗p, computes r = eˆ(pax1 · p−h1 , p2)y = eˆ(pax−h1 , p2)y and backpatches to
define the value H2(m, r) as h. Next, he computes σi = p
axq(µi)/(x+hi)
1 for
each µi 6= µ∗. For the feature µi = µ∗, he computes σµ∗ = paq(µ
∗)
1 . Lastly, B
returns σ = (Σ, h) to A, where Σ = {σi : µi ∈ ID}.
2. Else, B picks randomly z, h ∈ Z∗p, computes r = eˆ(pz1, p2)y and backpatches
to define H2(m, r) as h. Finally, B obtains the corresponding private key
components by simulating the key extraction oracle and returns (DIDµi )
z+h
for each µi ∈ ID.
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B aborts in the unlikely event that H2(m, r) is already defined.
Remark 5.2. The simulation of the signature queries on any ID such that |ID∩
ID∗| > d is correct since given (σ,m), A chooses an arbitrary set S ⊆ ID such













































































= eˆ(paxy1 , p2)eˆ(p1, p2)
−hy
= eˆ(pax−h1 , p2)
y
Thus, the simulation of the signature queries on any ID is correct since given
(σ,m), A chooses an arbitrary set S ⊆ ID such that |S| = d and checks h =


































• Phase 4: After the queries to the random oracles, the adversary has to forge a
signature (m, r, σ) on the exact challenge identity ID∗ = (µ1, .., µ
∗, ..µn).
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Next, the forking lemma [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000], [Bellare and Neven, 2006] is
applied on (m, r, h,Σ). If the triples (r, h,Σ) can be simulated without knowing the
private key components of ID∗, then there exists a Turing machine B′ that replays
a sufficient number of times on the input (Ppub, ID
∗) to obtain two valid signatures
(m∗, r, h′,Σ′) and (m∗, r, h′′,Σ′′) such that h′ 6= h′′ for the same message m∗ and com-
mitment r. If both forgeries satisfy the verification equation for all the sets S ⊆ ID∗















By verifying all the possible combinations for the set S, B is assured that each partial
signature σ′i and σ
′′
i is valid. B finds the solution to the k-DHI problem from the
forgeries associated to the feature µ∗ ∈ ID∗, namely σ′µ∗ , σ′′µ∗ .
Then, the computations are performed as in [Barreto et al., 2005],
eˆ(σ′µ∗ , Ppub · pH1(µ
∗)
2 )eˆ(p1, p2)




⇒ eˆ(σ′µ∗ , px2)eˆ(p1, p2)−h
′




⇒ eˆ(σ′µ∗/σ′′µ∗ , px2)(h
′−h′′)−1 = eˆ(p1, p2)








Finally, we obtain the solution to the k-DHI problem, namely g
1/x


























The computation for the advantage and the running time is identical to the compu-
tation described in [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000], [Barreto et al., 2005]. The only
difference in the computation of the running time is the removal of the factor q1 since
the security model of fuzzy IBS (and t-ABS) is based on given identity attack model
instead of adaptive chosen identity model as in standard IBS schemes.
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5.3.3 A Stronger Security Model
We prove the security of our new scheme in the framework of a stronger security model
[Sarier, 2010c] compared to exisiting adversarial models for fuzzy IBS and t-ABS,
which basically simulates the leakage of partial secret key components of the challenge
identity. A biometric IBS scheme is selectively unforgeable under adaptive chosen mes-
sage and given identity attacks (SUF-FIBS-CMA∗) if no probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the game between a challenger
and the adversary as follows.
• Phase 1: The adversary A declares the challenge identity ID∗ = {µ∗1, ..., µ∗n}.
• Phase 2: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns the system pa-
rameters to A.
• Phase 3: The challenger returns the private key components of any identity
such that |ID′ ∩ ID∗| < d except for a particular feature µ∗ ∈ ID∗ (if µ∗ ∈ ID′).
For the challenge identity, A obtains any d− 1 private key components he selects
other than µ∗ ∈ ID∗. The adversary issues signature queries for any identity and
the challenger returns the partial signatures for the all components of the queried
identity.
• Phase 4: A outputs a forgery (ID∗,m∗, σ∗), where A does not make a signature
query on (m∗, σ∗) for ID∗.
The success of A is defined as SuccSUF-FIBS-CMA
∗
A (l) =Pr[Verify(ID
∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1].
This security model is stronger than the model of fuzzy IBS since the adversary has
access to private key components of any ID including the case of |ID ∩ ID∗| ≥ d, as
opposed to the security model of [Yang et al., 2008], [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini,
2009]. We can further relax the requirement for the forgery on the exact challenge
identity ID∗ by allowing the adversary to output a forgery on the similar identity ID+
such that |ID+ ∩ ID∗| ≥ d and µ∗ ∈ ID+. We should note that in current fuzzy IBS
model, the forgery should be on the exact challenge identity.
The proof of our new scheme in the framework of this stronger model slightly differs
from the above proof.
Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A produces a forgery, then using A,
we show that one can construct an attacker B solving the k-DHI problem.




2 , ..., g
xk
2 ), B will compute g
1/x
1
using A as follows.
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• Phase 1: A declares the challenge identity ID∗ = {µ1, ...µn}.
• Phase 2: B picks a random feature µ∗ ∈ ID∗ and simulates the public parame-
ters for A as before.
B picks a random y ∈ Z∗p to compute κ = eˆ(p1, p2)y and returns A the public pa-
rameters (p1, p2, eˆ, ψ,G1,G2,F, Ppub, κ,H1, H2), where H1, H2 are random oracles
controlled by B as follows.
• Phase 3: H1-queries: Identical to the previous proof.
Key extraction queries: Upon receiving a query for ID, for every µi 6= µ∗ ∈ ID,
run the H1-oracle simulator and obtain 〈µi, hi + h0, p1/(x+hi)1 〉 from H1List. Pick
a random d − 1 degree polynomial q(·) such that q(0) = y and return Dµi =
p
q(µi)/(x+hi)
1 for each µi ∈ ID except for µ∗ ∈ ID (if µ∗ ∈ ID). For the challenge
identity ID∗, a random d − 1 degree polynomial q(·) such that q(0) = y is
picked and A is given the d − 1 private key components that A selects, namely
Dµi = p
q(µi)/(x+hi)
1 except for the feature µ
∗.
Signature queries: For a query on a message-identity pair (m, ID),
1. If |ID ∩ ID∗| ≥ d and µ∗ ∈ ID, B picks randomly a, h ∈ Z∗p, computes
r = eˆ(pax1 · p−h1 , p2)y = eˆ(pax−h1 , p2)y and backpatches to define the value
H2(m, r) as h. Next, B obtains the corresponding private key components by
simulating the key extraction oracle on ID and computes σi = p
axq(µi)/(x+hi)
1
for each µi 6= µ∗. For the feature µi = µ∗, he computes σµ∗ = paq(µ
∗)
1 . Lastly,
B returns σ = (Σ, h) to A, where Σ = {σi : µi ∈ ID}.
2. Else if |ID ∩ ID∗| < d and µ∗ ∈ ID, step 1 is repeated.
3. Else, B picks randomly z, h ∈ Z∗p, computes r = eˆ(pz1, p2)y and backpatches
to define H2(m, r) as h. Finally, B obtains the corresponding private key
components by simulating the key extraction oracle and returns (DIDµi )
z+h
for each µi ∈ ID.
B aborts in the unlikely event that H2(m, r) is already defined. The simulation
of the signature queries on any ID with µ∗ ∈ ID is correct as before.
• Phase 4: After the queries to the random oracles, the adversary has to forge a
signature (m, r, σ) on the exact challenge identity ID∗ = (µ1, .., µ
∗, ..µn).
Next, the forking lemma [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000], [Bellare and Neven, 2006] is
applied on (m, r, h,Σ). If the triples (r, h,Σ) can be simulated without knowing the
private key components of ID∗, then there exists a Turing machine B′ that replays
a sufficient number of times on the input (Ppub, ID
∗) to obtain two valid signatures
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(m∗, r, h′,Σ′) and (m∗, r, h′′,Σ′′) such that h′ 6= h′′ for the same message m∗ and com-
mitment r. If both forgeries satisfy the verification equation for all the sets S ⊆ ID∗
such that |S| = d and µ∗ ∈ S, as before.
By verifying all the possible combinations for the set S, B is assured that each partial
signature σ′i and σ
′′
i is valid. B finds the solution to the k-DHI problem from the
forgeries associated to the feature µ∗ ∈ ID∗, namely σ′µ∗ , σ′′µ∗ . Then, the computations
are performed as before. Again, the solution to the k-DHI problem, g
1/x
1 is obtained






cj)1/c0 due to the equation 5.1.
The computation for the advantage and the running time is identical to the compu-
tation described in [Pointcheval and Stern, 2000], [Barreto et al., 2005]. The only
difference in the computation of the running time is the removal of the factor q1 since
the security model of fuzzy IBS (and t-ABS) is based on given identity attack model
instead of adaptive chosen identity model as in standard IBS schemes.
We can further relax the requirement for the forgery on the exact challenge identity
ID∗ by allowing the adversary to output a forgery on the similar identity ID+ such
that |ID+ ∩ ID∗| ≥ d and µ∗ ∈ ID+. As long as both forgeries satisfy the verification
equation for all the sets S ⊆ ID∗ (or S ⊆ ID+) such that |S| = d and µ∗ ∈ S, B
is assured that each partial signature σ′i and σ
′′
i is valid. Since B finds the solution
to the k-DHI problem from the forgeries associated to the feature µ∗ ∈ ID∗, namely
σ′µ∗ , σ
′′
µ∗ , we can relax the requirement for the forgery on the exact challenge identity
ID∗. We should note that in current fuzzy IBS model, the forgery should be on the
exact challenge identity.
5.3.4 Weak Signer-Attribute Privacy
In the t-ABS scheme of [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], the verifier is able to
identify which d common attributes are used in the generation of the converted signa-
ture, since ID′ \ S components of the converted signature are publicly simulatable. If
only weak signer-attribute privacy is considered, more efficient Convert and CvtVer-
ify algorithms could be designed by removing the bilinear pairings and exponentiations
computed for the dummy components, namely ID′ \ S. For applications that require
full signer-attribute privacy, our “modified t-ABS” scheme with the additional protocols
presented in the original t-ABS paper could be a more efficient solution than t-ABS.
• Convert: On input the public parameters of the fuzzy IBS, the message signature
pair (m,σ) computed by the signer, and the identity ID′, the signature holder
selects S ⊆ ID ∩ ID′ such that |S| = d and sets ∀µi ∈ S, σ˜i = σi. Next,
∀µi ∈ ID′ \ S, the signer sets σ˜i =⊥ and returns the verifier (m, σ˜).
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• CvtVerify: Given an identity ID′, a message converted-signature pair (m, σ˜)
and the public parameters, the verifier can easily identify the d common attributes
and verifies the signature as before.
5.3.5 Some arguments against the architecture of t-ABS
We present our arguments against the architecture of the t-ABS scheme of [Shahan-
dashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009], which uses an additional party called “signature holder”
that has access to the (biometric) atributes ID of the signer and the verification at-
tribute set ID′ that is known by the verifier to be used during the verification of the
signature. By knowing the two similar (biometric) attributes ID and ID′, the signature
holder determines the common biometric attributes, i.e. performs an error correction
based on set difference to select the d signature components that will be used in the
actual verification, and then communicaties with the verifier to send a converted sig-
nature generated by the common attributes, i.e. the d signature components. This
new model is designed in order to achieve weak and/or full attribute privacy, however,
the model is against the definition of fuzzy IBS, which does not allow a third party to
compute an error-corrected converted signature. Instead, the verifier should be able
to verify the fuzzy IBS even if the signature is generated by using an attribute set
similar to the one the verifier has. Thus, this t-ABS scheme cannot be considered as a
fuzzy IBS scheme with the model described in [Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009].
Without this new model, t-ABS scheme is actually identitical to the fuzzy IBS scheme
presented in 2008 [Yang et al., 2008], where the only difference is the replacement of
the Water’s function W (·) on the message m, i.e. W (m) = h∏hmii , with the value
gm1 , where mi denotes the i
th bit of m and hi are random elements from G defined as
part of the public parameters of the fuzzy IBS of [Yang et al., 2008].
5.4 Efficiency Discussions and Comparison
In this section, we compare different fuzzy IBS and ABS schemes applicable for bio-
metric identities. For simplicity of the comparison, ψ is taken as the identity map (i.e.
G1 = G2 = G) and the computational cost for multiplication in G is omitted. All
the computations are performed according to the optimization introduced in [Pirretti
et al., 2006], where the dominant operations are considered as bilinear pairings followed
by exponentiations. The abbreviations used in figure 5.1 denote the following: |B| is
the bit-length of an element in set (or group) B; n is the number of features in ID;
Te is the computation time for a single exponentiation in G; T
′
e is the computation
time for a single exponentiation in F; TH is the computation time for a MapToPoint
hash function; Ti is the computation time for a single inverse operation in Zp; Tp is the
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computation time for a single pairing operation; T ′i the computation time for a single
inverse operation in F; d is the error tolerance parameter; k1 the size of the message;
k2 output size of the H2 hash function.
Figure 5.1: Comparison of error tolerant IBS schemes
fuzzy IBS t-ABS Modified t-ABS Our Scheme
Size of public (n+ k1 + 4)|G|+ |F| (n+ 5)|G| 4|G| 2|G|+ |F|
parameters
Size of DID 2n|G| 2n|G| 2n|G| n|G|
Size of σ 3n|G| 3n|G| 3n|G| n|G|+ k2
Cost of Key
n(n+ 4)Te n(n+ 4)Te n(3Te + TH) n(Ti + Te)Generation
Cost of
(k1 + 2n)Te 2nTe 2nTe nTe + T
′
eSign
Cost of d((n+ 4)Te + Tp) d((n+ 4)Te + Tp) d(3Te + Tp + TH) d(Tp + Te)
Verify k1Te + 2Tp 2Tp + 2T
′









In this chapter, we review the existing IBS schemes applicable for biometric identities
and propose a more efficient biometric IBS scheme by employing the Sakai Kasahara
Key Construction in the ROM. In addition, our scheme could function as a practical
fuzzy IBS or t-ABS scheme with the claim that the new scheme is faster than all known
pairing-based IBS methods for fuzzy identities as it is based on the currently the most
efficient pairing-based IBS scheme. Besides, examining the signer-attribute privacy for
fuzzy IBS and our scheme without requiring an intermediate (error-correcting) party
such as the “signature holder” of t-ABS could be an interesting future work since
the user may use his biometrics in other applications such as biometric encryption or
authentication systems, where the latter assumes the privacy of the identity-biometrics
relationship rather than the secrecy of the biometrics of the user.
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Chapter 6
Biometric Identity Based Encryption
In this chapter, we present two efficient biometric Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
schemes based on pairings following the security model of fuzzy IBE systems. The
first construction works for biometrics or in general for attributes that can be or-
dered/grouped, whereas the second construction called as BIO-IBE is suitable for any
type of biometrics. Our designs are based on the Sakai Kasahara Key Construction and
the security reduction is presented for large universe of biometric attributes in the Ran-
dom Oracle Model (ROM) and for small universe in the standard model. We will show
that for the large universe of attributes, BIO-IBE is more efficient compared to other
fuzzy IBE schemes and for the small universe, it is more efficient compared to the small
universe construction of [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. Similar to our fuzzy IBS system in
the previous chapter, we describe a stronger security model and prove the security of
BIO-IBE based on this stronger model that basically simulates the leakage of partial
secret key components of the challenge identity. This property is not considered in the
current security model of fuzzy IBE, which return to the adversary only the private
key components belonging to any identity other than (i.e. not similar to) the challenge
identity. However, in our stronger security model, we allow the adversary to query for
some of the private key components belonging to the challenge identity. Besides, BIO-
IBE is the first biometric IBE scheme that allows for the use of multi-modal biometrics
for defining the identity of the user. Specifically, we introduce a new method for key
generation, where a unique biometric identity string ID obtained from the biometric
attributes is used instead of picking a different polynomial for each user as in other
fuzzy IBE schemes. At the key generation phase, we combine the master secret key,
features of any biometric trait and this unique ID to bind the private key components to
the user and thus, avoid collision attacks. This new combination does not only prevent
this attack, but also has the advantage of better accuracy/identification compared to
the use of uni-modal biometrics as in current fuzzy IBE. From the efficiency point of
view, the fuzzy extraction of ID is performed only by the sender, is independent of
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the message, and hence can be done once and for all. Finally, our new method can be
applied in other IBE systems that are not based on pairing based cryptography, as we
will see in the next chapter. The contributions of this chapter are based on the papers
[Sarier, 2008] and [Sarier, 2011b].
6.1 Introduction
In Eurocrypt’05, Sahai and Waters proposed a new Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
system called fuzzy IBE that uses biometric attributes as the identity instead of an
arbitrary string like an email address. Before this application, other combinations
of biometrics and cryptography have been discussed in many research papers, which
mainly focused on the derivation of a secret key from a biometric trait. Clearly, bio-
metrics is assumed as secret data in these applications. One can argue whether this
assumption is realistic. After all, biometric information can be easily captured and can
be used to impersonate a user. Fingerprints, for example, are left everywhere and can
be easily lifted. But since biometrics can identify a person uniquely, it makes sense to
use them as the public key in an identity-based encryption scheme. The problem with
this approach is that biometrics usually consist of noisy data, i.e. two measures w and
w′ of the same biometric are not completely the same. However, the main feature of
fuzzy IBE is the construction of the secret key based on the biometric data of the user
which can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with a slightly different measurement of the
same biometrics. Specifically, fuzzy IBE allows for error tolerance in the decryption
stage, where a ciphertext encrypted with the biometrics w could be decrypted by the
receiver using the private key corresponding to the biometrics w′, provided that w and
w′ are within a certain distance of each other according to the ’set overlap’ distance
metric. This is in contrast to regular IBE schemes, which view the identity of a person
as a unique string like an e-mail address, thus they are not suitable for error-prone
identities. Thus, fuzzy IBE combines the advantages of IBE with using biometrics as
an identity, where IBE avoids the need for an online Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
which is the most inefficient and costly part of public key encryption. The use of
biometrics as the identity in the framework of IBE simplifies the process of key gen-
eration at the Private Key Generator (PKG). Since biometric information is unique,
unforgettable and non-transferable, the user only needs to provide his biometrics at the
PKG to obtain his secret key instead of presenting special documents and credentials
to convince the PKG about his identity. Also, biometrics is attached to the user, hence
the public key of the user is always with him to be used for encryption during an ad
hoc meeting. Finally, biometric data could be easily integrated with fuzzy IBE due
to its error tolerance property, which is required for the noisy nature of biometrics.
Besides, fuzzy IBE could be applied in the context of Attribute-Based Encryption [Pir-
156
retti et al., 2006, Sahai and Waters, 2005], where the sender encrypts data using a set
of attributes such as {university, faculty, department} and the ciphertext could only be
decrypted if the receiver has the secret key associated to all of these attributes or suf-
ficient number of them. In current fuzzy IBE schemes, the private key components are
generated by combining the values of a unique polynomial evaluated on each attribute
with the master secret key. Besides, the biometrics is considered as public information,
hence the compromise of the biometrics does not affect the security of the system.
6.1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Using biometrics in Identity-Based Encryption
Using biometric-based identity in an IBE system has a number of important advantages
over “standard” IBE that are listed in [Sahai and Waters, 2005] as follows.
• The process of obtaining a secret key from an authority is very natural and
straightforward. In standard IBE schemes, a user with a an identity such as
an e-mail address ’proves’ to the trusted authority that he is indeed entitled to
this identity. This will typically involve presenting supplementary documents
or credentials. The type of authentication that is necessary is not always clear
and robustness of this process is questionable (the supplementary documents
themselves could be subject to forgery) [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. Typically,
there exists a tradeoff between a system that is expensive in this step and one
that is less reliable [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. However, in biometric IBE the
user ony presents his biometrics to the trusted authority under the supervision
of a well trained operator. If the operator is able to detect imitation attacks,
for example playing the recording of a voice, then the security of this phase is
only limited by the quality of the biometric technique itself [Sahai and Waters,
2005]. Here, our proposal for multi-modal biometric identities prevents even
attempts for such impersonation attack as forging two different biometric traits
is more difficult compared to the use of one modality. In [Ross and Jain, 2004]
multimodal biometric systems are shown to be more reliable due to the presence
of multiple, (fairly) independent pieces of evidence. They also deter spoofing
since it would be difficult for an impostor to spoof multiple biometric traits of
a genuine user simultaneously. This fact also relax the requirement for a well
trained supervisor since a challenge response type of mechanism by requesting
the user to present a random subset of biometric traits thereby ensuring that a
’live’ user is indeed present at the point of data acquisition [Ross and Jain, 2004].
• We emphasize that the biometric measurement for an individual need not be
kept secret since it is used as a public key. This assumption is also accepted by
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the biometrics community who consider the biometrics as public data, whereas
the biometric template that is stored in a database for authentication purposes
should be kept private.
• Also, a biometric identity is an inherent trait and will always with a person.
Using biometrics in IBE will mean that the person will always have their public
key handy. In several situations a user will want to present an encryption key to
someone when they are physically present when a user is traveling and another
party encrypts an ad-hoc meeting between them [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek
et al., 2007].
• Finally, using a biometric as an identity has the advantage that identities are
unique if the underlying biometric is of a good quality. Some types of standard
identities, such as the name “Bob Smith” will clearly not be unique or change
owners over time [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. Here, our proposal for multi-modal
biometric identities also strengthens this assumption since multi-modal biomet-
rics identifies a person even more than a uni-modal system which is the current
default in fuzzy IBE schemes.
In this chapter, we present two efficient biometric Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
schemes based on pairings following the security model of fuzzy IBE systems. The
first construction works for biometrics or, in general, for attributes that can be or-
dered/grouped. Let us give this example: Assume the identites are represented as a set
of ID ={university, faculty, department, section, division, group, student}. If we preserve
this order for the representation of each user than a user with identity ID′ = {university,
faculty, department, section, 0, 0, student} is able to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted for
identity ID, due to the error-tolerance of the system. Similarly, let ID denote the
face biometrics of the user, i.e. {mouth, eye, nose, forehead, jaw, eyebrow, cheek}. If
we preserve this order for the representation of each user than a user with identity
ID′ = {mouth, eye′, nose, forehead, 0, eyebrow, 0} is able to decrypt a ciphertext en-
crypted for identity ID. Here, 0 indicates that the feature (or attribute) of a particular
region could not be extracted and eye′ denotes that the extracted eye feature is slightly
different than the actual eye feature of the user as a result of noise.
The second construction called as BIO-IBE is suitable for any type of biometrics in-
cluding the biometrics represented as an unordered set of features such as fingerprint
minutia. The security reduction is presented for large universe of biometric attributes
in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) and for small universe in the standard model.
For the former case, the security is based on the well-exploited k-BDHI computational
problem and for the latter case, it is based on the decisional k-BDHI problem. We
will show that for the large universe of attributes, BIO-IBE is more efficient compared
to the fuzzy IBE schemes secure in ROM [Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007, van
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Liesdonk, 2007] and for the small universe, it is more efficient compared to the small
universe construction of [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. Moreover, we describe a stronger
security model and prove the security of BIO-IBE based on this stronger model that
basically simulates the leakage of partial secret key components of the challenge iden-
tity. This property is not considered in the current security model of fuzzy IBE, which
return to the adversary only the private key components belonging to any identity
other than (i.e. not similar to) the challenge identity. However, in our stronger secu-
rity model, we allow the adversary to query for some of the private key components
belonging to the challenge identity. As different from the fuzzy IBE scheme of [Sahai
and Waters, 2005], the ciphertexts can contain a variable number of attributes but the
error tolerance parameter is a fixed threshold value as in current systems.
For our new construction, we have three main motivations. To begin with, our new
scheme BIO-IBE [Sarier, 2008, 2011b] is the first biometric IBE scheme that allows
for the use of multi-modal biometrics for defining the identity of the user. In particu-
lar, we mean to indicate that (1) the biometric sources are different; that is, multiple
biometric traits are involved such as face + fingerprint (2) Only a single sensor is em-
ployed to obtain the raw data from a single biometric trait; this data is then used
by multiple matchers, such as a matcher working on minutia-based fingerprint and a
matcher working on non-minutia based fingerprint. Multi-modal biometrics overcomes
the limitations of uni-modal systems, namely, unacceptable performance and inability
to operate on a large user population. First of all, identification using multiple biomet-
rics utilizes information from multiple sensors to increase fault tolerance capability, to
reduce uncertainty and noise, and to overcome incompleteness of individual sensors. A
multimodal approach can increase the reliability of the decisions made by a biometric
system. By using multiple biometric characteristics, the system will be applicable on a
larger target population. Finally, a multimodal biometric system is generally more ro-
bust to fraudulent technologies, because it is more difficult to forge multiple biometric
characteristics than to forge a single biometric characteristic [Ross and Jain, 2004].
How do we implement multi-modal identities in biometric IBE schemes? The an-
swer lies in the structure of the key generation algorithm of BIO-IBE, where a unique
biometric identity string ID obtained from the biometric attributes is used instead
of picking a different polynomial for each user as in other fuzzy IBE schemes. For
the case (1) (i.e. for different biometric sources), the private key components of each
user is computed by using a biometric trait such as fingerprint, face, palmprint, etc.
combined with the unique biometric identity string fuzzy-extracted from a different
biometric trait such as the Iris scan of the user. This combination is used to bind
the private key components to that user and thus avoid the collision attacks, which
means that different users sharing common biometric attributes with the receiver of
the ciphertext cannot decrypt this ciphertext by combining their secret key compo-
nents associated to these common attributes. In current fuzzy IBE schemes, collision
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attacks are prevented by picking a unique polynomial for each user that is evaluated
at each biometric feature of the user and that is combined with the master secret key
to generate the private key components. In BIO-IBE, the final computed private key
components of each user can be thought as a biometric fusion at the feature level. This
new combination does not only prevent collision attacks, but also has the advantage
of better accuracy/identification compared to the use of uni-modal biometrics as in
current fuzzy IBE. Some combinations appear more natural than others: fingerprint +
iris, face + iris or face+fingerprint, palmprint + fingerprint etc., which are the main
combinations for multimodal biometric identification/sketch/vault based on the fusion
of different biometric traits [Rattani et al., 2007, Y. Sutcu and Memon, 2007, Rat-
tani and Tistarelli, 2009, Nandakumar and Jain, 2008]. Hence, BIO-IBE combines
any type of biometrics represented as an ordered (such as face) or unordered (such as
fingerprint minutia) set of biometric features with another biometric trait that can be
represented as a binary string (such as Iris), which is input to a fuzzy extractor to
obtain a unique biometric identity string. If we employ the case (2) of multi-modal
biometrics, namely a single biometric trait with different feature processing methods,
then we can combine (unordered) features from fingerprint minutia with the binary
string obtained from vicinity-based fingerprint features described in [Bringer and De-
spiegel, 2010]. From the efficiency point of view, the fuzzy extraction is performed
only by the sender, is independent of the message, and hence can be done once and
for all. We should note that the use of multi-biometric based encryption using a fuzzy
extractor is claimed to be introduced in 2011 by [Zhang et al., 2011], although the first
use of this approach was presented at BIO-IBE in 2008. Finally, our new method for
preventing collision attacks can be applied in other IBE systems that are not based on
pairing based cryptography, as we will see in the next chapter.
Our second motivation for the new design is to eliminate the requirement of a special
hash function called MapToPoint hash function that maps a user’s identity to a point
on the underlying elliptic curve in IBE schemes. Currently, efficient fuzzy IBE schemes
[Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007, van Liesdonk, 2007] employ this special function,
which is usually implemented as a probabilistic algorithm and is more expensive than
a point scalar multiplication in terms of computation time [Chen and Cheng, 2005,
Chen et al., 2006]. This operation is also time consuming and cannot be treated as
a conventional hash operation which is commonly ignored in performance evaluation.
Besides, as it is noted in [Barreto et al., 2005, Smart and Vercauteren, 2007], it is
difficult to find groups as the range of the MapToPoint hash function and to define an
efficient isomorphism at the same time.
Apart from the efficiency gain resulting from the replacement of the MapToPoint hash
function with an ordinary one, BIO-IBE has a structurally simpler key generation
algorithm and provides better efficiency in terms of the key generation and decryption
algorithms compared to the existing fuzzy IBE schemes [Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek
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et al., 2007, van Liesdonk, 2007] secure in ROM. Specifically, we reduce the number
of exponentiations in the group G from 3n as in [Pirretti et al., 2006] (and from 2n
as in [Baek et al., 2007]) to n + 2. Also, the decryption algorithm requires d bilinear
pairing computations and d exponentiations, whereas the existing schemes require d+1
bilinear pairing computations and 2d exponentiations. Here, n denotes the size of the
biometric feature set of the user and d denotes the error tolerance parameter.
BIO-IBE [Sarier, 2008] is proven secure based on the standard security model for fuzzy
IBE and a stronger security model that we introduce in the ROM. The main difference
of our stronger security model is that the adversary is allowed to make private key
extraction queries on the challenge identity w∗, where A can obtain d− 1 private key
components of w∗ that A chooses. This new model basically simulates the leakage of
partial secret key components of the challenge identity. This property is not considered
in the current security model of fuzzy IBE, which return to the adversary only the
private key components belonging to any identity other than (i.e. not similar to) the
challenge identity. Thus, the adversary A has more power compared to the model
defined in [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007]. Next, we improve the reduction
cost of BIO-IBE by reducing its security to the decisional k-BDHI problem instead
of computational k-BDHI problem. We see a tradeoff between the tightness of the
reduction cost and the hardness of the underlying problem. Besides, for the small
universe construction, BIO-IBE is proven secure in the standard model based on the
decisional k-BDHI problem and the size of its public parameters is equal to the size of
a standard IBE scheme, whereas the small universe construction of [Sahai and Waters,
2005] has public parameters linear in the size of the (small) Universe of attributes. Here,
small universe construction means that the universe of features is defined beforehand,
thus we cannot use attributes that were not considered during the setup.
Next, we further improve BIO-IBE by eliminating a Denial of Service (DoS) attack
that results from the use of the fuzzy extraction process. In this context, we describe
a modified version of BIO-IBE and show that it is immune against this attack due to
the signature applied on the public value PAR of the user. To prevent DoS attacks,
the modified BIO-IBE [Sarier, 2011b] integrates an efficient IBS scheme into BIO-IBE
in order to sign the public value PAR of the receiver during the key generation phase
of BIO-IBE. Besides, the encryption phase is also modified by requiring the sender to
verify the signature on the PAR before the fuzzy extraction and the encryption of the
message. The IBS scheme that is used to sign the PAR is currently the most efficient
pairing based IBS scheme [Barreto et al., 2005] with the shortest signature length
among all IBS schemes as shown by [Galindo and Garcia, 2009]. Since this IBS scheme
is based on the Sakai Kasahara Key Construction, it is well-suited to modified BIO-IBE.
Alternatively, the recently introduced IBS scheme of [Galindo and Garcia, 2009] can be
used for a more efficient verification, which is based on sequentially delegating Schnorr
signatures and the verification cost is only 1.5 exponentiations in group G. This way,
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the sender can detect whether PAR of the receiver that is stored publicly is modified
by an active adversary, thus the generation of a ciphertext based on a wrong identity
is avoided. Despite the additional verification of the signature on PAR, the modified
BIO-IBE still achieves better efficiency compared to the existing fuzzy IBE schemes in
terms of the key generation and decryption algorithms. Similar to the fuzzy extraction
computation, the verification of the signature on PAR is performed once and for all.
Finally, key escrow problem inherent in all IBE systems effects also fuzzy/biometric
IBE systems, namely PKG can decrypt any message as it generates all the secret keys
of the users in IBE. However, applying certificateless encryption techniques to BIO-IBE
avoids this problem easily.
6.1.2 Related Work
The first fuzzy IBE scheme [Sahai and Waters, 2005] is described by Sahai and Waters
in 2005 and its security is reduced to the MBDH problem in the standard model, where
the size of the public parameters is linear in the size of the attribute (i.e. feature) space
U for the small universe construction. The authors present another scheme for the large
universe of attributes that is based on the first scheme presented in [Boneh and Boyen,
2004]. This scheme reduces the size of the public parameters to the number of attributes
n of a user at the cost of an expensive function computed for each ciphertext. Piretti
et al [Pirretti et al., 2006] achieved a more efficient fuzzy IBE scheme with short public
parameter size by employing the Random Oracle Model (ROM). Baek et al [Baek et al.,
2007] described two new fuzzy IBE schemes with efficient key generation algorithms
and proved their security in ROM based on the DBDH assumption. Next, the author
of [van Liesdonk, 2007] described another fuzzy IBE system that is based on the Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme [Boneh and Franklin, 2003] in ROM in order to achieve anonymity
notion. The main disadvantage of the schemes in [Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007,
van Liesdonk, 2007] is the use of the MapToPoint hash function, which is inefficient
compared to the ordinary hash functions.
Besides, Burnett et al [Burnett et al., 2007] described a biometric Identity Based Sig-
nature (IBS) scheme called BIO-IBS, where they used the biometric information rep-
resented as a fixed length binary string as the identity and construct the public key of
the user using a fuzzy extractor [Dodis et al., 2004], which is then used in the modified
SOK-IBS scheme [Bellare et al., 2004]. Finally, the signature analogue of fuzzy IBE is
described in [Yang et al., 2008, Shahandashti and Safavi-Naini, 2009] and an efficient
biometric IBS scheme is presented in [Sarier, 2010c]. The common property of all these
schemes is the use of bilinear pairings.
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6.1.3 Organization
In section 6.2, we will state the definitions of the primitives that are used in our scheme.
Next, we present our first construction OrdFIBE for ordered features and the security
reduction. In section 6.2.6, we describe a new method for preventing collision attacks
and section 6.3 describes our first BIO-IBE scheme. Next, we present a stronger security
model for biometric IBE and present the security reduction of BIO-IBE in section 6.4.
To obtain a tight reduction cost, the security reduction of BIO-IBE is modified in
section 6.5. Following this result, we are able to prove BIO-IBE for small universe of
attributes in the standard model in section 6.6. Furthermore, a new denial of service
attack is analyzed and a simple solution that does not affect the efficiency of the scheme
is presented in section 6.7. Finally, we compare our results with existing fuzzy IBE
schemes implemented for biometric identities and conclude our results.
6.2 Definitions and Building Blocks
In order to introduce the new biometric IBE scheme, at first, we briefly review the
definitions and required computational primitives. Given a set S, x
R← S defines the
assignment of a uniformly distributed random element from the set S to the variable x.
|S| denotes the size of the set S and µi denotes an attribute (or feature) of the biometric
feature set w in the universe U of biometric attributes. If y is a string then |y| denotes
the bit-length of y. Also, ID denotes any identity string such as Name, e-mail address,
whereas ID denotes the identity string extracted from biometric information of the
user. ID denotes the identity space, M denotes the message space and C denotes the
ciphertext space, whereas C denotes the error-correcting code with Ce encoding and Cd
decoding functions. Z∗p denotes Zp \{0}. Finally, we remind the reader that the details
of the definitions of the following primitives are presented in the background chapter.
Definition 6.1. (Bilinear Pairing). Let G and F be multiplicative groups of prime
order p and let g be a generator of G. A bilinear pairing is denoted by eˆ : G×G→ F
if the following two conditions hold.
1. ∀ a, b ∈ Zp, we have eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab
2. eˆ(g, g) 6= 1F, namely the pairing is non-degenerate.







For ease of presentation, we work exclusively in the setting where eˆ is symmetric; our
definitions and results can be generalized to the asymmetric setting where eˆ : G1×G2 →
F with G1 and G2 being different groups.
The security of our scheme is reduced to the well-exploited complexity assumption
(k-BDHI) [Chen and Cheng, 2005], which is stated as follows.
Assumption 6.1. (Bilinear DH Inversion (k-BDHI)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q, g be




In [Chen and Cheng, 2005], it is proven that BDH ⇔ (1−BDHI).
Assumption 6.2. (Decisional Bilinear DH Inversion (k-DBDHI)). Let k ∈ Z, x R← Z∗q,
g be a generator of G and eˆ : G × G → F a bilinear pairing. Distinguishing between












x ) is hard.
6.2.1 Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption
In [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007], fuzzy IBE is defined as follows.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k0, the Private Key Generator (PKG) gener-
ates the master secret key ms and the public parameters of the system.
• Extract: Given a user’s identity w and ms, the PKG returns the corresponding
private key.
• Encrypt: A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input an identity w′, public
parameters and a message m ∈ M and outputs the ciphertext c ∈ C. Here,
M , C and U denote the message space, the ciphertext space and the universe of
attributes, respectively.
• Decrypt: A deterministic algorithm that given the private key and a ciphertext
encrypted with w′ such that |w∩w′| ≥ d, returns either the underlying messagem
or a reject message. Here d denotes the error tolerance parameter of the scheme.
6.2.2 Security Model
In [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007], the Selective-ID model of security for
fuzzy IBE is defined using a game between a challenger and an adversary as follows. In
other words, a fuzzy IBE scheme guarantees indistinguishability against fuzzy selective
identity chosen plaintext attacks (IND-FSID-CPA) if no probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
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• Phase 1: The adversary A declares the challenge identity w∗ = (µ∗1, ..., µ∗n).
• Phase 2: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns to the adversary
the system parameters.
• Phase 3: The adversary A issues private key queries for any identity w′ such
that |w′ ∩ w∗| < d.
• Phase 4: The adversary A sends two equal length messages m0 and m1. The
challenger returns the ciphertext that is encrypted using w∗ and the message mβ,
where β
R← {0, 1}.
• Phase 5: Phase 3 is repeated.
• Phase 6: A outputs a guess β′ for β.
A fuzzy IBE scheme is secure in the sense of IND-FSID-CPA if




for all PPT A. Currently, fuzzy IBE systems are proven secure based on this no-
tion, however, they can be combined with the generic constructions such as REACT
[Okamoto and Pointcheval, 2001] to become secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.
6.2.3 The small universe construction of Sahai and Waters
In [Sahai and Waters, 2005], the first scheme for biometric identities is designed for
a small universe of attributes U. Here, small universe construction means that the
universe of biometric features is defined beforehand, thus we cannot use attributes
that were not considered during the setup. This assumption on the size of U is due to
the fact that the public parameters of this scheme are linear in |U|. In addition to the
error-tolerance property, this scheme provides security against collusion attacks, which
means that different users sharing common biometric attributes with the receiver of the
ciphertext cannot decrypt this ciphertext by combining their secret key components
associated to these common attributes. Collision attacks are prevented by picking a
unique polynomial for each user that is evaluated at each biometric feature of the
user and that is combined with the master secret key to generate the private key
components. To explain this key generation method and analyse the security reduction,
let us review the small universe construction of [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. The second
scheme presented in [Sahai and Waters, 2005] is already analyzed in the Background
chapter, as it is based on the Boneh-Boyen HIBE scheme [Boneh and Boyen, 2004].
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• Setup: Identities will be element subsets of some universe, U, of size |U|. Each
element is associated to a unique integer in Z∗p. (In practice an attribute will be
associated with each element so that identities will have some semantics.)
Let (g,G,F) be a bilinear group with eˆ : G × G → F. First, the universe, U of
elements is defined. For simplicity, the first |U| elements of Z∗p to be the universe.
Next, choose t1, ..., t|U| uniformly at random from Zp. Finally, choose y uniformly
at random Zp.
The published public parameters params are: T1 = g
t1 , ..., T|U| = g
t|U| , Y =
eˆ(g, g)y. The master secret key is: ms = t1, ..., t|U|, y.
• Extract(w,ms): To generate a private key for identity w ∈ U, we do the following.
A d− 1 degree polynomial q is randomly chosen such that q(0) = y. The private
key consists of components, (Di)µi∈w, where Di = g
q(µi)/ti for every µi ∈ w.
• Encrypt (w′,m, params): Encryption with the public key w′ and message m ∈ F
proceeds as follows. First, a random value s ∈ Zp is chosen. The ciphertext is
then published as: E = (w′, {Ei = T si }µi∈w′ , E ′ = mY s). Note that the identity,
w′ is included in the ciphertext.
• Decrypt(D,E): Suppose that a ciphertext, E, is encrypted with a key for identity
w′ and we have a private key for identity w, where |w ∩ w′| ≥ d. Choose an













(eˆ(g, g)sqµi )∆µi,S(0) = m
Theorem 6.1. [Sahai and Waters, 2005]. If an adversary can break the scheme in the
Fuzzy Selective-ID Model, then a simulator can be constructed to play the Decisional
MBDH game with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary, A, that can attack our scheme
in the Selective-ID model with advantage ǫ. We build a simulator B that can play the
Decisional MBDH game with advantage ǫ/2. The simulation proceeds as follows:
• Phase 1: The simulator B runs A and receives the challenge identity, α.
• Phase 2: We first let the challenger set the bilinear group (g,G,F). The
challenger flips a fair binary coin, ν outside of B’s view. If ν= 0, the chal-
lenger sets (A,B,C, Z) = (ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)ab/c); otherwise it sets (A,B,C, Z) =
(ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)z) for random a, b, c, z ∈ Zp. We assume the universe, U is de-
fined. The simulator assigns the public key parameters as follows.
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It sets the parameter Y = eˆ(g, A) = eˆ(g, g)a. For all µi ∈ α it chooses random
βi ∈ Zp and sets Ti = Cβi = gcβi . For all µi ∈ U − α it chooses random vi ∈ Zp
and sets Ti = g
vi . It then gives the public parameters to A. Notice that from the
view A all parameters are chosen at random as in the construction.
• Phase 3: A makes requests for private keys where the identity set overlap be-
tween the identities for each requested key and α is less than d. Suppose A
requests a private key γ where |γ ∩ α| < d.
We first define three sets κ, κ′, S in the following manner:
κ = γ∩α, let κ′ be any set such that κ ⊆ κ′ ⊆ γ and |κ′| = d−1, and S = κ′∩{ 0}.
Next, we define the decryption key components, Di, for µi ∈ κ′ as:
If µi ∈ κ: Di = gsi where si is chosen randomly in Zp.
If µi ∈ κ′ − κ : Di = gλi/vi where λi is chosen randomly in Zp.
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a ran-
dom d − 1 degree polynomial q(x) by choosing its value for the d − 1 points
randomly in addition to having q(0) = a.
For µi ∈ κ we have q(µi) = cβisi and for µi ∈ κ′ − κ we have q(µi) = λi.
The simulator can calculate the other Di values where µi /∈ κ′ since he knows the
discrete log of Ti for all µi /∈ α. The simulator makes the assignments as follows:







Using interpolation the simulator is able to calculate Di = g
q(µi)/ti for µi /∈ κ′
where q(x) was implicitly defined by the random assignment of the other d − 1
variables Di ∈ κ′ and the variable A. Therefore, the simulator is able to construct
a private key for the identity γ. Furthermore, the distribution of the private key
for γ is identical to that of the original scheme.
As one can notice, the simulator is not able to produce a decryption key when
the adversary A queries first for γ, such that |γ ∩ α| < d and then in some other
query, A asks for γ′ such that |γ′ ∩ α| < d but |γ ∩ γ′| ≥ d. This is due to
the structure of the secret keys that are computed based on the set κ′. If the
adversary asks the secret key for a similar biometrics γ′ which will have a slightly
different κ′ set, then the secret key components of the different features in the
set γ′ cannot be computed. This fact should not be a considered as a limitation
but the security model should include that the adversary cannot ask a similar
biometrics γ′ as some of its secret key components cannot be computed.
For BIO-IBE, we will follow the same approach in the generation of the challenge
ciphertext, namely by defining the polynomial q(·) by random assignments.
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• Phase 4: The adversary A, will submit two challenge messages m0 and m1 to
the simulator. The simulator flips a fair binary coin b, and returns an encryption
of mb. The ciphertext is output as: E = (α, {Ei = Bβi}µi∈α, E ′ = mbZ).
If ν = 0, then Z = eˆ(g, g)ab/c. Therefore, if we let r′ = b/c, then we have
E ′ = mbZ = mbeˆ(g, g)
ab/c = mbeˆ(g, g)
ar′ = mbY
r′ and Ei = B




Hence, E is a random encryption of the message mb under the public key α.
Otherwise, if ν = 1, then Z = gz. We then have E ′ = mbeˆ(g, g)
z. Since z is
random, E ′ will be a random element of F from the adversaries view and the
message contains no information about mb.
• Phase 5: Identical to Phase 3.
• Phase 6: A will submit a guess b′ of b. If b = b′ the simulator will output ν ′ = 0
to indicate that it was given a MBDH-tuple otherwise it will output ν ′ = 1 to
indicate it was given a random 4-tuple.
The reason for the review of this scheme is that this is the first fuzzy IBE scheme secure
in the standard model. Following the same construction for the simulation of the key
extraction queries, we design an efficient biometric IBE scheme as follows.
6.2.4 A first Attempt for an efficient biometric IBE
As noted before, the main disadvantage of the small-universe construction of Sahai and
Waters is the size of the public parameters which is linear in the size of the universe
of attributes U. To eliminate this feature, the authors design a second scheme, where
the public parameters include the values t1, ..., tn ∈ G instead of the whole universe.
However, a special function T has to be computed in both the key generation and




j where N is the set {1, ..., n + 1}. By
applying the conversion presented in [Pirretti et al., 2006], the n + 1 exponentiations
needed to solve T at each encryption have been replaced with a single MapToPoint
hash function used as a random oracle [Pirretti et al., 2006], [Baek et al., 2007].
In this section, we introduce the use of a different key construction method for biometric
IBE, which outperforms all the previous constructions of fuzzy IBE and ABE. We first
describe an efficient biometric IBE scheme denoted as OrdFIBE, which is restricted
for biometrics that can be represented as an ordered set of features. The system can
also be implemented as an ABE scheme, since the attributes {university, department,
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section, division, etc} can be grouped/ordered. The reason of this restriction is due
to the structure of the security reduction. In the following section, we present another
protocol for biometric IBE which also works for unordered set of features/attributes.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k0, the parameters of the scheme are generated
as follows.
1. Generate two cyclic groups G and F of prime order p > 2k0 and a bilinear
pairing eˆ : G×G→ F. Pick a random generator g ∈ G.
2. Pick at random x1, ...., xn, t ∈ Z∗p and set P 1pub = gx1 ,...,P npub = gxn , eˆ(g, g)t.
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions H1 : Z
∗
p × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p,
H2 : F→ {0, 1}k1 .
M = {0, 1}k1 denotes the message space and C = U×Gn×{0, 1}k1 denotes the ci-




and the master secret key is ms = x1, ..., xn, t.
• Extract: First, a user’s biometric attributes are obtained, where each attribute
is mapped to an element of Z∗p as in [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007,
Pirretti et al., 2006]. Given a user’s biometric attributes w, the PKG picks a
random polynomial q(·) of degree d− 1 over Zp such that q(0) = t and computes
the shares q(µi) = qi for µi ∈ w. It returns Dµi = gqi/(xi+H1(µi)) = gqi/(xi+hi) for
each µi ∈ w.
• Encrypt: On input a (similar) biometrics of the receiver, the biometric attribute
set w′ is computed. Given a plaintext m ∈ M and w′, the following steps are
performed.
1. Pick at random r ∈ Zp.
2. Compute Li = P
i
pub · gH1(µi) = gxi · ghi = g(xi+hi) for µi ∈ w′ and
V = H2(eˆ(g, g)
tr) for each µi ∈ w′.
3. Compute C = (w′, {Ui : µi ∈ w′},W ) = (w′, {Lri : µi ∈ w′},m⊕ V ).
• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext C and Dµi for each µi ∈ w, choose an arbitrary
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Theorem 6.2. Suppose the hash functions H1, H2 are random oracles and there exists
a polynomial time adversary A that can break the scheme by making q1 H1-queries, q2
H2-queries and qex private key extraction queries. Then there exists a polynomial time
algorithm B that solves the k-BDHI problem with k = q1 + qex + 1 and advantage
2AdvIND-FSID-CPA(A) ≤ q2Advk-BDHI(B)
Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A breaks our scheme, then using A,
we show that one can construct an attacker B solving the k-BDHI problem. Suppose




), B will compute eˆ(g, g)1/x using
A as follows.
• Phase 1: The adversary A declares the challenge identity w∗ = (µ∗1, ..., µ∗n).
• Phase 2: B simulates the public parameters for A as follows. The computations
of Q,Qx, Q1/(x+hj), T ′, T0 are the same as in Lemma 3 of [Chen and Cheng, 2005].
First, B selects t, a1, ...an ∈ Z∗p and h0, ...hn−1, ..., hk−1 ∈ Z∗p at random. Let us
denote with H the set {hn, ..., hk−1}. Define f(z) =
∏k−1
j=1(z + hj), which could
be written as f(z) =
∑k−1
j=0 cjz
j. The constant term c0 is non-zero because hj 6= 0
and cj are computable from hj.
B computes Q =
∏k−1
j=0(g











j for 1 ≤ j < k and Q1/(x+hj) = gfj(x) =∏k−2
v=0(g
xv)dj,v is computed.




B sets T ′ =
∏k−1
j=1(g
xj−1)cj = g(f(x)−c0)/x and set T0 = eˆ(T
′, Q · gc0).
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B returnsA the public parameters (G,F, eˆ, Q, P 1pub, ..., P
n
pub, eˆ(Q,Q)
t, H1, H2), where
P 1pub = Q
a1(x−h0), P 2pub = Q
a2(x−h1),..., P npub = Q
an(x−hn−1) and H1, H2 are random
oracles controlled by B as follows.
As one can notice, for the challenge identity, we set H1(µ
∗





n) = anhn−1 and the associated secret key of µ
∗
i ∈ w∗ is Qq(i)/(aix).
The correction can be verified by
eˆ(Q,Qq(i)) = eˆ(P ipub ·QH1(µ
∗
i ), Qq(i)/(aix))
= eˆ(Qai(x−hi−1) ·Qaihi−1 , Qq(i)/(aix))
= eˆ(Qai(x−hi−1)+aihi−1 , Qq(i)/(aix))
= eˆ(Qaix, Qq(i)/(aix))
Using interpolation, we obtain eˆ(Q,Qt).
• Phase 3: B answers the hash and private key queries of A as follows:
H1-queries: For a query on identity w = (µ1, ...µn), repeat the following for
i = 1, ..., n. If an element of w is already queried, return the same answer.
1. If µi ∈ w∗, return aihi−1 to A and add 〈µi, aihi−1,⊥〉 to H1List.
2. Else if µi /∈ w∗, pick a random element hj of the set H, return ai(hj + hi−1)
to A and add the tuple 〈µi, ai(hj + hi−1), Q1/ai(x+hj), Qx/ai(x+hj)〉 to H1List.
We note that the hash queries can also be made individually, i.e. as a query
µi instead of w since we are able to determine the order of each feature. For
instance, an attribute rwth-aachen can easily be recognized as an attribute for
university, thus, it should be associated to the public parameter P 1pub. The hash
value is a1(hj+h0), where hj is picked at random. The correction can be verified
eˆ(Q,Qq(rwth-aachen)) = eˆ(P 1pub ·QH1(rwth-aachen), Qq(rwth-aachen)/a1(x+hj))
= eˆ(Qa1(x−h0) ·Qa1(hj+h0), Qq(rwth-aachen)/a1(x+hj))
= eˆ(Qa1(x+hj), Qq(rwth-aachen)/a1(x+hj))
H2-queries: Upon receiving a new query R,
1. If there exists (R, ξ) in H2List, return ξ.
2. Else, choose ξ
R← {0, 1}k1 and return ξ to A.
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Key extraction queries: B simulates the private key extraction queries of A as
follows. Suppose A requests a private key w where |w ∩ w∗| < d.
We first define three sets κ, κ′, S in the following manner: Let κ = w ∩ w∗ and
denote with κ′ any set such that κ ⊆ κ′ ⊆ w and |κ′| = d− 1, and S = κ′ ∩ { 0}.
Next, we define the decryption key components, Di for µi ∈ κ and Dj for µj ∈
κ′− κ as follows. Here, we denote with subscript i, the elements of w that are in
κ and with subscript j, the elements of w that are in κ′ − κ and the elements of
w that are not κ′.
If µi ∈ κ: Di = Qsi where si is chosen randomly in Zp.
If µj ∈ κ′ − κ : Dj = Qλj/aj(x+hj) where λj is chosen randomly in Zp.
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a ran-
dom d − 1 degree polynomial q(x) by choosing its value for the d − 1 points
randomly in addition to having q(0) = t.
For µi ∈ κ we have q(µi) = xaisi and for µj ∈ κ′ − κ we have q(µj) = λj.
The simulator can calculate the other Dj values where µj /∈ κ′ by interpolation.








Since we are able to compute Qx/aj(x+hj) and Q1/aj(x+hj) for each feature µj 6= µ∗i ,
i.e. µj ∈ w − κ, using interpolation the simulator is able to calculate Dj =
Qq(µj)/aj(x+hj) for µj /∈ κ′ where q(x) was implicitly defined by the random as-
signment of the other d−1 variables of the set κ′ and the variable Qt. Therefore,
the simulator is able to construct a private key for the identity w. Furthermore,
the distribution of the private key for w is identical to that of the original scheme.
• Phase 4: Upon receiving the messages (m0,m1) with |m0| = |m1|, B generates
the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1. Pick at random r∗ ∈ Zp.
2. Compute Uµ∗i = [P
i
pub · QH1(µ∗i )]r∗ = [Qai(x−hi−1) · Qaihi−1 ]r∗ = Qair for each
µ∗i ∈ w∗.
3. B chooses a random β ∈ {0, 1} and W ∗ R← {0, 1}k1 .
4. Set the ciphertext to c∗ = (w∗, {Uµ∗i : µ∗i ∈ w∗},mβ ⊕W ∗).
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing the
randomness r as r∗/x.
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• Phase 5: B answers A’s queries as in Phase 3.
• Phase 6: At some point, A responds with the guess β′ for the underlying plain-





eˆ(Uµ∗i , Dµ∗i )
∆µ∗
i
,S(0)) = W ∗ ⊕H2(T tr∗).
From the queries of A to the H2-oracle, we obtain T
tr∗ . Since the simulator knows the
value of r∗ and t, the value of T = eˆ(Q,Q)1/x is computed.
The solution to the k-BDHI problem, eˆ(g, g1/x), is obtained by outputting (T/T0)
1/c20 =
eˆ(g, g1/x) as in [Chen et al., 2006].








Since the probability that the session key T tr
∗





As one can notice, OrdFIBE works only for biometrics that can be ordered/grouped or
in the setting of ABE, where the attributes of {university, department, section, division,
etc.} can be ordered/grouped for each user. If an attribute is missing, it can take the
value 0 and the representation of each user follows the same pattern. Besides, if some
of the attributes at the sender’s side does not match the ones at the receiver’s side, for
instance, the values of division and section is different at the both sides, by the error-
tolerance of the scheme, the receiver is still able to decrypt the ciphertext. OrdFIBE is
more efficient in all of its phases compared to the current fuzzy IBE and ABE schemes
as shown in figure 6.3 with the exception that the scheme has n different public keys
P ipub instead of one public key Ppub as in other schemes secure in ROM. These additional
n− 1 keys in the public parameters have a much smaller effect than the small universe
construction of Sahai and Waters, where the size of the public parameters is linear in
the size of the universe of attributes U such that n << |U|.
As a result, our first attempt cannot be implemented for unordered biometrics such
as fingerprint minutia and has a small constant (i.e. n) of overhead in the public
parameters of the scheme, which should be improved so that the scheme is more efficient
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than existing schemes in ROM in all aspects. For this purpose, we describe BIO-IBE,
which is also based on the Sakai Kasahara Key Construction, but it is designed in a
slightly different way and has a different security reduction. In particular, BIO-IBE is
proven secure both for small and large universe constructions, where the former allows
us to reduce the security in the standard model under a specific condition. When we
prove BIO-IBE for small universe of attributes, we will simulate the challenge ciphertext
similar to the simulation of the private keys of the above scheme, namely by picking
random values for the d − 1 components. Despite this similarity, for BIO-IBE, we
require a different method to prevent collision attack. First, we review the necessary
tools for our new method.
6.2.5 Error Correcting Codes and Fuzzy Extractors
Let H = {0, 1}N = FN2 be the Hamming space of length N , where F2 = {0, 1}. The
Hamming distance over H is denoted by disH(). An Error Correcting Code (ECC) over
H is a subset C ⊂ H, where elements of C are called as codewords. A binary linear
error correcting code C is a vector subspace of FN2 . When C contains 2k codewords,
then C is denoted as [N, k, t], where t is the correction capacity of C.
The main idea of fuzzy sketches is given a public data PAR = c ⊕ b, one tries to
correct the corrupted codeword PAR ⊕ b′ = c ⊕ (b ⊕ b′). If the Hamming distance
disH(b, b
′) is small, recovering p from PAR ⊕ b′ is possible [Bringer et al., 2007a]. An
important requirement for such a scheme is that the value PAR should not reveal too
much information about the biometric template b, which is obtained as described in
section 6.2.6. By applying a strong extractor, one can convert any secure sketch to a
fuzzy extractor. The details of fuzzy sketch and fuzzy extractor is given in [Dodis et al.,
2004, Juels and Wattenberg, 1999]. Formally, an (M, l, t) fuzzy extractor is defined as
follows. LetM = {0, 1}v be a finite dimensional metric space with a distance function
dis :M×M→ Z+. Here, dis measures the distance between b and b′, where b, b′ ∈M.
An (M, l, t) fuzzy extractor consists of two functions Gen and Rep.
• Gen: A probabilistic generation procedure that takes as input b ∈M and outputs
an biometric identity string ID ∈ {0, 1}l and a public parameter PAR, that is used
by the Rep function to regenerate the same biometric string ID from b′ such that
dis(b, b′) ≤ t.
• Rep: A deterministic reproduction procedure that takes as input b′ and the pub-
licly available value PAR, and outputs ID if dis(b, b′) ≤ t.
In [Burnett et al., 2007], the authors describe a concrete fuzzy extractor using a
[n, k, 2t + 1] BCH error correction code, Hamming Distance metric and a one-way
hash function H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l. Specifically,
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• The Gen function takes the biometrics b as input and returns ID= H(b) and
public parameter PAR = b⊕ Ce(ID), where Ce is a one-to-one encoding function.
• The Rep function takes a biometric b′ and PAR as input and computes ID′ =
Cd(b′⊕PAR) = Cd(b⊕ b′⊕Ce(ID)). ID = ID′ if and only if disH (b, b′) ≤ t. Here Cd
is the decoding function that corrects the errors upto the threshold t.
6.2.6 Our New Method for Biometric Identities
Any biometric IBE/IBS scheme requires the biometric measurement of the receiver or
the signer, respectively. For this purpose, the biometrics of the user is captured using
a sensor and the raw biometric data is further processed to extract the feature vector
and to obtain the biometric template b of the user. In a biometric encryption scheme,
feature extraction is applied on the raw biometric data to obtain the set of features
(attributes) and then, each attribute is associated with a unique integer wi ∈ Z∗p to
form the identity w = (w1, ..., wn) [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007]. Here,
n denotes the size of the attributes of each user. Since some of the attributes could be
common in some users, a unique polynomial is selected for each user and included in
the key generation algorithm to bind the private key to the user. This way, different
users cannot collude in order to decrypt a ciphertext that should only be decrypted by
the real receiver.
In a biometric IBS scheme such as BIO-IBS [Burnett et al., 2007], the biometric tem-
plate b assumed as a fixed length binary sting is computed and the hash of b is used as
the identity ID. This is in accordance with the framework for biometric template gener-
ation, which consists of (1) extracting features; (2) quantization and coding per feature
and concatenating the output codes; (3) applying error correction coding (ECC) and
hashing [Chen et al., 2007]. During this process, many quantizers produce and use
side-information, which could be published to be used later in the reconstruction of
the binary template b′.
As different from existing fuzzy IBE systems, BIO-IBE requires the use of the multi-
modal biometrics, where a biometric feature set extracted from a biometric trait is
combined with a unique biometric binary string fuzzy extracted either from the same
biometric trait but using a different feature extraction method or from a different
biometric trait that can be represented as a binary string. A fuzzy extractor is used to
generate a unique biometric string in order to bind the private key components to the
user’s identity and thus avoid collusion attacks. Specifically, the identity is obtained
from the biometric information of the user using a feature extraction algorithm followed
by a fuzzy extraction process, where the result of the former procedure (i.e. w =
(w1, ..., wn)) is combined with the output of the latter (i.e. ID) to obtain the biometric
attribute set BID = 〈H1(w1, ID), ..., H1(wn, ID)〉 to be used in the key generation phase.
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This way, the privacy of biometric-identity relation and the resistance against collusion
attacks is maintained. For multi-modal biometrics using a single biometric trait, the
feature set w and the unique identity string ID are obtained from the same biometric
trait w and using a single sensor. Instead of choosing a unique polynomial for each
user as in current fuzzy IBE schemes, we use the fuzzy extractor to obtain a unique
string ID via error correction codes from the biometric template b of the user in such a
way that an error tolerance t is allowed. In other words, we will obtain the same string
ID even if the fuzzy extractor is applied on a different b′ such that dis(b, b′) < t. Also,
multi-modal approach can be implemented for multi biometric traits that combines
fingerprints + Iris or face + iris, where fingerprint minutia can described as a set of
unordered features and iris can be represented as a 2048 bit string which is already
combined with error correction procedures in different secure sketch/fuzzy extraction
applications to have improved accuracy [Bringer et al., 2007a]. Hence, a multi-modal
approach for preventing collision attacks has also benefits in security and identification
of the users during key generation process.
6.3 BIO-IBE
The second biometric IBE scheme we propose is called as BIO-IBE, which differs from
the current fuzzy IBE systems due to the use of a unique biometric string obtained via
a fuzzy extractor to prevent the collision attacks. Again, BIO-IBE is based on Sakai-
Kasahara’s Key Construction for the generation of the private keys, thus it does not
require a MapToPoint hash function as opposed to the current fuzzy IBE schemes secure
in ROM. Thus, our scheme achieves better performance due to the use of an ordinary
hash function instead of MapToPoint hash function since the hash computation is
performed n times at each encryption and key generation. We emphasize that, the
fuzzy extraction process is only performed by the sender only once and for all and can
be efficiently implemented on the finite field F2m , where n = 2
m − 1 is the length of
the code. If we use the same fingerprint system described in [Burnett et al., 2007], we
have m ≈ 10 for the [905, 160, 201] BCH error correction code. Besides, this is the first
scheme that allows the use of multi-modal biometrics for defining the identity of the
user. Thus the final computed private key components of each user can be considered
as a biometric fusion at the feature level. We present the details of BIO-IBE as below.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k0, the parameters of the scheme are generated
as follows.
1. Generate two cyclic groups G and F of prime order p > 2k0 and a bilinear
pairing eˆ : G×G→ F. Pick a random generator g ∈ G.
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2. Pick at random x, y ∈ Z∗p and compute Ppub1 = gx/y, Ppub2 = g1/y and eˆ(g, g).
3. Pick two cryptographic hash functions H1 : Z
∗
p × {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H2 : F →
{0, 1}k1 . In addition, for the fuzzy extraction process, the PKG picks
H : b→ {0, 1}∗, an encoding function E and a decoding function D and the
error correction capacity t. These four components are represented by the
fuzzy extraction algorithm FE.
M = {0, 1}k1 denotes the message space and C = U×Gn×{0, 1}k1 denotes the ci-
phertext space. The master public key is (g,G,F, eˆ, Ppub1, Ppub2, eˆ(g, g), H1, H2, FE)
and the master secret key is ms = x, y.
• Extract: First, a user’s biometric attributes are obtained, where each attribute is
mapped to an element of Z∗p as before. Besides, the identity string ID= H(b) is
calculated from the same or different biometric trait of the receiver using a fuzzy
extractor. Given a user’s biometric attributes w and the biometric string ID, the
PKG returns DIDµi = g
y/(x+H1(µi,ID)) = gy/(x+hi) for each µi ∈ w.
• Encrypt: On input a (similar) biometrics of the receiver, the biometric attribute
set w′ is computed and a unique string ID′ is fuzzy extracted with the help of the
associated public parameter PAR as described in section 6.2.6. We should note
that the computation of ID′ is performed only once and for all.
Given a plaintext m ∈M , ID′ and w′, the following steps are performed.
1. Pick a random polynomial q(·) of degree d − 1 over Zp such that q(0) = q
and compute the shares q(µi) = qi for µi ∈ w′.
2. Compute Li = Ppub1 ·(Ppub2)H1(µi,ID′) = gx/y ·(Ppub2)hi = gx/y ·ghi/y = g(x+hi)/y
for µi ∈ w′ and V = H2(eˆ(g, g)q).
3. Return c = (w′, {Ui : µi ∈ w′},W ) = (w′, {Lqii : µi ∈ w′},m⊕ V ).
• Decrypt: Given the ciphertext c and DIDµi for each µi ∈ w, choose an arbitrary set



















Here, the polynomial q(·) of degree d− 1 is interpolated using d points by polynomial





i for each µi ∈ S due to the fact that ID = ID′.
6.4 A Stronger Security Model
Before presenting the security reduction of BIO-IBE, we describe a stronger model
of security for fuzzy IBE (IND-sFSID-CPA) using a game between a challenger and
an adversary as follows. The main difference of our new security model is that the
adversary is allowed to make private key extraction queries on the challenge identity
w∗, where A can obtain d− 1 private key components of w∗ that A chooses. This new
model basically simulates the leakage of partial secret key components of the challenge
identity. This property is not considered in the current security model of fuzzy IBE,
which return to the adversary only the private key components belonging to any identity
other than (i.e. not similar to) the challenge identity. Thus, the adversary A has more
power compared to the model defined in [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007].
• Phase 1: The adversary declares the challenge identity w∗ = (µ∗1, ..., µ∗n).
• Phase 2: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns to the adversary
the system parameters.
• Phase 3: The adversary issues private key queries for any identity w′ such that
|w∗ ∩ w′| < d and the challenger returns the private key components of w′. For
the challenge identity w∗, A is given the d− 1 private key components of w∗ that
A selects except for the component µ∗ ∈ w∗.
• Phase 4: The adversary A sends two equal length messages m0 and m1. The
challenger picks β
R← {0, 1} and returns encryption of the message mβ using the
challenge identity w∗.
• Phase 5: Phase 3 is repeated. A is not allowed to issue private key queries for
the remaining n− d+ 1 attributes of w∗.
• Phase 6: A outputs a guess β′ for β.
Theorem 6.3. Suppose the hash functions H1, H2 are random oracles and there exists
a polynomial time adversary A with advantage ǫ that can break the scheme BIO-IBE
in the stronger security model by making q1 H1-queries, q2 H2-queries and qex private
key extraction queries. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm B that solves the




(A) ≤ (n− d+ 1)q2Advk-BDHI(B)
Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A breaks our scheme, then using A,
we show that one can construct an attacker B solving the k-BDHI problem. Suppose




), B will compute eˆ(g, g)1/x using
A as follows.
• Phase 1: The adversary A declares the challenge identity w∗ = (µ∗1, ..., µ∗n).
• Phase 2: B will implicitly associate a random element of w∗, for instance µ∗ ∈
w∗, to the k-BDHI problem. B simulates the public parameters for A as follows.
The computations of this phase are the same as in [Chen and Cheng, 2005] and
[Chen et al., 2006].
First, B selects y ∈ Z∗p and h0, ..., hk−1 ∈ Z∗p at random and computes the pa-
rameters f(z), Q,Qx, Q1/(x+hj), T ′, T0 as in the previous proof.
B returns A the public parameters (Q,G,F, eˆ, Ppub1, Ppub2, H1, H2, FE), where
Ppub1 = Q
(x−h0)/y, Ppub2 = Q
1/y, and H1, H2 are random oracles controlled by
B as follows. As one can notice, the hash value of H1(µ
∗, ID∗) = h0 and the
associated secret key of µ∗ ∈ w∗ is Qy/x. Here, FE denotes the fuzzy extraction
algorithm that is used to extract a unique binary string ID.
• Phase 3: B answers the hash and private key queries of A as follows:
H1-queries: For a query (µi, ID), if there exists 〈j, l, µi, ID, hj + h0, Qy/(x+hj)〉 in
H1List, return hj + h0. Otherwise,
1. If µi ∈ w∗, ID = ID∗ and l 6= d, return hj + h0 and add 〈j, l, µi, ID∗, hj +
h0, Q
y/(x+hj)〉 to H1List. Increment j and l by 1.
2. If µi ∈ w∗, ID = ID∗ and l = d, then return h0, add the tuple 〈j, d, µi =
µ∗, ID∗, h0,⊥〉 to H1List. Increment j and l by 1.
3. Else, return hj+h0 and add the tuple 〈j, l, µi, ID, hj+h0, Qy/(x+hj)〉 toH1List.
Increment j by 1.
Here, j and l denotes the values of two counters, where 1 ≤ j ≤ q1 and 1 ≤ l ≤ n.
H2-queries: Upon receiving a new query R,
1. If there exists (R, ξ) in H2List, return ξ.
2. Else, choose ξ
R← {0, 1}k1 and return ξ to A.
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Key extraction queries: B simulates the private key queries of A as follows.
Upon receiving a query (w′, ID′), such that |w′ ∩ w∗| < d, for every µi ∈ w′, run
the H1-oracle simulator and obtain 〈j, l, µi, ID′, hj + h0, Qy/(x+hj)〉 from H1List.
Since ID′ 6= ID∗, return DID′µi = Qy/(x+hj) for each µi ∈ w′. For the challenge
identity (w∗, ID∗), return the d− 1 private key components DID∗µ∗i = Qy/(x+hj) that
A chooses except for the component associated to the attribute µ∗.
• Phase 4: Upon receiving the messages (m0,m1) with |m0| = |m1|, B generates
the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1. Pick qi
R← Zp for each µi ∈ w∗ unless µi = µ∗.
2. Using the values in H1List, compute Uµi = [Ppub1 · (Ppub2)H1(µi,ID
∗)]qi =
[Q(x−h0)/y · (Ppub2)hj+h0 ]qi = [Q(x−h0)/y · Q(hj+h0)/y]qi = Qqi(x+hj)/y for each
µi ∈ w∗ except for µi = µ∗.
3. Pick q∗
R← Zp and compute Uµ∗ = Qq∗ .
4. B chooses a random β ∈ {0, 1} and W ∗ R← {0, 1}k1 .
5. Set the ciphertext to c∗ = (w∗, Uµi ,mβ ⊕W ∗) where µi ∈ w∗.
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a ran-
dom d − 1 degree polynomial q(x) by choosing its value for the d − 1 points
randomly in addition to having q(µ∗) = q∗y/x. For the remaining n−d (dummy)
features we choose the values of q(i) at random.
• Phase 5: B answers A’s random oracle and private key extraction queries as
before. The only condition on the private key extraction queries is that the
attacker A cannot query the challenge private key for the remaining n − d + 1
components of the challenge identity.
• Phase 6: At some point, A responds with the guess β′ for the underlying plain-



















Here, the set S ⊆ w∗ with |S| = d denotes the d elements of the challenge identity,
where A already knows the secret key components of d − 1 of the set S. Hence, we
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assume that a clever attacker has to pick another element of the challenge identity w∗
other than the d − 1 elements to compose the set S, thus, A can query the H2-oracle
with R to have any advantage.
On the other hand, the only way for B to have any advantage in this game is when
















Here S = {µ∗} ∪ S¯ and S¯ denotes the d − 1 elements of the challenge identity for
which the A knows the secret key components, namely S¯ ⊆ w∗ with |S¯| = d− 1. If we
define the advantage of the adversary A (i.e. the probability that A distinguishes the
challenge message correctly) as Adv(A), then advantage of the adversary B (i.e. the
probability that B finds the solution to the k-BDHI problem) is
Adv(B) ≤ 1
n−d+1
Adv(A) since the probability that A chooses µ∗ as the remaining
element to compose the set S is 1
n−d+1
. B sets T = (R∗/Λ)1/(yr
∗∆µ∗,S(0)) = eˆ(Q,Q1/x).
The solution to the k-BDHI problem, eˆ(g, g1/x), is obtained by outputting (T/T0)
1/c20 =
eˆ(g, g1/x) as shown in the previous proof.
Let H be the event that algorithm A issues a query for H2(R). We have Pr[H]≥ 2ǫ due
to the following facts.
If the H2List does not contain the value R, then denoting SuccA = Pr[β
′ = β], we
have Pr[β′ = β|¬H] = 1
2
. By the definition of A, |Pr[β′ = β]− 1
2
| > ǫ.
Combining all the results and defining the event SuccA = Pr[β = β′], we obtain the
following as in [Boneh and Franklin, 2003]
SuccA = Pr[β = β′|H]Pr[H] + Pr[β = β′|¬H]Pr[¬H]
⇐⇒ Pr[β = β′] ≥ 1
2
(1− Pr[H])








Pr[H]⇐⇒ Pr[H] ≥ 2ǫ
The probability that R = R∗ is 1
n−d+1
, we have Pr[H¯] ≥ 2 1
n−d+1
ǫ, where H¯ be the event
that algorithm A issues a query for H2(R
∗) at some point during the simulation. Since





2AdvIND-sFSID-CPA(A) ≤ (n− d+ 1)q2Advk-BDHI(B)
This stronger security model gives the adversary as much power as possible by providing
the adversary with d− 1 private key components of the challenge identity requiring a
stronger security model than the Fuzzy Selective-ID model of [Sahai and Waters, 2005,
Baek et al., 2007]. We should note that BIO-IBE can be proven in the (weaker) Fuzzy









different choices for the set S instead





, we obtain the reduction cost
for the Fuzzy Selective-ID model.
B’s running time is computed identical to [Baek et al., 2007] as tB < tA+(q1+qex)O(Te),
where Te denotes the computing time for an exponentiation in G.
6.5 Improving the reduction cost of BIO-IBE
As one can note from the above analysis, the reduction cost of BIO-IBE is not tight.
However, we can modify the proof slightly to obtain a tight reduction cost by reducing
the security of BIO-IBE to the decisional k-BDHI (k-DBDHI) problem instead of its
computational version. This way, H2 is not assumed as a random oracle, and thus the
factor of 1
q2
is eliminated from the reduction cost. The tradeoff is the use of a (weaker)
decisional problem instead of the computational k-BDHI problem. We can also remove
H2 function and directly multiply the message to the session key eˆ(g, g)
q instead of
xoring it to the hash of the session key, i.e. m ⊕ H2(eˆ(g, g)q). Then each message m
should be an element of the group F as in [Sahai and Waters, 2005].
Theorem 6.4. Suppose the hash function H1 is a random oracle and there exists a
polynomial time adversary A with advantage ǫ that can break the scheme BIO-IBE in
the stronger security model by making q1 H1-queries, and qex private key extraction
queries. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm B that solves the decisional




Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A breaks our scheme, then using A,
we show that one can construct an attacker B solving the decisional k-BDHI prob-
lem. Suppose that B is given an instance of the decisional k-BDHI problem, B will
distinguish between eˆ(g, g)1/x and eˆ(g, g)r using A as follows.
• Phase 1: The adversary A declares the challenge identity w∗ = (µ∗1, ..., µ∗n).
• Phase 2: B simulates the public parameters for A as follows. We first let
the challenger set the groups G and F with an efficient bilinear map, eˆ and
generator g. The challenger flips a fair binary coin b outside of B’s view. If









, eˆ(g, g)r). The remaining computations of this phase are the
same as in the Phase 2 of the proof of BIO-IBE.
B returnsA the public parameters (Q, eˆ,G,F, Ppub1, Ppub2, H1, FE), where Ppub1 =
Q(x−h0)/y,Ppub2 = Q
1/y, and H1 is a random oracle controlled by B as follows.
• Phase 3: B simulates the hash and key extraction queries of A as in BIO-IBE.
• Phase 4: Upon receiving the messages (m0,m1) with |m0| = |m1|, B generates
the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1. Pick qi
R← Zp for each µi ∈ w∗ unless µi = µ∗.
2. Compute Uµi = Q
qi(x+hi)/y for each µi ∈ w∗ unless µi = µ∗ as before.
3. Define S = {µ∗} ∪ S¯ with |S| = d as before and compute for all elements of
S by considering the equation
q1∆µ1,S(0) + q2∆µ2,S(0) + ....+ q
∗∆µ∗,S(0) = 1/x (6.1)
which implies
Qxq
∗∆µ∗,S(0) = Q ·Qx(−
∑d−1
i=1 qi∆µi,S(0)) (6.2)





i=1 qi∆µi,S(0)))1/∆µ∗,S(0). Set Uµ∗ = Q
xq∗/y for µ∗ ∈ w∗.
4. Choose a random β ∈ {0, 1} and set mβ as the challenge message.
5. Set the ciphertext to (w∗, {Uµi : µi ∈ w∗},mβ eˆ(Q,Q)r).
The intuition behind these assignments is that we are implicitly choosing a ran-
dom d − 1 degree polynomial q(x) by choosing its value for the d − 1 points
randomly in addition to having q(0) = 1/x. Here, each qi = q(µi) and q
∗ = q(µ∗)
for µi ∈ w∗.
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For the set S, where S = {µ∗} ∪ S¯ and S¯ denotes the d − 1 elements of the
challenge identity, for which A knows the secret key components. Thus, S¯ ⊆ w∗
with |S¯| = d − 1, the assignments for the features q(µi) ∈ S¯ are valid and
computable due to the following.
By considering the equation (6.1) and the case that B flips the coin as b = 0 in
Phase 2 of the game, we have eˆ(g, g)r = eˆ(g, g)1/x. In particular, if the challenger
of B flips the coin as b = 0, then eˆ(g, g)r = eˆ(g, g)1/x, from which B computes
T = eˆ(Q,Qr) = eˆ(Q,Q1/x) = eˆ(g, g1/x)c
2
0T0, where T0 = eˆ(T
′, Q · gc0) as defined
before. Hence, by knowing Q and Qx, we can compute
Qq1∆µ1,S(0)+q2∆µ2,S(0)+....+q
∗∆µ∗,S(0) = Q1/x (6.3)
which implies Qx(q1∆µ1,S(0)+q2∆µ2,S(0)+....+q








∗∆µ∗,S(0)) = Q. (6.4)
By denoting Z = (−∑µi∈S¯ qi∆µi,S(0)), and multiplying both sides of (6.4) with
(Qx)Z , we obtainQx(q
∗∆µ∗,S(0)) = Q·(Qx)Z , which impliesQxq∗ = [Q·QxZ ]1/∆µ∗,S(0)
By taking the power of 1/y of both sides Qxq
∗/y = [Q ·QxZ ]1/(y∆µ∗,S(0)).
In summary, we can compute the component of the challenge ciphertext asso-
ciated to the feature µ∗ by using the known values of Q,Qx, qi, Z but without
knowing q(0) = 1/x and q∗ = q(µ∗). Thus, if the adversary A with advantage
ǫ picks the set S, where S = {µ∗} ∪ S¯, then B can distinguish the decisional
k-BDHI challenge with advantage ǫ′ using A.
Otherwise, if b = 1, then eˆ(g, g)r is a random element, thus T = eˆ(Q,Qr) is also a
random element computed the same way as above. Since eˆ(g, g)r is random, the
session key eˆ(Q,Q)r) will be a random element of F from the adversaries view
and the challenge ciphertext contains no information about mβ.
• Phase 5: Identical to BIO-IBE.
• Phase 6: At some point, A responds with the guess β′ for the underlying plain-










If β = β′, B will output b′ = 0 to indicate that it was given a decisional k-BDHI
tuple otherwise it will output b′ = 1 to indicate it was given a random tuple.
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If the challenger of B flips the coin as b = 0 in Phase 2 of the game, the only way for









Here, the set S ⊆ w∗ with |S| = d denotes the d elements of the challenge identity,
where A already knows the secret key components of d − 1 of the set S. Hence, we
assume that a clever attacker has to pick another element of the challenge identity w∗
other than the d− 1 elements to compose the set S.
If the challenger of B flips the coin as b = 0 in Phase 2 of the game, the only way for















-If A picks the set S = {µ∗} ∪ S¯ for the computation of the session key:
• Pr[β = β′|b = 0]= ǫ+ 1
2
. Since B guesses b′ = 0 when β = β′, we have
Pr[b′ = b|b = 0]= ǫ+ 1
2
• Pr[β 6= β′|b = 1]=1
2
. Since B guesses b′ = 1 when β 6= β′, we have
Pr[b′ = b|b = 1]= 1
2
Thus, denoting the event that A picks the set S as pickS, we have














-Else if A does not pick the set S = {µ∗} ∪ S¯ for the computation of the session key:
• Pr[β = β′|b = 0]= 1
2
. Since B guesses b′ = 0 when β = β′, we have
Pr[b′ = b|b = 0]= 1
2
• Pr[β 6= β′|b = 1]=1
2
. Since B guesses b′ = 1 when β 6= β′, we have
Pr[b′ = b|b = 1]= 1
2
Thus, in this case,
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Combining the two cases, the overall advantage of B in the decisional k-BDHI game is
Pr[b = b′]− 1
2



















































As before, we should note that BIO-IBE can be proven in the Fuzzy Selective-ID model,











different choices for the set S instead of (n− d+ 1) choices. By





, we obtain the reduction cost for the Fuzzy Selective-ID
model. B’s running time is identical to the previous proof.
6.6 BIO-IBE in the standard model for small universe
In [Sahai and Waters, 2005], the authors give a construction for the small universe of
attributes (i.e. biometric features), where the universe is denoted by U. The reason for
this limitation is that, the public parameter size of that scheme is linear in the size of
the universe U. If we want to prove the security of BIO-IBE in standard model, then
we do not have this limitation, however, in order to simulate the private key extraction









different identites, the associated private keys
beforehand in order to simulate the public parameters of the system and the private
key extraction oracle. In other words, we have to compute all the possible private
keys beforehand, instead of computing them during each query. This is possible since
we use an ordinary hash function, which is efficiently computable. Thus, we have an
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upper bound on the total number of queries made to the private key extraction oracle,
which is equal to the total number of identites that can be obtained from the small
universe of attributes. Thus, our method does not impose a restriction as in the case
of bounded CCA secure schemes [Hanaoka and Imai, 2006, Cramer et al., 2007], which
have a bound on the decryption queries that should be known before the setup. As
a result, we only require a small universe of attributes for BIO-IBE in the standard
model, which is more efficient compared to the scheme in [Sahai and Waters, 2005] due
to the (small) size of the public parameters.
Theorem 6.5. Suppose there exists a polynomial time adversary A with advantage ǫ
that can break the scheme BIO-IBE in the stronger security model by making qex private
key extraction queries. Then there exists a polynomial time algorithm B that solves the




Proof. Assume that a polynomial time attacker A breaks our scheme, then using A,
we show that one can construct an attacker B solving the decisional k-BDHI problem.









, eˆ(g, g)r) using A as follows.
• Phase 1: Identical to BIO-IBE.
• Phase 2: We first let the challenger set the groups G and F with an efficient
bilinear map, eˆ and generator g. The challenger flips a fair binary coin b outside of




, eˆ(g, g)1/x) otherwise




, eˆ(g, g)r). We assume the universe of features (i.e.
attributes) is defined. After A declares the challenge identity w∗ = {µ∗1, ..., µ∗n},
B picks a random µ∗ ∈ w∗ and simulates the public parameters for A as follows:
B computes for all the possible different biometric identities that can be generated
from the universe U of attributes, i.e. for |ID| different identities, the associated
private keys. In particular, B first computes for each different biometric identity
w = {w1, ..., wn} such that |w∗ ∩ w| < d, H1(µj, ID) = hj for each µj ∈ w using
the cryptographic hash function H1. Since H1 is not a random oracle anymore,
we cannot arrange its outputs as in the previous proofs. Thus, we slightly modify
the calculation of Q as follows.







are non-zero values. Here h0 = H1(µ
∗, ID∗) is the computed hash value of the
feature µ∗. Again, f(z) could be written as f(z) =
∑k−1
j=0 cjz
j. The constant term
c0 is non-zero because h
′
j 6= 0 and cj are computable from h′j.








j for 1 ≤ j < k and Q1/(x+h′j) = gfj(x) =∏k−2
v=0(g
xv)dj,v is computed. Finally, B sets T ′, T0 as before.
B returnsA the public parameters (Q, eˆ,G,F, Ppub1, Ppub2, H1, FE), where Ppub1 =
Q(x−h0)/y, Ppub2 = Q
1/y As one can notice, the hash value of H1(µ
∗, ID∗) = h0 and
the associated secret key of µ∗ ∈ w∗ is Qy/x.
With this modification, we are able to compute the secret key components of
each feature as Qy/(x+h
′
j) = Qy/(x+hj−h0).
The correctness can be verified by taking a component of the ciphertext
Uj = [Ppub1 · (Ppub2)hj ]qj = [Q(x−h0)/y ·Qhj/y]qj = Qqj(x+hj−h0)/y.
When we perform the decryption of each component using the bilinear pairing
eˆ(Uj, Dj) = eˆ(Q
qj(x+hj−h0)/y, Qy/(x+h
′
j)) = eˆ(Qqj(x+hj−h0)/y, Qy/(x+hj−h0)) = eˆ(Q,Q)qj .
Here, FE denotes the fuzzy extraction algorithm that is used to extract a unique
binary string ID. For simplicity of the proof, each ID associated to the biometrics w
is extracted from the same biometric trait but using a different feature extraction
method and thus, a unique ID is computed for each different biometrics w to
bind the private key components to the user. (Clearly, multi biometric traits can
also be employed, then again, the biometric ID associated to the user identity
from its own universe of attributes.) Since the computations are performed for
each unique identity represented by either a single or multi biometric trait, the
total number of private key components that are calculated beforehand could
be approximately 260. Hence, we allow for private key extraction queries for a
bounded number, which is a reasonable assumption in case of a small universe of
attributes.
After computing each hash value, B computes the private keys as before. The
only difference is that, instead of assuming H1 as a random oracle, we compute
the real values of H1 and the associated private key components. The rest of
the computations are performed as in Phase 2 of BIO-IBE’s security reduction
presented in section 6.5. The only difference is the replacement of random oracles
with real hash functions, i.e. the randomly picked hi values are replaced with the
real values of the H1 function.
• Phase 3: Upon receiving a query (w′, ID′) such that |w′ ∩ w∗| < d, B simulates
the private key extraction queries of A by returning Qy/(x+h
′
j) associated to each
hj computed before hand for each µi ∈ w′. For the challenge identity (w∗, ID∗), B
returns the d− 1 private key components DID∗µ∗i = Qy/(x+h
′
i) that A chooses except
for the component associated to the attribute µ∗.
• Phase 4: Upon receiving the messages (m0,m1) with |m0| = |m1|, B generates
the challenge c∗ as in the challenge phase of section 6.5.
188
• Phase 5: B answers A’s private key extraction queries as in section 6.5. The
only condition on the private key extraction queries is that the attacker A cannot
query the challenge private key for the remaining n − d + 1 components of the
challenge identity.
• Phase 6: At some point, A responds with the guess β′ for the underlying plain-
text mβ. If β = β
′, B will output b′ = 0 to indicate that it was given a decisional
k-BDHI tuple otherwise it will output b′ = 1 to indicate it was given a random
tuple. The analysis of the reduction cost is the same as in section 6.5.
6.7 A New Denial of Service Attack
To prevent collision attacks,BIO-IBE requires the public storage of the value PAR,
which is the information needed for error-tolerant reconstruction of the biometric iden-
tity string ID and subsequent fuzzy extraction. Since the encryption is performed by
combining each biometric feature µi with the biometric identity ID of the receiver, the
presence of an active adversary who maliciously alters the public string PAR leads the
sender to use a wrong public key for the encryption due to a different identity string
computed by the fuzzy extractor. By the malicious modification of the public value
PAR, an adversary cannot gain any secret information but the receiver of the ciphertext
either cannot decrypt it or he obtains a wrong plaintext upon decryption.
The first idea to solve this problem is using a robust fuzzy extractor, which is resilient
to modification of the public value PAR [Boyen et al., 2005]. However, the robust fuzzy
sketches/fuzzy extractors described in [Boyen et al., 2005] assumes the biometrics as
secret data and replaces the value PAR with PAR∗ = 〈PAR, H(b,PAR)〉, where H is a
hash function. Since the adversary knows the biometric data b, he can easily modify
the value PAR∗ by computing a valid hash value, hence, the sender cannot detect the
modification of the public value. Another solution could be that the user store the
public value PAR in his smart card and present this to the sender during the biometric
measurement. However, this defeats the purpose of biometric IBE in the first place,
which enables an unprepared user to encrypt in an ad hoc meeting, where the users do
not have their smartcards with them.
In [Liu et al., 2007], a similar attack called as Denial-of-Decryption (DoD) Attack in
the context of certificateless encryption is defined, whose nature is similar to the well
known DoS Attack. In DoD, the attacker can modify the public key of the receiver since
the authenticity of the public key is not provided. The authors provide the solution
against this attack by requiring the receiver to sign his public key using the private key
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associated to a certificateless signature scheme and store the public value together with
the signature in a public storage. When the sender wants to encrypt a message, he first
verifies the signature on the public value and upon validation, he starts encryption.
In order to prevent a DoS attack on our scheme, we follow a similar approach requir-
ing the receiver of the ciphertext or the PKG to sign the public value PAR using an
efficient IBS scheme, and publish both values. A good candidate is the IBS scheme
of [Barreto et al., 2005] presented in section 2.10.5 of the background chapter, whose
public parameters are almost equal to the parameters of BIO-IBE since both schemes
are based on the same Sakai-Kasahara Key Construction method. The only difference
in the public parameters of [Barreto et al., 2005] is the use of an arbitrary string such
as an e-mail address as the identity and two hash functions, which have a different
domain. If the signature is applied by the PKG, then the identity information is taken
as the identity of the PKG. Alternatively, the receiver of the ciphertext can sign the
PAR using the biometric IBS scheme described in the previous section. Consequently,
the signature on the public value PAR makes the modified BIO-IBE immune against a
DoS attack.
Figure 6.1: Modified BIO-IBE Flow diagram for single-biometric trait
After verifying the signature on the public value PAR, the sender can encrypt a message.
The only additional cost for the sender is caused by the verification of the signature,
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namely, one exponentiation in G and in F and one bilinear pairing if the PKG signes
PAR. Despite the additional bilinear pairing computation for the sender, our scheme
is still more efficient compared to existing fuzzy IBE schemes due to the removal of n
MapToPoint hash computations from each phase. Moreover, the scheme of [Barreto
et al., 2005] is currently the most efficient pairing-based IBS scheme in the literature,
which is suitable for the modified BIO-IBE. Alternatively, the IBS scheme of [Galindo
and Garcia, 2009] can be used for the signing of the PAR, which has an additional
verification cost of only 1.5 exponentiation in G for the encryptor.
As a final note, the key escrow problem inherent with IBE systems also effects
fuzzy/biometric IBE systems. Basically, key escrow means that the PKG can decrypt
any message as it generates all the secret keys of the users. However, applying certifi-
cateless encryption techniques to BIO-IBE avoids this problem, where certificateless
encryption is designed as a new system in [Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003] to solve key
escrow problem of IBE and thus avoids the drawbacks of PKE and IBE by combining
the functionality of the both systems. In certificateless encryption, a sender requires
both the receiver’s identity and a public key value produced by the receiver to encrypt
a message. For BIO-IBE, key escrow is eliminated by individualizing the value y of the
master secret keyms = x, y. In particular, if each user Ui in the system selects a unique
yi value and the signature of the receiver is applied on the public values g
x/yi , g1/yi and
PAR instead of only on PAR, the PKG cannot decrypt a message since the new master
secret key is ms = x and the decryption keys are of the form gyi/(x+hi), where yi is only
known to the user Ui and PKG only generates g
1/(x+hi).
6.7.1 The modified BIO-IBE
Here, we summarize the algorithms of our new scheme, which is obtained by modifying
the Key Generation and Encrypt algorithms of BIO-IBE. To avoid the key escrow
problem, the technique explained above can also be applied.
• Setup: The parameters of the scheme are generated as in BIO-IBE. Two addi-
tional hash functions H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H4 : {0, 1}∗ × F → Z∗p are required for
the signature scheme as described before.
• Extract: First, a user’s biometric attributes w are obtained from the raw biometric
information using a reader and the feature extractor and each attribute µi ∈ w
is associated to a unique integer in Z∗p as before. Besides, the identity string
ID= H(b) is calculated from the biometric template b using a fuzzy extractor,
which also outputs the public value PAR that is used in the reconstruction of the
ID by the sender (or encryptor). Next, PAR is signed by the PKG or the receiver
of the ciphertext.
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Figure 6.2: Modified BIO-IBE Flow diagram for two biometric traits
Given a user’s biometric attributes w and ID, the PKG returnsDIDµi = g
y/(x+H1(µi,ID)) =
gy/(x+hi) for each µi ∈ w. Finally, the PAR and the signature σ are stored in a
public file.
• Encrypt: The sender obtains a biometric reading of the receiver together with
the signed public parameter PAR, verifies the signature on the PAR, extracts the
feature vector w′ and computes ID′ = Rep(b′,PAR). Here, if dis((b, b′) < t, then
ID = ID′. The encryption of m ∈M using ID′ and w′ is identical to BIO-IBE.
• Decrypt: The same algorithm as in BIO-IBE.
Lemma 6.1. The modified BIO-IBE is immune against a DoS attack under the exis-
tential unforgeability of the IBS scheme of [Barreto et al., 2005].
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6.8 Comparison
We summarize in the following tables the properties of the modified BIO-IBE and com-
pare the computational costs of each algorithm used in the schemes that are provably
secure in ROM. The abbreviations used in figure 6.3 are listed in table 6.3. In Table
6.6, we compare the properties of fuzzy IBE schemes in the standard model for small
universe of features. The public parameter size of BIO-IBE consists of the size of the
master public key, whereas small universe construction of [Sahai and Waters, 2005]
has additionally |U| elements in the public parameters, where |U| denotes the size of
the universe of features. We note that our first construction for ordered biometrics
OrdFIBE is even more efficient than BIO-IBE at the cost of n − 1 additional public
parameters. Obviously, all of our constructions are more efficient than existing fuzzy
IBE schemes in terms of the key generation and decryption algorithms. Compared
to BIO-IBE, the encryption algorithm of the modified BIO-IBE requires additionally
one bilinear pairing and two exponentiations due to the signature verification on the
PAR, which makes our scheme secure against DoS attacks. However, this verification
is performed once and for all similar to the fuzzy extraction operation. Below, figure
6.3 shows the comparison of the costs if the signing of PAR is performed using the
IBS scheme of [Barreto et al., 2005] and using the IBS scheme of [Galindo and Garcia,
2009], which avoids the additional pairing computation to sign the public value PAR.
Although the fuzzy extraction of the unique identity string and the verification of the
signature on it is performed only once, the cost analysis is made by considering the
operations for these two one-time computations. The relations between the parameters
used in the cost analysis are Te < T
′
e < Tp and d < n.
Table 6.1: Properties of Fuzzy IBE Schemes in the Standard Model
Scheme
Decisional Security Universe Size of Multi
Problem Model Size public parameters Modal
SW for Small Universe
MBDH Standard Small
linear in |U| + master ×
[Sahai and Waters, 2005] public paramters









SW-RO [Pirretti et al., 2006] DBDH MaptoPoint ×
EFIBE-I[Baek et al., 2007] DBDH MaptoPoint ×
EFIBE-II[Baek et al., 2007] DBDH MaptoPoint ×
Fuzzy-BF[van Liesdonk, 2007] BDH MaptoPoint ×
BIO-IBE k-BDHI Regular X
Table 6.3: Abbreviations
|S| bit size of an element in the set S n number of features of a user
d error tolerance parameter FE time for the fuzzy extraction process
Te time for a single exponentiation in G T
′
e time for a single exponentiation in F
TH time for MaptoPoint hash computation Tp time for a single pairing operation
Tm time for a single multiplication in G T
′
m time for a single multiplication in F
Ti time for a single inverse operation in Zp T
′
i time for a single inverse operation in F
k1 output size of an ordinary hash function CRC time for a checksum computation
Figure 6.3: Comparison to various fuzzy IBE schemes secure in ROM
Size of the Size of the Cost of Key Cost of Cost of
Seret key Ciphertext Generation Enrypt Derypt
SW-RO
2n|G| (n+ 1)|G| + |F| n(TH + Tm + 3Te) n(Te + TH) d(2Te + Tm + Tp)
Pirretti et al. [2006℄ +2Te + Tp + T
′






2n|G| (n+ 1)|G| + |F| n(TH + 2Te) n(Te + Tm + TH) d(2Te + Tm + Tp)
Baek et al. [2007℄ +2Te + Tp + T
′






2n|G| (n+ 1)|G| + |F| n(TH + Tm + 2Te) n(Te + TH) d(2Te + Tm + Tp)
Baek et al. [2007℄ +2Te + Tp + T
′






n|G| |G|+ nk1 n(TH + Te) n(Tp + TH + T
′
e) n(Tp)
van Liesdonk [2007℄ +nCRC
OrdFIBE
+ n|G| n|G|+ k1 n(Te + Ti) n(2Te + Tm) + Tp d(Te + Tp)
BIO-IBE
n|G| n|G|+ k1 n(Te + Ti) n(2Te + Tm) d(Te + Tp)
Sarier [2008℄ +FE +Tp + FE
Modied BIO-IBE
(n+ 1)|G| n|G|+ k1 n(Te + Ti) n(2Te + Tm) + Te d(Te + Tp)
Sarier [2011℄ +FE + Te + T
′





(n+ 1)|G| n|G|+ k1 n(Te + Ti) n(2Te + Tm) d(Te + Tp)
Sarier [2011℄ +FE + Te Tp + FE + 1.5Te
OrdFIBE
+
: Our rst 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s; *: PAR is signed with the sheme of [Galindo and Garia, 2009℄
Referenes
J. Baek, W. Susilo, and J. Zhou. New onstrutions of fuzzy identity-based enryption. In ACM ASIACCS'07, pages 368370.
ACM, 2007.
D. Galindo and F. D. Garia. A shnorr-like lightweight identity-based signature sheme. In AFRICACRYPT'09, volume 5580 of
LNCS, pages 135148. Springer, 2009.
M. Pirretti, P. Traynor, P. MDaniel, and B. Waters. Seure Attribute-Based Systems. In ACM CCS'06, pages 99112. ACM,
2006.
N. D. Sarier. A New Biometri Identity Based Enryption Sheme. In International Symposium on Trusted Computing - Trust-
Com'08, pages 20612066. IEEE, 2008.
N. D. Sarier. A New Biometri Identity Based Enryption Sheme Seure Against DoS Attaks. Seurity and Communiation
Networks, 4(1):2332, 2011.




In this chapter, we propose efficient biometric IBE schemes that are provably secure
in the ROM and standard model depending on the size of the universe of attributes
and the representation of the attributes of the user. We start with an efficient fuzzy
IBE scheme denoted as OrdFIBE that is restricted to ordered biometrics or attributes
that can be grouped/ordered. Thus, OrdFIBE can be generalized to attribute-based
encryption. Next, we describe BIO-IBE that is applicable to any type of biometric
modality if combined with a fuzzy extractor to avoid collision attacks. For the two uni-
verse sizes, BIO-IBE is currently the most efficient biometric IBE scheme with a tight
reduction cost among the other pairing based fuzzy IBE schemes applied for biometric
identities. Besides, BIO-IBE is the first biometric IBE scheme that is applicable for
multi-modal biometrics as opposed to the claim in [Zhang et al., 2011], which combines
fuzzy extractors with multi-biometric encryption. Key escrow problem inherent in all




Anonymous Biometric IBE without
Pairings
In this chapter, we present a novel framework for the generic construction of biometric
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) schemes, which do not require bilinear pairings and
result in more efficient schemes than existing fuzzy IBE systems implemented for bio-
metric identities. Also, we analyze the security properties that are specific to biometric
IBE namely anonymity, and introduce a new notion for biometric IBE called as identity
privacy. Considering these notions, we present generic constructions for biometric IBE
and ID-KEM based on weakly secure anonymous IBE schemes, error correcting codes
and generic conversion schemes in order to obtain highly secure anonymous biometric
IBE schemes. As different from the current fuzzy/biometric IBE systems, our scheme
relies on the standard quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption instead of (stronger) bi-
linear assumptions. In fact, it is the first biometric IBE scheme without depending
on pairings. Finally, we describe concrete applications of our framework and compare
them to the existing fuzzy IBE systems in terms of time complexity and bandwidth.
We design our new constructions for any type of biometrics that can be represented
as an ordered set of features (i.e. a sequence of n feature points) such as face, online
handwritten signatures, iris, voice etc. [Li et al., 2006]. However, if anonymity prop-
erty is not required, then our system is applicable for any type of biometrics since we
can allow the attachment of the biometrics to the ciphertext as in fuzzy IBE schemes.
Collision attacks are prevented using our new method described in the previous chap-




As described in the previous chapter, encryption using biometric inputs as identities
is provided with fuzzy IBE, since the error-tolerance property of a fuzzy IBE scheme
is precisely what allows for the use of biometric identities, which inherently will have
some noise each time they are sampled. A fuzzy IBE scheme allows for a private key of
the receiver’s identity set w, to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with a similar identity
set, w′, if and only if the set w and set w′ are close to each other as measured by the ’set
overlap’ (i.e. set intersection) distance metric. This is actually the same metric used in
fuzzy vault, where Bob, using an unordered set w, can unlock the vault (and access the
hidden secret data) only if w overlaps with w′ to a large extent. In current fuzzy IBE
schemes, the private key components are generated by combining the values of a unique
polynomial evaluated on each attribute with the master secret key. This way, different
users, each having some portion of the secret keys associated to the attributes of a given
ciphertext c cannot collude to decrypt c, which is defined as collusion resistance. The
basic fuzzy IBE schemes guarantee a weak level of security for identity based setting i.e.
Indistinguishability against Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-ID-CPA), but they could be
combined with well-known generic conversion systems to obtain a high level of security
i.e. Indistinguishability against Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-ID-CCA). Besides, the
biometrics is considered as public information, hence the compromise of the biometrics
does not affect the security of the system. Thus, in existing systems, biometrics w′
of the receiver is sent together with the corresponding ciphertext so that the receiver
with biometrics w can determine the common features between w and w′ in order to
apply the correct secret key components. Clearly, this could effect the privacy of the
user’s actions if we consider the notion of anonymity for IBE systems.
7.1.1 Motivation and Contributions
Currently, the secrecy of biometric data is viewed with skepticism since it is very easy
to obtain biological information such as fingerprint, iris or face data through fingerprint
marking or using a camcorder. However, biometrics is a sensitive information, as in the
case of biometric remote authentication, it should not be easy to obtain the biometric
data by compromising the central server, where the biometrics of each user is often
associated with his personal information. In particular, a user could use its biometrics
on a number of applications such as identification, authentication, signing, etc. Thus,
the secrecy of identity-biometrics relation should be maintained, which is defined as
identity privacy [Bringer et al., 2007b, Tang et al., 2008]. Current fuzzy IBE and
biometric IBE systems do not consider anonymity and privacy of user biometrics at
the same time, hence, it is vital to describe an efficient and anonymous error-tolerant
encryption system for biometric identities in order to avoid traceability of the user’s
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actions. Although the fuzzy IBE scheme of [van Liesdonk, 2007] provides anonymity,
the scheme combines each biometric attribute with the identity (i.e. Name, e-mail
address) of the user to avoid the collusion attacks. This approach is not only against
identity privacy but also against the main principle of fuzzy IBE or biometric IBE,
where the identity of the user should only consist of his biometric data.
In this chapter, we present a novel framework for the generic construction of biomet-
ric IBE schemes, which do not require bilinear pairings and result in more efficient
schemes than existing fuzzy IBE systems implemented for biometric identities. Also,
we analyze the security properties that are specific to biometric IBE namely anonymity,
and introduce a new notion for biometric IBE called as identity privacy. Considering
these notions, we present generic constructions for biometric IBE and ID-KEM based
on weakly secure anonymous IBE schemes, error correcting codes and generic conver-
sion schemes in order to obtain highly secure anonymous biometric IBE schemes. As
different from the current fuzzy/biometric IBE systems, our scheme relies on the stan-
dard quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption instead of (stronger) bilinear assumptions.
In fact, it is the first biometric IBE scheme without depending on pairings. Finally,
we describe concrete applications of our framework and compare them to the existing
fuzzy IBE systems in terms of time complexity and bandwidth. We may add that
the importance of relying on the standard quadratic residuosity assumption should not
be underestimated. In fact, this is what motivated the recent work in IBE without
pairings. We design our new constructions for any type of biometrics that can be
represented as an ordered set of features (i.e. a sequence of n feature points) such
as face, online handwritten signatures, iris, voice etc. [Li et al., 2006]. However, if
anonymity property is not required, then our system is applicable for any type of bio-
metrics since we can allow the attachment of the biometrics to the ciphertext as in
fuzzy IBE schemes.
We start with analyzing the security properties of biometric IBE schemes and review
our new method for preventing collusion attacks that we introduced in the previous
chapter. Next, we present generic constructions for biometric IBE and ID-KEMs that
convert any weakly secure (i.e. IND-ID-CPA) anonymous IBE scheme encrypting a
message bit by bit to a highly secure (i.e. IND-ID-CCA) biometric IBE scheme. To
build the new generic constructions, we combine fuzzy sketches, error correcting codes
and/or modify well known generic conversion schemes to function in the error-tolerant
setting. Also, we will describe concrete applications of our generic constructions using
anonymous IBE schemes [Boneh et al., 2007, Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] that encrypt
each message bit by bit and do not depend on bilinear pairings. This construction
allows for the design of biometric IBE schemes relying on weaker assumptions such as
interactive QR or standard QR assumption. To avoid collusion attacks and to guarantee
the security notions that we present, the anonymous IBE schemes are implemented
for biometric identites using our new method described in the previous chapter that
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combines each feature with a unique biometric string obtained via a fuzzy extractor
as described in the previous chapter. Thus, we achieve more efficient and anonymous
biometric IBE schemes compared to current fuzzy IBE systems when implemented for
an ordered set of biometric features as in face, iris or voice biometrics (or any type of
biometrics if anonymity is not required).
We first implement the anonymous IBE scheme of Boneh et al. [2007] for biometric
identities consisting of an ordered set of features to obtain an IND-ID-CPA anonymous
biometric IBE scheme in the standard model. Next, we input this anonymous biomet-
ric IBE into one of our generic constructions to obtain IND-ID-CCA secure anonymous
biometric IBE scheme. To improve the efficiency further, we present another appli-
cation based on the scheme of [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] that is secure in ROM and
compare it with the current fuzzy/biometric IBE systems in terms of computational
cost of encryption/decryption.
As described in the previous chapter, multi-modal biometric identities are used in our
new biometric IBE scheme to prevent collision attacks and to achieve higher security
and accuracy as in multi-modal biometric identification.
7.1.2 Related Work
The first fuzzy IBE scheme is described by Sahai and Waters in [Sahai and Waters,
2005], where the size of the public parameters is linear in the number of the attributes of
the system or the number of attributes (or features) of a user. More efficient fuzzy IBE
[Baek et al., 2007, Furukawa et al., 2008], Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [Pirretti
et al., 2006] and biometric IBE [Sarier, 2008, 2011b] schemes are achieved with short
public parameter size by employing the Random Oracle Model (ROM). Except for the
schemes in [Sarier, 2008, 2011b] that work with an ordinary hash function, the main
disadvantage of the schemes in [Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007, van Liesdonk,
2007] is the use of the MapToPoint hash function, which is inefficient compared to the
ordinary hash functions. To achieve IND-ID-CCA security, the authors of [Sahai and
Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007, van Liesdonk, 2007] suggest to combine their schemes
with well known generic conversion schemes such as Fujisaki-Okamoto [Fujisaki and
Okamoto, 1999] or REACT [Okamoto and Pointcheval, 2001]. The only work that
considers privacy of biometric attributes in fuzzy IBE is the master thesis of [van
Liesdonk, 2007], which adapts the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [Boneh and Franklin,
2003] to function as an error tolerant IBE scheme in ROM. The main reason for using
Boneh-Franklin IBE is that this scheme is anonymous [Abdalla et al., 2005]. The
common property of all these fuzzy/biometric IBE schemes is the use of a number
of bilinear pairing computations depending on the size of the receiver’s attributes,
which affects the efficiency of the system significantly. Recently, other anonymous IBE
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schemes [Boneh et al., 2007, Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] for the standard IBE setting
(i.e. non-biometric identities) are described, which do not require bilinear pairings and
their security is based on the standard quadratic residuosity problem. Besides, these
schemes encrypt a message bit by bit, thus they can be used to encrypt short session
keys due to the large bandwidth consumption. To achieve IND-ID-CCA security, the
schemes can implement the KEM/DEM construction of Bentahar et al. [Bentahar
et al., 2008], which takes as input a weakly secure IBE scheme and a hash function
to output an IND-ID-CCA secure KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism). Finally, the
KEM is combined with an IND-CCA secure DEM (Data Encapsulation Mechanism) to
obtain an highly secure and efficient hybrid encryption system.
7.1.3 Organization
In section 7.2, we will state the definitions of the primitives that are used in our scheme.
In section 7.3, a first attempt for a new construction is given, which provides a weak
security level. Next, we analyze the security properties for biometric IBE in section 7.4
and present new generic constructions in section 7.5. Following these results, we also
describe a biometric ID-KEM in section 7.6. Finally, we present two applications of our
generic constructions in section 7.7 and compare our results to other fuzzy/biometric
IBE systems.
7.2 Definitions and Building Blocks
Before stating the necessary definitions, we present some notations. Given a set S,
x
R← S defines the assignment of a uniformly distributed random element from the
set S to the variable x. |S| denotes the bit-length of an element in S and µi denotes
an attribute (or feature) of the biometric feature set w in the universe U of biometric
attributes. Here, ID denotes any identity string such as Name, e-mail address, whereas
ID denotes the identity string extracted from biometric information of the user. ID
denotes the identity space, M denotes the message space and C denotes the ciphertext
space, whereas C denotes an error-correcting code with Ce encoding and Cd decoding
functions.
Definition 7.1. (γ-uniformity). Let Π =(Setup, Extract, Encrypt,Decrypt) be an IBE
scheme with space of randomness COIN. For a given ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the corresponding
decryption key, m ∈ M and c ∈ C, we define γ(ID,m, c) =Pr[h R←COIN : c = En-
cryptΠID(m;h)]. We say that Π is γ-uniform, if for any ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, m ∈ M and any
c ∈ C, we have γ(ID,m, c) ≤ γ.
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For an encryption scheme Π, γ-uniformity is defined as a parameter to evaluate the
substantial coin space, i.e. how uniformly in how many large numbers the variants of
the encryption of a message occur [Kitagawa et al., 2006]. For instance, e.g. it is γ = 1
for deterministic encryption and γ = 2−k for El Gamal encryption over Zq with k = |q|.
7.2.1 Robust Sketch and Robust Fuzzy Extractors
As described in the background chapter and in section 6.2.5 of the previous chapter,
the main idea of fuzzy sketches is given a public helper data PAR = c ⊕ b, one tries
to correct the corrupted codeword PAR ⊕ b′ = c ⊕ (b ⊕ b′), i.e. the correction is
performed by combining the biometrics b′ with the public value PAR to obtain the exact
biometric template b. In [Boyen et al., 2005], the authors present a new attack for the
secure sketches that assume biometrics as secret data. In particular, the presence of an
active adversary who maliciously alters the public string PAR leads an adversary even
to obtain the secret b′ entirely depending on the utilized sketch or fuzzy extractor.
This attack can be avoided by using a robust fuzzy extractor, which is resilient to
modification of the public value PAR. The generic robust fuzzy sketch described in
[Boyen et al., 2005] replaces the value PAR with PAR∗ = 〈PAR, H(b,PAR)〉, where H is
a hash function. Although fuzzy/biometric IBE systems assume biometrics as public
data, this robust construction can still be used for a different purpose that we show as
below. By applying a strong extractor, one can convert any robust sketch to a robust
fuzzy extractor.
7.3 A weakly secure Generic Construction
A possible design for an efficient biometric IBE scheme without using bilinear pairings is
to combine any IBE scheme Π with an error correcting code ECC() and a robust sketch.
Particularly, given Π=(Setup,Extract, Encrypt,Decrypt) is an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE
scheme that encrypts a message (i.e. codeword c) bit by bit, an ECC() with correction
capacity d and a robust sketch of [Boyen et al., 2005] with PAR∗ = 〈PAR, H(m,PAR)〉,
the new construction Π′=(Setup′,Extract′, Encrypt′,Decrypt′) is described as follows.
Figure 7.1 shows an overview of this construction.
• Setup′: It is identical to the Setup except for the setup of an ECC() with correction
capacity d and a robust sketch.
• Extract′: Given a user’s feature vector w = (w1, ...wn) and ms, it returns the
corresponding private key set Dw = (D1, ...Dn) by running Extract on each wi.
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• Encrypt′: An algorithm that takes as input a similar feature vector w′, Encrypt
algorithm of the Π, a messagem ∈M and a robust sketch, outputs the ciphertext
〈U, V,W 〉 = 〈EncryptΠw′(c),PAR, H(m,PAR)〉, where PAR = c ⊕ m for a random
codeword c ∈ C.
Here, EncryptΠw′(c) denotes the encryption of each bit cj of the codeword c using
the associated biometric feature w′j individually. For simplicity, we assume that
the size of the biometric feature vector, size of the codeword c and the size of the
message m are equal. The biometric vector w′ of the receiver is attached to the
ciphertext as in fuzzy IBE.
• Decrypt′: A deterministic algorithm that given the private key set Dw of the
Decrypt algorithm, an error correcting procedure ECC() and a ciphertext en-
crypted with w′ such that d ≤ |w∩w′|, the algorithm computes c′ = DecryptΠw(U)
by decrypting each bit of U using the secret key of the corresponding biometric
feature individually. Due to the errors on some of the biometric features of w′, we
obtain a corrupted codeword, which needs to be corrected via c=ECC(c′). Next,
m = c ⊕ V is obtained and if W = H(m,V ), m is returned, else ⊥ is returned.
Similar to the fuzzy commitment scheme, if w and w′ are similar to each other,
the codeword c is correctly recovered.
Figure 7.1: A weakly secure generic construction
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7.3.1 Entropic Security vs. Indistinguishability
As it is noted in [Dodis and Smith, 2005], semantic security cannot be achieved for fuzzy
sketches, when the adversary generates the two strings m1,m2 such that |m1| = |m2|
and thus knows that the challenge ciphertext is the encryption of one of m1,m2, the
adversary can easily distinguish by computing mi ⊕ V and verifying W = H(mi, V )
from the challenge ciphertext. Thus, fuzzy sketches guarantee entropic security, which
is weaker than Shannon security and assumes that the adversary is sufficiently uncertain
about the challenge message. Thus, we have to design constructions that provide IND-
ID-CCA security. Besides, anonymity, collision attacks and other biometrics-related
issues should be considered.
7.4 Security Properties
In addition to the standard security level of (IND-ID-CCA) that an IBE scheme should
achieve, biometric IBE schemes have to guarantee the following properties that are
particularly important for biometric cryptosystems, since a user could use its biometrics
on a number of applications such as identification, authentication, signing, etc. Thus,
the traceability of the user’s actions should be prevented through the anonymity of the
ciphertexts and the secrecy of the identity-biometrics relation.
7.4.1 Anonymity
Informally, Recipient Anonymity (RA) or key privacy means that the adversary must
be unable to decide whether a ciphertext was encrypted for a chosen identity, or for
a random identity. In other words, an adversary cannot tell who the recipient is by
looking at the ciphertext, which could be used to thwart traffic analysis. The formal
definition is as follows.
Experiment ExpIBE-RA-CPAA,Π (l)
(ms, params)← Setup(1l)
(ID0, ID1, s,m)← A(params)
b
R← {0, 1}, c∗ ← Encrypt(m, params, IDb)
b′ ← A(s, c∗, params)
If b′ = b return 1 else return 0
The advantage of the attacker A is AdvIBE-RA-CPAA,Π = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |. An IBE scheme Π
is said to be IBE-RA-CPA secure if the respective advantage function is negligible for
all PPT A.
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In order to establish the IBE-RA-CPA/IBE-RA-CCA security of concrete schemes, it is
helpful to work with a related notion IBE-RA-RE-CPA/IBE-RA-RE-CCA security. This
notion is first defined in [Abdalla et al., 2005], where the only difference between the
two notions is the challenge phase. In this phase, the challenger encrypts a random
message m′ in place of the adversaries choice of message m, hence the acronym RE in
IBE-RA-RE-CPA denotes the randomized encryption.
Experiment ExpIBE-RA-RE-CPAA,Π (l)
(ms, params)← Setup(1l)
(ID0, ID1, s,m)← A(params)
b
R← {0, 1}, m′ ←M s.t. |m′| = |m|
c∗ ← Encrypt(m′, params, IDb)
b′ ← A(s, c∗, params)
If b′ = b return 1 else return 0
In [Abdalla et al., 2005],the notions of IBE-RA-CPA and IBE-RA-RE-CPA are related
using a lemma, which is extended in [Paterson and Srinivasan, 2008] for CCA-security.
Lemma 7.1. Let Π be an IBE scheme that is IND-ID-ATK secure and IBE-RA-RE-ATK
secure. Then, Π is also IBE-RA-ATK secure. Here, ATK∈ {CPA,CCA}.
If the ciphertext could be anonymized by anyone using the public key of the recipient,
i.e. not just by the encryptor, the encryption scheme is defined as universally anony-
mous. In current fuzzy IBE systems, the biometric vector w of the receiver is attached
to the ciphertext since set overlap is used as the distance metric between the identities
w and w′ in order to determine the d common features in |w ∩ w′| and to bring the
ciphertext to the correct order for decryption. Hence, a different system should be
designed to achieve anonymity for biometric IBE.
The formal definition of recipient anonymity for biometric IBE (BIBE-RA-CPA) is as
follows. Here, w0, w1 denote the biometric feature vectors of two different users (i.e.
|w0 ∩ w1| < d), d is the error-tolerance and s is the state information. Without the
condition of |w0 ∩ w1| < d, the recipient anonymity game cannot be played, as two
similar biometrics (i.e. |w0 ∩ w1| ≥ d) define the same user.
Experiment ExpBIBE-RA-CPAA,Π (l)
(ms, params)← Setup(1l)
(w0, w1, s,m)← A(params) s.t. |w0 ∩ w1| < d
b
R← {0, 1}, c∗ ← Encrypt(m, params,wb)
b′ ← A(s, c∗, params)
If b′ = b return 1 else return 0
The advantage of the attacker A is AdvBIBE-RA-CPAA,Π = |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |. A biometric
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IBE scheme Π is said to be BIBE-RA-CPA secure if the respective advantage function
is negligible for all PPT A.
7.4.2 Identity Privacy
For biometric authentication, this notion guarantees the privacy of the sensitive rela-
tionship between the user identity (i.e. ID= Name or e-mail address) and its biometrics
against a malicious service provider or a malicious database [Bringer et al., 2007b, Tang
et al., 2008]. For biometric IBE setting, this notion can be adapted for having privacy
even against the trusted authority (PKG) or the encryptor. Thus, identity privacy is a
stronger notion than anonymity, namely, identity privacy implies anonymity, which is
shown in the following lemma. The privacy of biometrics-identity relation is achieved
for many fuzzy IBE systems, which depend only on biometric identities, thus the user
does not need to present any document to prove its personal identity ID. However,
the fuzzy IBE scheme in [van Liesdonk, 2007] combines the identity ID (i.e. Name,
e-mail) of the receiver with his biometric features in order to avoid collusion attacks.
This approach is not only against identity privacy but also against the main principle
of fuzzy IBE. However, the scheme of [van Liesdonk, 2007] could be corrected using our
method described in section 6.2.6 of the previous chapter. The security notion Identity
Privacy for biometric IBE (BIBE-IP-CPA) is formally defined as follows:
Experiment ExpBIBE-IP-CPAA,Π (l)
(ms, params)← Setup(1l)
(s,m, ID0, w0, ID1, w1)← A(params) s.t. |w0 ∩ w1| < d
b
R← {0, 1}, c∗ ← Encrypt(m, params,wb, IDb)
b′ ← A(s, c∗, params)
If b′ = b return 1 else return 0
The advantage of the attacker A is AdvBIBE-IP-CPAA,Π = |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 |. A biometric
IBE scheme Π is said to be BIBE-IP-CPA-secure if the respective advantage function is
negligible for all PPT A.
Lemma 7.2. Identity privacy implies anonymity.
Proof. If an adversary can break the anonymity of biometric IBE, then a simulator can
be constructed that can break the identity privacy of biometric IBE.
Given an adversary A breaking the anonymity of biometric IBE, the simulator can run
A on the challenge ciphertext c∗ generated by randomly picking one of two different
identities that are represented by concatenating the identity data to the biometrics
data of each user. Since A is able to distinguish the randomly picked identity IDb||wb
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of the recipient from c∗, by separating the result into two parts, the simulator reveals
the link between the identity and biometrics. Thus identity privacy is not satisfied.
For the reverse direction, namely the statement “Anonymity implies identity privacy” is
only valid against a passive adversary who eavesdrops on the communication channel.
However, an attacker -including the sender of the ciphertext or the trusted authorithy
issuing the biometric secret keys- who does not know any information about the name
or e-mail of the user, has zero advantage in the identity privacy game, as in the case
of biometric remote authentication schemes of [Bringer et al., 2007b, Bringer and Cha-
banne, 2008]. In these biometric systems, the detached (malicious) biometric database
has zero advantage in the identity privacy game since it does not have access to the
personalized information (i.e. ID, name, e-mail,..) of the users that are stored at the
service provider. Similarly, current fuzzy IBE schemes do not take any personalized
information as input at any stage of the system.
7.5 Generic Constructions for Biometric IBE
In this section, we describe generic constructions converting any weakly secure IBE
scheme that encrypts a message bit by bit into an IND-ID-CCA secure encryption
scheme in the error-tolerant setting. For this, we combine a weakly secure IBE scheme
Π, an error correcting code ECC() and a generic conversion scheme that preserves the
anonymity of Π after conversion, namely, if Π is an anonymous IBE scheme, then the
resulting IND-ID-CCA secure biometric IBE scheme is also proven to be anonymous.
Since anonymity is an important goal we want to achieve, the sender should not at-
tach the biometric feature set to the ciphertext. As a result, it is impossible for the
receiver to determine the set of common features between the biometrics attached to
the ciphertext and the (similar) biometrics of the receiver. However, if we employ
biometrics that can be ordered/grouped, i.e. biometrics represented as a sequence of
n ordered feature points [Ballard et al., 2008, Teoh et al., 2008], such as Iris [Kanade
et al., 2009, Bringer et al., 2007b], fingercode [Jain et al., 2000, Tong et al., 2007],face
[Li et al., 2006, Ekenel and Stiefelhagen, 2009, Gao et al., 2009, Boehnen et al., 2009,
Moreno et al., 2005], online signatures [Igarza et al., 2004], then the receiver is able
to make an ordered element by element decryption using only his own biometrics. We
can observe a suitable representation for our system in the face recognition system of
[Moreno et al., 2005], where a feature is zero valued if it cannot be computed because of
the non-existence of a region from which it is derived. Besides, the fuzzy commitment
construction of [Juels and Wattenberg, 1999] is based on ordered biometric feature
vectors. Hence, for non-order features like minutiae of fingerprints, whose components
vary and cannot be described as a vector [Zhou and Busch, 2008], our system is not
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suitable, if we want to achieve anonymity.
7.5.1 Based on the Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversion
Our first generic construction for biometric IBE is based on the Fujisaki-Okamoto
(FO) conversion. Fujisaki and Okamoto proposed a simple conversion scheme called as
a hybrid scheme εhy from weak asymmetric-key encryption (AE) and symmetric-key
encryption (SE) schemes into a public-key encryption scheme which is secure in the
sense of IND-CCA. Basically, εhy is defined in [Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999] as follows.
εhy(m; σ) = 〈AEpk(σ;H(σ,m)||SEG(σ)(m)〉
In εhy, σ is picked at random from COIN, where COIN ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a finite set. H and
G are two cryptographic hash functions with H: AKMS x SKMS → COIN and
G: AKMS → SKS, where AKMS denotes asymmetric-key message space, SKMS denotes
symmetric-key message space, and SKS is the symmetric-key space. The idea is, first
encrypting the redundancy σ with the random coin H(σ, m) under public key pk using
the probabilistic scheme AE and then encrypting the message under the symmetric
key G(σ) using the scheme SE. In [Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999], it is proven that
if AE is an one-way encryption scheme, then εhy is IND-CCA secure in the ROM.
However, it is shown that if AE scheme satisfies IND-CPA security, then there is a
significant improvement in the security reduction, where IND-CPA implies also one-
way encryption [Boneh and Franklin, 2003].
Next, the authors of [Yang et al., 2006],[Kitagawa et al., 2006] describe the FO con-
version for standard IBE schemes, which we is extended by [Paterson and Srinivasan,
2008] to multi trusted authority IBE setting. First, we review the Fujisaki-Okamoto
(FO) Conversion for standard IBE setting as described in [Yang et al., 2006].
Let Π = (Setup,Extract,Encrypt,Decrypt) is an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme. Define
Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) as a new IBE scheme as below.
• Setup′: This is the almost the same Setup algorithm of Π, namely given a security
parameter l, the PKG generates the master secret key ms and the public param-
eters of the system. In addition, H and G are cryptographic hash functions with
H : {0, 1}l1 × {0, 1}l2 × {0, 1}∗ → COIN, where COIN ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a finite set and
G : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 .
• Extract′: This is the same Extract algorithm of Π, namely given a user’s identity
ID and ms, it returns the corresponding private key DID.
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• Encrypt′: A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input identity ID, Encrypt
algorithm of the Π scheme, a message m ∈ {0, 1}l2 , outputs the ciphertext
(U, V ) = 〈EncryptΠID(σ);H(σ,m, ID)||G(σ)⊕m〉.
• Decrypt′: A deterministic algorithm that given the private key DID of the Decrypt
algorithm and a ciphertext (U, V ) encrypted with ID, it first computes σ =
DecryptΠID(U) and G(σ) to obtain m = G(σ) ⊕ V . Finally, H(σ,m, ID) is
computed for reencryption as EncryptΠID(σ;H(σ,m, ID)), thus, the correctness
is checked and m is returned.
According to our framework, we present an IND-ID-CCA secure application
Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) that works in error-tolerant IBE setting as fol-
lows. Here c ∈ C denotes a random codeword and Π = (Setup,Extract,Encrypt,Decrypt)
is an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme that encrypts a message bit by bit. Finally,
w = (w1, ...wn) denotes the feature vector of the user biometrics. For better readibility
of the proof, we do not consider collision attacks at this stage, although in section
7.5.2, we replace the biometric w with the collision resistant biometrics BID. Finally,
we assume the existence of a code C that is suitable to the properties of the generic
construction.
• Setup′: Given a security parameter l, the PKG generates the master secret keyms
and the public parameters of the system. Here, H and G are cryptographic hash
functions with H : {0, 1}l1×{0, 1}l2×{0, 1}∗ → COIN and G : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 .
• Extract′: Given a user’s biometric feature vector w and ms, it returns the corre-
sponding private key set Dw by running Extract on each wi individually.
• Encrypt′: A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input biometrics w′, Encrypt
algorithm of the Π scheme, a message m ∈ M and a random codeword c ∈ C,
outputs the ciphertext (U, V ) = (EncryptΠw′(c;H(c,m,w
′)), G(c)⊕m).
Specifically, EncryptΠw′ encrypts the message (i.e. the codeword c) bit by bit using
the biometric feature vector w′ = w′1, ..., w
′










• Decrypt′: A deterministic algorithm that given the private key Dw of the Decrypt
algorithm, an error correcting procedure ECC() and a ciphertext encrypted with
w′ such that |w ∩ w′| ≥ d, first computes c′ = DecryptΠw(U) and error cor-
rects c=ECC(c′). Specifically, DecryptΠw(U) performs the decryption bit by bit
as c′ = 〈c′1, ..., c′n〉 = DecryptΠw(U) = 〈DecryptΠw1(U1), ...,DecryptΠwn(Un)〉. After
error correction, m = G(c) ⊕ V is obtained. Finally, by computing H(c,m,wi)
and using it in reencryption, the correctness is verified for at least d encryptions
(since |w ∩ w′| ≥ d) and m is returned.
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Remark 7.1. For simplicity, we assume that the length l1 of the codeword c and
the size n of the biometric feature set w is equal, i.e. l1 = n. If n < l1, then we
obtain a longer feature vector by extracting more features or by providing biometric
data from more fingers instead of one fingerprint. In [Boneh et al., 2007], the authors
expand the identity ID by computing it as H(ID, j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n to make it suitable
for the encryption of n-bit messages. The same method could be employed to expand
the biometric identity of the user. For the case that the underlying IBE scheme is not
anonymous, the biometric vector w′ of the receiver is attached to the ciphertext. Hence,
the biometric trait does not need to be ordered as the receiver with the similar biometrics
w can determine the common features easily as in current fuzzy IBE schemes.
Theorem 7.1. Let Π be a γ-uniform anonymous IBE scheme with negligable γ. Sup-
pose that the hash functions H,G are random oracles and let A be an IND-ID-CCA
adversary which has advantage ǫ′(l) against anonymous Π′ and it runs in time at most
t′(l). Suppose A makes at most qH H-queries, qG G-queries, qE Extraction queries
and qD Decryption queries. Suppose that encrypting one message needs time τ . Then
there is an OW-ID-CPA adversary R against anonymous Π which has running time
t(l) = O(t′(l) + τ l1qH) and has advantage
ǫ(l) ≥ 1
qH + qG
(2ǫ′(l)− dγqD − qD
2l2
)
Proof. Given an IND-ID-CCA secure anonymous Π′, the goal of the reduction algorithm
R is to invert the OW-ID-CPA secure anonymous Π scheme using an adversary A
running against Π′.
The challenger of R outputs the public parameters of Π, which is passed by R to the
adversary A in order to simulate the setup phase of Π′.
R answers the random oracle and decryption queries of A as follows.
• H-queries: On each new input (c,m,w′j), R picks a random hj from the range of
H, returns hj to A and inserts the tuple (c,m,w
′
j , hj, U
′
j , V
′) to the HList. Here,






′ = G(c) ⊕ m, where V ′ is computed by
simulating the G-oracle as below. Here, we basically store the encryption of the
j-th bit of the codeword c encrypted with the biometric feature w′j to be used
later during the simulation of the decryption oracle.
• G-queries: On each new input c, R picks a random g from the range of G, returns
this value to A and inserts the tuple (c, g) to the GList.
• Private Key Extraction queries: For any identity w˜, the extraction query is passed
to the challenger of R and his answer is returned to A.
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• Decryption queries: On each new input (w¯, U, V ),
R finds the tuples (c,m,w′j, hj, U
′
j , V
′) from the HList such that V = V ′, w¯j = w
′
j
and Uj = U
′
j for at least d features of w¯.
R outputs m if the above condition is satisfied, or outputs reject otherwise.
• Challenge: A outputs the challenge identity w∗ such that |w∗ ∩ w˜| < d, two equal
length messages (m0,m1) on which it wishes to be challenged. R sends w
∗ to the
challenger and receives a ciphertext
U∗ = 〈EncryptΠw∗1 (c∗1; r1)....Encrypt
Π
w∗n
(c∗n; rn)〉 and ri ∈ COIN. R picks a random
V ∗ ∈ {0, 1}l2 and returns A the ciphertext (U∗, V ∗).
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′.
After A outputs its guess b′, R checks the HList for (c,m,wj) such that w
∗
j ∈ w∗ for
at least one feature of w∗ or GList for c and returns c to his challenger.
Similar to the computation of the reduction cost presented in [Yang et al., 2006], we
first define the following three events:
1. Pr[SuccA] the event that A wins the IND-ID-CCA game.
2. Let Ask be the event that algorithm A issues either the hash query G(c) or
issues at least one hash query H(c, ∗, w′j) for w′j ∈ w at some point during the
simulation. Here, ∗ denotes any l2-bit string.
3. Let Fail to be the event that R fails to answer a decryption query correctly at
some point during the game, which can occur only when A submits a decryption
query (w,U, V ), where U = {Uj : wj ∈ w} = {EncryptΠwj(cj;H(c,m,wj)) : wj ∈
w, cj ∈ c} without asking G(c) or H(c,m,wj) for at least d features of w. For the
first case, R fails to properly answer each such decryption query with probability
at most 2−l2 . And for the second case with probability at most γd. Thus, due to
the qD decryption queries, we have Pr[¬Fail] ≤ (1−γd− 12l2 )qD ≈ 1− qD(γd+ 12l2 )
Then, similar to [Yang et al., 2006]
Pr[SuccA|¬Fail]Pr[¬Fail] ≥ ǫ′(l) + 1
2
−Pr[Fail]
Since Pr[SuccA|¬Fail,¬Ask] = 1
2
, we also have












)· Pr[¬Fail]≥ ǫ′(l) + 1
2
−Pr[Fail]







(2ǫ′(l)− (1− (1− qD(γd + 12l2 ))))
≃ 1
qH+qG
(2ǫ′(l)− dqDγ − qD2l2 )
R’s running time is computed as in [Yang et al., 2006]. First, we consider that R has
to run the encryption algorithm of Π at most l1qH times. By adding the time that is
required by A we obtain t(l) = O(t′(l) + τ l1qH).
Next, we show that our generic construction preserves the anonymity of the underlying
encryption scheme. In this proof, we play the standard game for anonymity, namely,
the game for IBE-RA-CPA/IBE-RA-CCA as described in 7.4. An alternative proof can
also be described by playing the game of IBE-RA-RE-CPA/IBE-RA-RE-CCA and apply
Lemma 7.1. Since the generic construction outputs an IND-ID-CCA secure IBE scheme,
it is enough to prove that the generic construction guarantees the notion of IBE-RA-
RE-CCA. Again for better readibility of the proof, we do not consider collision attacks
on the biometrics at this stage, although in section 7.5.2, we replace the biometric w
with the collision resistant biometrics BID.
Theorem 7.2. Let Π be a γ-uniform anonymous IBE scheme with negligable γ. Sup-
pose that the hash functions H,G are random oracles and let A be an IBE-RA-CCA
adversary which has advantage ǫ′(l) against anonymous Π′ and it runs in time at most
t′(l). Suppose A makes at most qH H-queries, qG G-queries, qE Extraction queries
and qD Decryption queries. Suppose that encrypting one message needs time τ . Then
there is an IBE-RA-CPA adversary R against anonymous Π which has running time










Proof. Given an IBE-RA-CCA secure anonymous Π′, the goal of the reduction algorithm
R is to distinguish the identity of the IBE-RA-CPA secure anonymous Π scheme using
an adversary A running against Π′.
The challenger of R outputs the public parameters of Π, which is passed to the adver-
sary A in order to simulate the setup phase of Π′.
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R answers the random oracle and decryption queries of A as follows.
• H-queries: Identical to the proof of theorem 7.1.
• G-queries: Identical to the proof of theorem 7.1.
• Private Key Extraction queries: Identical to the proof of theorem 7.1.
• Decryption queries: Identical to the proof of theorem 7.1.
• Challenge: A outputs the challenge identities w0, w1 such that |wb ∩ w˜| < d and
|w0 ∩ w1| < d for b ∈ {0, 1} and a message m. R picks a random codeword
c and sends (w0, w1, c) to the challenger and receives a ciphertext U∗. Here,
U∗ = {Uj : wbj ∈ wb} = {EncryptΠwbj (cj; rj) : w
b
j ∈ wb} and rj ∈ COIN. R simulates
the G oracle on input c and obtains g = G(c), and returns A the ciphertext
(U∗, g ⊕m). Four sorts of queries are answered as the same as before.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′.
After the challenge query has been issued, if the adversary A makes H-oracle queries
on either (c,m,w0j ) or (c,m,w
1
j ) for at least one feature of w
b, R outputs b′ = 0 or
b′ = 1, respectively, as its guess for the value of the bit b. If neither hash query is made,
then R returns the same bit b′ that A outputs to his challenger. R wins if b′ = b.
We should note that if we play the IBE-RA-RE-CPA/ IBE-RA-RE-CCA game, then the
challenge phase of the proof slightly changes. Specifically, A outputs only the challenge
identities to be given to R, similarly, R obtains from his challenger an encryption of a
random codeword, instead of the codeword c that R has picked at random.
The analysis of the reduction cost is similar to the analysis presented in [Fujisaki and
Okamoto, 1999, Kitagawa et al., 2006, Paterson and Srinivasan, 2008]. Let Pr[SuccA]
be the probability that adversary A outputs a bit b′ = b. Similarly, let Pr[SuccR] be
the probability that the reduction R outputs a bit b′ = b. Let Askb be the event that
algorithm A issues at least one query H(c,m,wbj) for w
b
j ∈ wb and let Askb¯ be the event
that algorithm A issues at least one query H(c,m,wb¯j) for w
b¯
j ∈ wb¯ at some point during
the simulation.
Pr[SuccA] = Pr[SuccA|Askb]Pr[Askb]
+ Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯] Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯]
+ Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Askb¯)] Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Askb¯)]
Similarly,
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Pr[SuccR] = Pr[SuccR|Askb] Pr[Askb]
+ Pr[SuccR|(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯] Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯]
+ Pr[SuccR|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Askb¯)] Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Askb¯)]
From the conditions of the simulation,
Pr[SuccR|Askb]=1,Pr[SuccR|(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯] =0,
Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Askb¯)] =Pr[SuccR|(¬Askb) ∧ (¬Askb¯)]
Therefore,
Pr[SuccR]-Pr[SuccA] = Pr[Askb](1- Pr[SuccA|(Askb])
+ Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯](0-Pr[SuccA|(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯])
≥ - Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯]
Since, even a computationally unbounded adversary has no information about what
the string c (which is uniformly distributed on a set of size 2l1) and our adversary
makes at most qH queries to the H-oracle, we have
Pr[(¬Askb) ∧ Askb¯] ≤ qH2l1 . Hence,





As before, let Fail to be the event that R fails to answer a decryption query correctly at
some point during the game, which can occur only when A submits a decryption query
(w,U, V ), where U = {Uj : wj ∈ w} = {EncryptΠwj(cj;H(c,m,wj)) : wj ∈ w, cj ∈ c}
without asking G(c) or H(c,m,wj) for at least d features of w. For the first case,
R fails to properly answer each such decryption query with probability at most 2−l2 .
And for the second case with probability at most γd. Thus, due to the qD decryption
queries, we have Pr[¬Fail] ≤ (1− γd − 1
2l2
)qD ≈ 1− qD(γd + 12l2 )
Hence, we have,




)(1− qD(γd + 12l2 ))− 1.
7.5.2 Collision Attacks
As described in section 6.2.6 of the previous chapter, we can use our new method to
prevent collision attacks so that different users cannot collude in order to decrypt a
ciphertext that should only be decrypted by the real receiver. We note that the method
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presented in [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Baek et al., 2007] is not applicable to different
fuzzy/biometric IBE systems designed for non-pairing-based cryptographic techniques.
In the biometric cryptosystems such as BIO-IBS [Burnett et al., 2007], the fixed length
binary string b is computed using the feature vector and the hash of b is used as the
identity ID. Specifically, we use the robust fuzzy extractor to obtain a unique biometric
string ID via error correction codes from the biometric template b of the user in such
a way that an error tolerance t is allowed. In other words, we will obtain the same
biometric string ID even if the fuzzy extractor is applied on a different b′ such that
disH (b,b’)< t. Here, dis() is the distance metric used to measure the variation in the
biometric reading and t is the error tolerance parameter of the fuzzy extractor.
In the anonymous fuzzy IBE scheme of [van Liesdonk, 2007], collusion attacks are
avoided by combining each biometric feature wi with the identity (i.e. Name,e-mail) of
the user. However, this approach is against the nature of fuzzy IBE, where the identities
should only consist of the biometric data of the user. Besides, identity privacy is not
satisfied despite the anonymity of the scheme. One can correct this fuzzy IBE scheme
by using BID = 〈H1(w1, ID), ..., H1(wn, ID)〉 in the key generation phase. This way,
the privacy of biometric-identity relation and the resistance against collusion attacks
is maintained. We can combine an ordered feature set w and a unique biometric string
obtained from the same/different biometric trait. For instance, we can combine face +
iris, where face can described as a set of ordered features and iris can be represented as
a 2048 bit string which is already combined with error correction procedures in secure
sketch/fuzzy extraction applications in order to have improved accuracy [Bringer et al.,
2007a]. Hence, a multi-modal approach for preventing collision attacks has also benefits
in security and identification of the users during key generation process. As before, we
note that the computation of ID is performed only once and for all.
Based on our generic construction for the error-tolerant setting, we present an anony-
mous IND-ID-CCA secure application Π′ = (Setup′,Extract′,Encrypt′,Decrypt′) that
prevents collision attacks as follows. Here c ∈ C denotes a random codeword and
Π = (Setup,Extract,Encrypt,Decrypt) is an IND-ID-CPA secure anonymous IBE scheme
that encrypts a message bit by bit such as [Boneh et al., 2007, Ateniese and Gasti,
2009]. Finally, BID denotes the combined feature vector of the user biometrics that is
generated based on our new method presented before. Finally, the only difference to
our generic construction for error tolerant setting is the replacement of the biometric
feature vector w with the collision resistant biometric vector BID.
• Setup′: The same as Π′ except for an additional fuzzy extractor scheme that is
included to the public parameters to avoid collision attacks.
• Extract′: The same as Π′ except that each secret key component of the user
is computed for the combined biometric features BIDj= H1(wj, ID) as in Sarier
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[2008, 2011b] to avoid collision attacks. Here ID can also be extracted from a
different biometric trait (i.e. not necessarily from w).
• Encrypt′: A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the combined biometric
feature vector BID′, Encrypt algorithm of the Π scheme, a message m ∈M and a
random codeword c ∈ C, outputs the ciphertext






encrypts the message (i.e. the codeword c) bit by bit
















• Decrypt′: The same as Π′. The only difference is the computation of H(c,m,wi)
is replaced by H(c,m,BIDi) before the reencryption due to our new method for
biometric identity generation to avoid collision attacks.
By replacing the biometrics w with collision resistant biometrics BID, we uniquely bind
each feature of w to the user, thus avoid collision attacks. The proofs remain identitical
and the binding procedure is performed by the encryptor only once and for all.
7.5.3 Based on REACT
As it is noted in [Okamoto and Pointcheval, 2001], Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation
converts any one-way cryptosystem into a CCA secure encryption scheme, but it is not
optimal due to the re-encryption operation during the decryption phase. In [Okamoto
and Pointcheval, 2001], an efficient and IND-CCA secure generic conversion scheme with
a tight reduction cost is presented, which takes as input a OW-PCA secure encryption
scheme and avoids the disadvantages of FO transformation via
εhy(m;R) = 〈AEpk(R)||SEG(R)(m)||H(R,m,AEpk(R), SEG(R)(m))〉
Similar to FO conversion, REACT is also implemented for IBE in [Kitagawa et al.,
2006]. When used in biometric IBE setting, one should modify REACT for IBE as
〈U, V, Y 〉 = 〈EncryptΠw′(c), G(c)⊕m,H(c,m, U, V )〉
Thus, the only difference to the FO transformation adapted to the error-tolerant setting
occurs in the decryption stage where only one hash computation, i.e. H(c,m, U, V )
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• G-queries: On each new input c, R picks a random g from the range of G, returns
g to A and inserts the tuple (c, g) to the GList.
• H-queries: On each new input (c,m, U, V ), R picks a random h from the range
of H, returns h to A and inserts the tuple (c,m, U, V, h) to the HList.
• Private Key Extraction queries: For any identity w˜, the extraction query is passed
to the challenger of R and his answer is returned to A.
• Decryption queries: Let (w,U, V, Y ) be a decryption query issued byA. R responds
as follows:
1. R picks up a tuple (c,m, U, V, h) from the HList such that Y = h.
2. R computes G(c)⊕m and checks if V = G(c)⊕m. If this holds, R queries
(w, c, U) to the PC (plaintext checking) oracle.
3. If the PC oracle answers “yes”, R returns m to A. Otherwise, R outputs
“reject”.
As opposed to the previous proof, here, we do not consider error-tolerance for
some of the components of the ciphertext, as the decryption oracle checks first
whether the hash of all the components that form the ciphertext is queried to the
H-oracle. If this tuple is not found in HList, the query is rejected. Due to this
property, the proof is the same as the original proof of REACT, as in [Okamoto
and Pointcheval, 2001, Kitagawa et al., 2006]. The probability that A comes
with a valid ciphertext without querying the H-oracle is 2−l2 and similarly, the
probability that A comes with a valid ciphertext without querying the G-oracle
is 2−l5 .
• Challenge: A outputs a challenge identity w∗ such that |w∗ ∩ w˜| < d and two
messages on which it wishes to be challenged. R sends w∗ to the challenger and
receives a ciphertext U∗ encrypted using w∗. Next, R generates a l2-bit random
string V ∗ and a l5-bit random string Y
∗, which are all returned to A. Four sorts
of queries are answered as the same as before.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′.
After A outputs its guess b′, R picks all c’s which appear in tuples on the Glist and
the Hlist. For each c, R queries (w∗, c, U∗) to PC oracle. If PC oracle returns ’yes’, R
outputs the c as the answer of OW-ID-PCA game.
The advantage of R is identical to the computation described in [Kitagawa et al., 2006],
i.e. ǫ(l) ≥ 2ǫ′(l)− qD( 12l2 + 12l5 ).
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In order to prove that our generic construction preserves anonymity, we should simply
modify the challenge phase of the proof similar to the proof presented in [Zhang et al.,
2007] as below.
Challenge: A outputs a message m and the challenge identities w0, w1 such that |wb ∩
w˜| < d and |w0 ∩ w1| < d for b ∈ {0, 1}. R picks a random codeword c∗ and sends
(w0, w1, c∗) to the challenger and receives a ciphertext U∗. Here, U∗ = {Uj : wbj ∈
wb} = {EncryptΠwbj (c
∗) : wbj ∈ wb}. R simulates the G oracle on input c and obtains
g = G(c∗), and returns A the ciphertext (U∗, g⊕m,h), where h = H(c∗,m, U∗, g⊕m)
by simulating the H oracle. Finally, when A stops and outputs a bit b, R also outputs
the same bit.
The advantage of R is identical to the computation described in [Zhang et al., 2007], we
review it briefly as below. From the above description, Rmay reject a correct ciphertext
query. Denote this event as Fail1, which happens with probability (2−l2)q1 + (2−l5)qD ,
where q1 and qD is the number of G-oracle queries and decryption queries, respectively.
Additionally, R may fail when R is queried on c∗ within G-oracle queries. Denote this
event as Fail2, which happens with probability at most (2−l2)q1 . Furthermore, denote
the event R fails in the simulation as FailR. We know if R does not fail,A’s advantage
is at most ǫ′(l). Denoting the advantage of R as ǫ(l), we have
ǫ(l) = ǫ′(l)Pr[¬(FailR]= ǫ′(l)Pr[¬(Fail1 ∧ Fail2)]≥ ǫ′(l)−Pr[Fail1] - Pr[Fail2].
As a result, ǫ′(l) ≤ q12−l2 + qD2−l5 .
Again, collision attacks should be avoided by our new method as before, namely by
replacing the w with the biometric identity BID as in the previous constructions.
7.6 A Generic Biometric ID-KEM Construction
A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) consists of three algorithms: Key genera-
tion, encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms, where a KEM outputs a random
session key to be used by the Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM) in the sym-
metric encryption in order to achieve efficient encryption of long messages. Current
identity-based KEM’s [Bentahar et al., 2008] are not suitable for error prone identities,
thus we present a generic construction for a biometric ID-KEM Π′=(Setup′,Extract′,
Enc′,Dec′) that takes any IBE scheme Π=(Setup,Extract, Encrypt,Decrypt) that en-
crypts a message bit by bit. Here, H, and G denote cryptographic hash functions with
H : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l1 and G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l2 .
• Setup′: The same Setup algorithm of Π except for the two additional hash func-
tions H and G.
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• Extract′: The same Extract algorithm of Π.
• Enc′: This algorithm takes as input a biometric vector w′, Encrypt algorithm of
Π, a random codeword c ∈ C, it returns 〈U,K〉 = 〈EncryptΠw′(c;H(c, w)), G(c)〉.
As before, the encryption is performed bit by bit EncryptΠw′(c;H(c, w))
= EncryptΠw′1(c1;H(c, w1)), ...,Encrypt
Π
w′n
(cn;H(c, wn)). Here, K = G(c) ∈ KID-KEM
is an encapsulation key from the key space of the ID-KEM, which is used as input
to a DEM for the encryption of the actual message.
• Dec′: A deterministic algorithm that given the private key Dw of the Decrypt
algorithm, an error correcting procedure ECC() and a ciphertext (U) encrypted
with w′ such that d ≤ |w ∩ w′|, it computes c′ = DecryptΠw(U) by decrypting
bit by bit and corrects the error via c=ECC(c′). Finally, by computing H(c, wi)
and using it in reencryption, the correctness is checked for at least d encryptions
(since |w ∩ w′| ≥ d) and the algorithm returns either the encapsulated key G(c),
else ⊥ is returned.
The security of a biometric ID-KEM is defined identical to the definition given in
[Bentahar et al., 2008] using the following game between an adversary and a challenger.
Experiment IND-ID-CCA(l, ID-KEM, A)
(params,ms)←Setup(l)





b′ ← AO2 (w∗, U∗, s,Kb)
If b′ = b return 1 else return 0
The advantage of the attacker A = (A1, A2) is Adv
IND-ID-CCA
A,ID-KEM = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |. Hence,
a biometric ID-KEM is IND-ID-CCA secure if the advantage of A is negligible in the
security parameter l. Here O represents the oracles that A has access to, the private
key extraction and decapsulation oracles.
Theorem 7.4. Let Π be a γ-uniform anonymous IBE scheme with negligable γ. Sup-
pose that the hash functions H,G are random oracles and let A be an IND-ID-CCA
adversary which has advantage ǫ′(l) against anonymous ID-KEM. Suppose A makes at
most q1 H-queries, q2 G-queries,qE Extraction queries and qD Decapsulation queries.
Then there is an OW-ID-CPA adversary R against anonymous Π which has advantage
at least ǫ′(l) ≥ 2ǫ(l)
q1+qD
− dqDγ.
Proof. Given an IND-ID-CCA secure anonymous biometric ID-KEM, the goal of the
reduction algorithm R is to invert the OW-ID-CPA secure anonymous IBE scheme
using an adversary A running against ID-KEM.
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The challenger of R outputs the public parameters of IBE, which is passed to the
adversary A in order to simulate the setup phase of ID-KEM.
A responds with the challenge biometric identity w∗, which is relayed to the challenger
of R, which returns the encryption U∗ of a random message c∗ ∈ C encrypted with
w∗. R outputs U∗ together with a random key K0 to simulate the challenge phase of
ID-KEM and answers the random oracle and decapsulation queries of A as follows.
1. H-queries: On each new input (c, wj), R picks random h and g from the ranges




the tuple (c, Uj, h) to the HList and and (c, g) to the GList.
2. G-queries: On each new input (c), R returns a random g and adds the tuple (c, g)
to the GList.
3. Private Key Extraction queries: For any identity w, the extraction query is passed
to the challenger of R.
4. Decapsulation queries: On each new input (w,U),
• If |w ∩ w∗| < d, R runs the private key extraction oracle and answers A as
the real decapsulation oracle would.
• If |w ∩ w∗| ≥ d, R checks EncryptΠw(c;H(c, w)) = U . Since the encryption is
performed bit by bit, we actually check whether at least d values of the set
〈EncryptΠw1(c1;H(c, w1)), ...,EncryptΠwn(cn;H(c, wn))〉 is found in the HList.
If we can find at least d such values, the check is successful, then R returns
H2(c). If not, R returns reject.
Finally, A outputs its guess b′. R will pick at random an entry from HList or GList
and returns this to the challenger.
Let Fail to be the event that R fails to answer a decapsulation query correctly at some
point during the game, which can occur only when A submits a decryption query
(w,U), where U = {Uj : wj ∈ w} = {EncryptΠwj(cj;H(c, wj)) : wj ∈ w cj ∈ c} without
asking H(c, wj) for at least d features of w. R fails to properly answer each such
decryption query with probability at most γd. Thus, due to the qD decryption queries,
we have Pr[¬Fail] ≤ (1 − γd)qD ≈ 1 − qD(γd). Similar to the previous constructions,
we use our new method to prevent collision attacks by replacing w with the biometric
identity BID, which is resistant to collision attacks.
As we can se, this ID-KEM construction corresponds to the first part of the FO con-
version without the message m, thus, if the underlying IBE scheme is anonymous, we
obtain also an CCA secure and anonymous ID-KEM. The proof is identical (except we
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remove the message m and the oracle corresponding to the second part of the FO con-
version) to our first generic construction based on FO conversion. To avoid repetition,
we leave the details to the reader.
7.7 Applications
In this section, we present two concrete instantiations based on the anonymous IBE
schemes of [Boneh et al., 2007, Ateniese and Gasti, 2009], which do not require bilinear
pairings and encrypt a message bit by bit. Thus, they could be used as an input to
our generic constructions with the following modifications to avoid collusion attacks.
7.7.1 Based on the scheme of Boneh et al.
The first space efficient IBE scheme AnonIBE is introduced in [Boneh et al., 2007], which
is IND-ID-CPA secure in the standard model based on the difficulty of the Interactive
Quadratic Residuosity (IQR) problem and the encryption of a n-bit message results in
a single element in ZN plus n + 1 additional bits. Here, N denotes a RSA composite.
First, we briefly review the scheme AnonIBE and its main components, the reader is
referred to [Boneh et al., 2007] for the details.
Definition 7.2. Let Q′be a deterministic algorithm that takes as input (N, u,R, S)
where N ∈ Z+ and u,R, S ∈ ZN . The algorithm outputs polynomials f, f¯ , g, τ ∈ ZN [x].
We say that Q′ is Enhanced IBE Compatible if the following conditions hold [Boneh
et al., 2007]:
• (Condition 1a) If R and S are quadratic residues, then f(r)g(s) is also a quadratic
residue for all square roots r of R and s of S.
• (Condition 1b) If uR and S are quadratic residues, then f¯(r¯)g(s)τ(s) is also a
quadratic residue for all square roots r¯ of uR and s of S.
• (Condition 2a) If R is a quadratic residue, then f(r)f(−r)S is also a quadratic
residue for all square roots r of R.
• (Condition 2b) If uR is a quadratic residue, then f¯(r¯)f¯(−r¯)S is also a quadratic
residue for all square roots r¯ of uR.
• (Condition 2c) If S is a quadratic residue, then τ(s)τ(−s)u is also a quadratic
residue for all square roots s of S.
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• (Condition 3) τ is independent of R, that is, Q′(N, u,R1, S) and Q′(N, u,R2, S)
produce the same τ for all N, u,R1, R2, S.
An example for Enhanced IBE Compatible Q′ is given in [Boneh et al., 2007].
The authors define an efficient anonymous IBE scheme AnonIBE using the Enhanced
IBE Compatible Q′ as follows.
• Setup: Generate two primes (p, q) and compute N = pq, where N is a RSA
composite. Select a random u
R← J(N)/QR(N). Here, J(N) denotes the set
{x ∈ ZN : ( xN ) = 1}, where ( xN ) is the Jacobi symbol of x in ZN . Also, QR(N)
is the set of quadratic residues in J(N). The public parameters are params =
(N, u,H), where H is a hash function H : ID × [1, n]→ J(N). The master key
is msk = (p, q,K), namely the factorization of N together with a random key K
for a pseudorandom function FK : ID × [1, n]→ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
• Extract: It takes as input msk, an identity ID and a message length parameter n.
The algorithm outputs a private key DID = (r1, ..., rn) for decrypting encryptions
of n-bit messages as follows. For j= 1,...,n do:
1. Rj ← H(ID, j) ∈ J(N) and t← FK(ID, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
2. let a ∈ {0, 1} such that uaRj ∈QR(N)
3. let z0, z1, z2, z3 be the four square roots of u
aRj ∈ ZN and set rj ← zt
• Encrypt: The encryption algorithm that takes as input the identity ID of the
receiver, params and a message m = m1...mn ∈ {−1,+1}n. It generates a
random s ∈ ZN and sets S ← s2 mod N . Then, Q′(N, u, 1, S) is computed to
obtain the polynomial τ and k ← ( τ(s)
N
). Here, Q′ is a deterministic algorithm
that satisfies the properties listed above and we run Q′ with inputs (N, u,Rj , S)
for j = 1, ..., n, N ∈ Z+, and u,Rj , S ∈ ZN .
Specifically, for j = 1, ..., n do:
1. Compute Rj ← H(ID, j) and run Q′(N, u,Rj , S) to obtain gj
2. Compute ej = mj · ( gj(s)N )
The ciphertext is U = (S, k, e), where e = e1...en.
• Decrypt: The decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext U and the pri-
vate key DID = (r1, ..., rn) and recovers m
′ = m′1...m
′
n as follows. For j = 1, ..., n,
set Rj ← H(ID, j) and run Q′(N, u,Rj , S) to obtain fj, f¯j
If r2j = Rj set mj ← ej · (fj(rj)N ), else if r2j = uRj set mj ← ej · k · ( f¯j(rj)N )
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In order to prevent collision attacks, we slightly modify AnonIBE using our method,
where we take the biometric identity as BID = (BID1, ...,BIDn) = (w1||ID, ..., wn||ID)
instead of the ID and thus, we use H(wj, ID) in place of H(ID, j) for j = 1, ..., n. Since
the features wj ∈ U are ordered, w1 represents j = 1, w2 represents j = 2, etc. for
the particular biometric identity string ID. Since we need to encrypt (or encapsulate)
a random codeword c in our generic constructions, the message m that is encrypted
in AnonIBE becomes m = c. This way, we obtain the following IND-ID-CPA biometric
IBE scheme, which is also anonymous if implemented for ordered biometrics.
1. Setup: The same as AnonIBE except for the hash function H, which is taken as
H : BID → J(N), where BID = U× ID. We assume that the features wj ∈ U
are ordered as in [Li et al., 2006, Sutcu et al., 2007, Chang et al., 2006]. The
master key is msk = (p, q,K), namely the factorization of N together with a
random key K for a pseudorandom function FK : U× ID → {0, 1, 2, 3}.
2. Extract: It takes as input msk, a biometric vector w with length n. The algo-
rithm outputs a private key for biometric identity BID as DBID = (r1, ..., rn) for
decrypting encryptions of n-bit messages as follows. For j= 1,...,n do:
• Rj ← H(wj, ID )∈ J(N) and t← FK (wj, ID)∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
• let a ∈ {0, 1} such that uaRj ∈QR(N).
• let z0, z1, z2, z3 be the four square roots of uaRj ∈ ZN and set rj ← zt.
3. Encrypt: The encryption algorithm that takes as input (collision resistant) bio-
metrics BID′ of the receiver, params and a codeword c = c1...cn ∈ C. It generates
a random s ∈ ZN and sets S ← s2 mod N . Then, Q′(N, u, 1, S) is computed to
obtain the polynomial τ and k ← ( τ(s)
N
). Here, Q′ is a deterministic algorithm
that satisfies some properties [Boneh et al., 2007] and takes as inputs (N, u,Rj , S),
where N ∈ Z+, and u,Rj, S ∈ ZN . It outputs polynomials fj, f¯j , gj, τ ∈ ZN [x].
Finally, for j = 1, ..., n do:
• Compute Rj ← H( wj, ID) and run Q′(N, u,Rj , S) to obtain gj.
• Compute ej = cj · ( gj(s)N ).
The ciphertext is U = (S, k, e), where e = e1...en.
4. Decrypt: The decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext U and the pri-
vate key DBID = (r1, ..., rn) and recovers c = c1...cn as follows. For j = 1, ..., n,
set Rj ← H(wj,ID) and run Q′(N, u,Rj , S) to obtain fj, f¯j
If r2j = Rj set cj ← ej · (fj(rj)N ), else if r2j = uRj set cj ← ej · k · ( f¯j(rj)N ).
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As noted before, the security of the Anonymous IBE depends on the difficulty of the
interactive quadratic residuosity (IQR) problem in the standard model and QR problem
in ROM. The encryption of a binary string results as a ciphertext of size log2N +n+1,
where N is a RSA modulus and n is length of c and BID. For simplicity, we assume
that the length of the codeword c and the size of the biometric feature set w is equal.
Since we cannot change the message size (i.e. the codeword), we have to adapt the
identity, if |w| ≤ |c|. For this, we can apply the solutions discussed in remark 7.1.
Since the modified scheme is also secure in the sense of IND-ID-CPA, it is input to one
of our generic constructions to obtain either an IND-ID-CCA secure encryption scheme
or an IND-ID-CCA secure KEM.
The main drawback of the scheme of [Boneh et al., 2007] is its inefficiency since the
complexity is quartic in the security parameter. Recently, Ateniese and Gasti [Ateniese
and Gasti, 2009] proposed an efficient and universally anonymous IBE scheme based
on the QR assumption in the ROM. Similar to the modification presented above, if
the key generation of the scheme in [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] is adapted for biometric
identities, we are able to integrate this modified IBE scheme into one of our generic
constructions.
7.7.2 Based on the scheme of Ateniese et al.
The second application of our generic construction is based on the scheme of [Ateniese
and Gasti, 2009], whose security relies on the QR assumption in the ROM. Similar to
the scheme of [Boneh et al., 2007], an n-bit message (i.e. codeword c) is encrypted
bit by bit resulting in a ciphertext of 2n(120+1024) bits if necessary optimizations
suggested in [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] are applied. Thus, it could be used as an input
to our generic constructions with the following modifications to avoid collision attacks.
Let us first review briefly the basic scheme, the reader is referred for the details to
[Ateniese and Gasti, 2009].
• Setup: LetH be a full domain hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N [+1], where Z∗N [+1]
denotes the set of elements in Z∗N with Jacobi symbol +1, k0and k security pa-
rameters (e.g., k0 = 1024 and k = 128). Generate two primes (p, q) and compute
N = pq, where N is a k0-bit Blum integer and p, q are two k0/2-bit primes each
congruent to 3 modulo 4. The public parameters are params = (N,H) and the
master secret key is msk = (p, q).
• Extract: It takes as input msk, and an identity ID. The algorithm outputs
a private key DID = r by computing a ← H(ID). Thus, the jacobi symbol
( a
N
) = +1. r ∈ Z∗N is chosen such that r2 ≡ a mod N or r2 ≡ −a mod N .
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• Encrypt: The encryption algorithm that takes as input ID of the receiver, params
and a bit mj ∈ {−1,+1} since we encrypt the message m bit by bit, namely for
each bit mj ∈ {−1,+1} we do the following. For j = 1, ..., n,
– choose at random tj, vj ∈ Z∗N such that ( tjN ) = (vjN ) = mj.
– compute (fj, gj) = (tj +
a
tj
, vj − avj ) and select random Tj , Vj ∈ Z∗N and set
Z1j = fj + Tj,Z
2
j = gj + Vj
– mask the ciphertext using one of the constructions in [Ateniese and Gasti,
2009].
The encryptor sends the ciphertext (Z1j , T
1
j , ..., T
k




j , ..., V
k
j )
• Decrypt: On input the ciphertext and DID, first the recipient derives the intended
ciphertext. For j = 1, ..., n, the receiver computes
– One of the two tuples (Z1j , T
1
j , ..., T
k




j , ..., V
k
j ) is discarded based on
whether a or −a is a square. Lets assume we keep the tuple (Z1j , T 1j , ..., T kj )
and discard the other.
– In order to decrypt, find the smallest index 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that GT (a, Z1j −
T ij , N) = +1. Here GT (·) denotes the Galbarith’s test, which is defined over













– we run the same procedure above if the second tuple is selected and the first
tuple is discarded by replacing a with −a, Z1j with Z2j , and T ij with V ij .
In order to prevent collision attacks and due to the structure of our biometric identity,
we encrypt each bit of the message (i.e. codeword c), which is n bits long, using the
biometric identity vector of size n. Specifically, the identity a = H(ID) that is used
to encrypt a single bit mj is replaced by aj = H(wj, ID) for encrypting each bit mj of
the message individually. As opposed to our modified scheme based on [Boneh et al.,
2007], the difference between the number of features and the message size does not cause
any problem as the message size is not a fixed parameter of the scheme of [Ateniese
and Gasti, 2009]. Since each bit of the message is encrypted individually without
depending on a fixed message size parameter, if the size of the biometric feature set is
less than the size of the message (i.e. the codeword), the remaining bits of the message
are individually encrypted by starting again from the first feature till the message is
completed.
Remark 7.2. In [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009], the authors suggest the use of a function
G : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N , which is modeled as a random oracle that maps a uniformly random
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e-bit string α to a random value in Z∗N . The parameter e must be large enough, e.g.,
e = 160. G is used to expand a short seed α into a value selected uniformly and
independently in Z∗N . Thus, for the encryption of the bit mj, a single short seed αj
R←
{0, 1}e (and βj R← {0, 1}e) plus a counter to generate all values T ij ’s (and V ij ’s) is
required. This first solution would provide minimal ciphertext expansion, since only
the seed αj must be sent for the encryption of each bit. However, this solution is
computationally expensive, hence, the authors suggest a second efficient variant, where
for each plaintext, the sender selects a random message identifier MIDm which is sent
along with the ciphertext. Also a new global parameter l which is a small positive










j , ..., β
l
j)
where αij , β
i
j ∈ {0, 1}e, when i < l and αlj, βlj ∈ {0, 1}e′ for some e′ > e. The intended
ciphertext is derived by the recipient by computing:
T ij = G(MIDm||0||αij||i||j) or V ij = G(MIDm||1||βij||i||j) for i < l
T ij = G(MIDm||0||αij||i||j) or V ij = G(MIDm||1||βij||i||j) for i ≥ l
7.8 Comparison
To show the efficiency of our constructions, we will compare our results to the existing
IND-CPA secure fuzzy IBE schemes secure in the ROM. In [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009],
the authors implement different anonymous IBE schemes to present the average times
of encryption of a short session key. Using these values presented in [Ateniese and
Gasti, 2009], we compare our results to any pairing based fuzzy IBE system in Table
7.1. For simplicity, we use different variables to represent the approximate times, where
x and y denote the encryption and decryption times for Boneh-Franklin IBE [Boneh
and Franklin, 2003] scheme implemented for a unique identity such as an e-mail address.
Specifically, x is the time to compute two exponentiations within their respective groups
if the bilinear pairing is precomputed and y is the time for one pairing computation,
which is the dominant operation in terms of computation cost. For fuzzy IBE systems,
since the identity is represented as a set of features of size n with 20 < n < 100
depending on the biometric modality, the required times are computed as multiples of
x and y. When compared to the exact times of the scheme [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009]
that we implement for our generic construction, the encryption of a message of the
same size requires approximately 4x, whereas the decryption time is again y. Here, k
is the size of the message, d is the error tolerance parameter, which can be 10 < n < 50
depending on the biometric modality. The only disadvantage of this system is the large
bandwidth due to the bit by bit encryption, which we analyze in table 7.2. For this,
we compare the bandwidth required for pairing based fuzzy IBE systems based on a
bilinear pairing group (eˆ,G,F) such that eˆ : G ×G → F where we take the suggested
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parameters of [Galindo and Garcia, 2009] as |Zq| ≈ |G| ≥ 512 and |F| ≈ 3072. Here, we
write |G| to denote the number of bits needed to represent an element in G. Finally,
for our construction, a fuzzy extraction procedure FE for encryption and an error
correcting procedure ECC for decryption stage is required. Again, the computation of
FE is performed only once and for all. As one can note, there is a tradeoff between the
bandwidth of our two constructions and their computational efficiency.
Table 7.1: Computational Cost of various IND-CPA secure biometric IBE systems
Encryption Decryption Anonymity Multi-modal
time time Biometrics
Current Pairing based
nx dy No No
fuzzy IBE Systems†
Anonymous fuzzy IBE
ny ny Yes No
[van Liesdonk, 2007]
Our Construction‡ 4x + FE∗ y+ ECC Yes Yes
†:for biometric identities [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007, Furukawa et al., 2008];
‡:Based on the scheme of [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009];
∗: FE computed only once and for all.
Table 7.2: Ciphertext size of various biometric IBE systems
Biometric IBE Systems Bandwidth
Pairing based fuzzy IBE Systems† 2n512 + 3072 bits
Our Construction based on [Boneh et al., 2007] k +1 + 1024 bits
Our Construction based on [Ateniese and Gasti, 2009] 2k(120 + 1024) bits
n: size of the feature set; k: size of the message;
†:for biometric identities [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Pirretti et al., 2006, Baek et al., 2007, Furukawa et al., 2008, van
Liesdonk, 2007, Sarier, 2008];
7.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a new design for biometric IBE, which results in a highly
secure encryption system preserving the anonymity of the underlying encryption system
if implemented for ordered biometrics. In addition to reduced computational costs, the
security of our design could be based on stronger (standard) assumptions as opposed to
the current fuzzy IBE systems. We note that our system is only designed for biometric
applications, however, an interesting future work could be the design of a different
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method for preventing collision attacks for IBE systems without depending on pairings,




In this thesis, we focused on biometric cryptosystems that are designed according
to a realistic security model and that provide a security reduction to guarantee the
security notions of this model. Unfortunately, we noticed that very few biometric
cryptosystems in the fields of remote authentication, encryption and signature are
evaluated from a cryptographic point of view. We start by analyzing the distributed
remote authentication schemes in the literature and show that almost all of these
schemes have a different security gap despite the security reductions they provide.
This is actually due to an inherent weakness in these constructions that require a
secure sketch for improved accuracy; the sketch itself leak information to the internal
adversaries. We show that the security notions, in particular identity privacy notion
cannot be guaranteed if the sketch is stored either in a public database or as encrypted
at the server-side, where the components of the server-side are assumed to be malicious
in this model. However, if the error-correction procedure is performed at the client
side in the setting of a two factor authentication or at least the helper data is stored
secretly in the user’s smartcard, then the security notions can be achieved for the
current protocols.
Generally, for biometric remote authentication, simultaneous attacks against the bio-
metric system can only be prevented by multi-factor solutions. To achieve this goal,
we combine basic cryptographic primitives such as homomorphic encryption and zero-
knowledge proofs with a tamper-proof smartcard that stores the cancelable biometric
transformation parameters. As we pointed out, the concept of “Encryption with Equal-
ity Testing” (EET) enables the server to make the authentication decision without using
any decryption key. Gap Diffie Hellman groups give rise to a natural application of
EET, which we already implemented before the actual introduction of the concept.
The second part of the thesis is devoted to the design of biometric IBE/IBS systems in
a stronger security model achieving better efficiency. The main problem with current
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fuzzy IBE systems is that they all require the same key generation technique for bind-
ing the biometric features to the user, which allows for a limited number of protocols,
whose security is based on stronger (bilinear) assumptions. However, by simply binding
the biometric features using a fuzzy-extracted identity string -either from the same or
a different biometric trait of the user-, a wider class of IBE systems become applicable
for biometric identities. The outcome of this tweak was tremendous as it made the
constructions rest on IBE schemes without bilinear pairings, and consequently led to
more efficient biometric IBE schemes with much smaller decryption cost. For particular
biometric modalities, our generic constructions based on error-correcting codes, con-
version schemes and weakly secure anonymous IBE schemes preserves the anonymity
property of the underlying IBE scheme while upgrading its security.
The immediate prospect of this different key generation method is its extension to
other identity-based mechanisms/signatures, which share the various advantages of
using biometric identities as public keys. In the future, we expect new applications
of biometric cryptosystems including certificateless encryption schemes with biometric
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